Risiko, Italian identity, taxes. The government’s contradictory stance when discussing banks

There is a curious paradox within the Meloni government, one that has been evident for some time but is coming to the fore with particular force in recent days. The government, accused by the opposition of being in the pocket of the banks, is the very one that has treated them like a cash machine. And, having so vigorously defended the national interest, it now risks handing over a major bank to the French. The banking Risiko is a snapshot of this contradiction. Having used the ‘golden power’ to block Unicredit’s takeover bid for Banco BPM, with the aim of creating a third national banking hub alongside MPS, the government now finds itself faced with Crédit Agricole’s proposal to take over the bank based in Piazza Meda. Palazzo Chigi must therefore choose whether to intervene forcefully once again by using the ‘golden power’ – thereby exposing itself to further criticism from the EU – or to passively accept that a bank it sought to protect from the Italian Unicredit will end up within Crédit Agricole’s sphere of influence. The third national banking powerhouse will therefore come into being, but it will speak French, thanks to the efforts of the Meloni government.

The paradox within the paradox is that, during the previous parliamentary term, FdI sounded the alarm about French penetration of the Italian economy. The most vocal was Adolfo Urso, then chairman of Copasir, who called for a staunch defence against the invasion of the French into the Italian financial sector: Urso went so far as to criticise the Draghi government for failing to use the ‘golden power’ to prevent Crédit Agricole from acquiring a regional bank such as Credito Valtellinese. Now that they are in government, Minister Urso and his fellow FdI members are far less combative in the face of a Crédit Agricole deal involving a systemically important bank such as BPM, which is ten times larger than Creval.

But whilst the government has shown a desire to steer the market in the banking crisis – with results that are, however, far from its plans – on the fiscal front it has demonstrated a desire to squeeze it. At the parliamentary hearing on the budget, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) reported that the cost of the last three budget laws amounts to 22 billion: 15 billion in taxes under the 2025 and 2026 budget measures, to which is now added 7 billion which, as the Court of Auditors points out, derives 67 per cent of the funding for 2027 from banks and energy companies. Two out of every three euros. The IRES surcharge rises by a further 3 percentage points, bringing the rate for banks to 30.5 per cent. The deductibility for IRAP purposes of administrative expenses and depreciation – ordinary costs incurred in carrying out banking activities – is reduced from 90 per cent to 30 per cent. Added to this are tighter restrictions on the deductibility of interest expense and the deferral of past tax deductions (DTA).

Particularly problematic is the ‘Superbonus spread’, which spreads over ten years the construction tax credits due to expire next year (20.5 billion). As we reported in Il Foglio, this constitutes a default on a specific obligation of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which the Italian Banking Association (ABI) in fact describes as a ‘forced restructuring of government debt’: a measure that imposes a significant cost on creditor banks and businesses, sets a precedent that causes reputational damage to the Treasury and, paradoxically, provides no additional leeway for the budget. Finally, there is the Tobin tax. The centre-right parties had promised to abolish it but have instead quadrupled it: the government intends to double the rates once again, having already doubled them last year. This move is obviously intended to raise revenue (+1.4 billion, 2.8 billion in total), but it penalises the Italian stock market compared with other European markets and makes it more expensive to invest in Italian companies. The tax also creates an incentive to move a company’s registered office abroad: a share in a foreign company listed in Milan does not pay the Italian Tobin tax, whilst a share in an Italian company does, even if traded in London. The government claims it wants to attract capital and channel savings towards productive investments, but in doing so it discourages both.

The objections to these measures are both economic and legal, given that it is clear – as the Italian Banking Association (ABI) has suggested – that the matter will end up before the Constitutional Court, where the banks will be able to put forward sound arguments given the potential unconstitutionality of some of these levies. But the issue is also, and above all, political, and concerns the role of the opposition as well. It may well be electorally effective to portray the Meloni government as a friend of the banks, but it makes little sense to accuse it of not having done enough to target them. If anything, the problem is that it has done too much. The banking sector is one of the few sectors of the economy that has demonstrated profitability, capital strength and investment capacity in recent years. It is not a piggy bank to be smashed before Christmas to pay for the bonuses in the Budget Law, but an important part of the national economy: banks provide 1,700 billion in loans, collect and invest 2,150 billion in savings, and hold over 400 billion in Italian government bonds.

Undermining the profitability and investment capacity of banks means running the risk of undermining the rest of the economy as well. If, on the other hand, the underlying common view in Italian politics – both in government and in opposition – is that, as some like to say, ‘you get money from wherever it is’, this means that budget laws are not drawn up by pursuing a development model but by applying the same logic as those who go and rob banks.