How I’ll spread the Superbonus around. Meloni plays another trick on the banks

The bill for the financial sector is higher than expected. Not only because the contribution required of banks under the Budget Bill amounts to almost 6 billion euros – which is above the 5 billion indicated in the Draft Budget Bill – but also because the government has included a measure in the draft Budget Bill that will cost the financial sector at least a further 2 billion.

This refers to Article 37, which, as reported by Il Sole 24 Ore, spreads the Superbonus tax credits due to expire next year over a period of ten years. This parliamentary term, and therefore the Meloni government’s budgetary policy, has been characterised by the gradual expiry of the instalments for building bonuses issued during the three-year period 2021–23. Taking only the Superbonus credits into account, the Treasury had to offset tax credits amounting to 17 billion in 2023; 37.5 billion in 2024; 38.5 billion in 2025; 39 billion in 2026 and 21.5 billion in 2027. It is this final, massive instalment that the Budget Law targets, spreading it over ten years. Excluded from this measure are taxpayers who, on a voluntary basis, had already chosen to spread the tax credit (which was payable in four or five instalments) over ten annual instalments; however, this represents a minority share amounting to 1 billion. The remaining €20.5 billion, held by banks, insurance companies and financial operators (though partly held also by businesses and multi-utility companies), will not, however, be reimbursed in 2027 as planned, but in instalments of €2 billion per year, extending the payments until 2036.

The ‘Superbonus’ deferral scheme has a positive impact on public finances, although the technical report does not quantify this. There is no direct effect on the deficit, as these credits have been recorded in the 2023 accounts. There is, however, an indirect effect on the 2027 deficit, due to the non-issuance of approximately 18 billion in government bonds during a very tense phase in the market; with an average cost of debt of around 3.2 per cent, this translates to 550–600 million less spent on interest. This may appear modest, yet recent experience shows that amounts of this order can be decisive in determining whether the legendary three per cent deficit threshold is exceeded. More noticeable, however, is the impact on public debt: the Superbonus spread will reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by around 0.8 percentage points in 2027, before causing it to rise by less than one decimal point over the following nine years.

The consequences for banks’ balance sheets are far more significant. Assuming an inflation rate of two per cent (i.e. lower than the current rate), by the end of the decade the holders of these tax credits will see their present value reduced by ten per cent. This measure is more severe than many others in the package of taxes on the financial sector that have received the most attention: the additional IRES levy on banks and insurance companies for the two-year period 2027–28, for example, amounts to 1.5 billion; whilst the deferral of the recovery of DTAs amounts to around 2 billion (most of which will be recovered in subsequent years).

This is not the first measure of its kind. Back in 2024, with the decree aimed at curbing out-of-control building grants, Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti imposed a division into ten annual instalments for expenditure incurred in 2024. Now the same logic is being extended to the entire remaining stock of building credits. The reasoning behind this is understandable, given the complexity of the current situation. But when a debtor unilaterally extends the repayment deadline for a debt, without providing for any additional remuneration, we are faced with a debt restructuring. Technically speaking: a default. Of course, the building bonuses represent a tiny and entirely anomalous slice of Italy’s public debt, and the government’s decision is not due to a financial inability to meet its payments. But failing to meet contractual obligations – especially for a major debtor such as Italy – is never a good sign.