Favours for the elderly, a debt to their children. The intergenerational inequalities behind the protests

The youth protests that took place in many European cities, from Paris to Milan, have provoked reactions from the public, commentators and political parties, which have focused mainly on the incidents of violence that occurred on the fringes of these events. The debate has centred on security measures to prevent such incidents from recurring, and on their alleged effectiveness.

Few, however, have sought to understand the reasons why young people – the non-violent ones, who make up the vast majority – took to the streets. They will continue to do so in the future, thereby – unwittingly – creating the conditions for further violent infiltration. A disparaging tone has prevailed in the comments, typical of those who, having reached a certain age, believe that wisdom is the preserve of older people, often lumping everyone together and treating violent and non-violent protesters in the same way. Or by trotting out the usual clichés, according to which young people’s discontent is said to stem from the growing inequalities in Western societies, between the few – indeed, the very few – who have more and more, and the many who have less and less.

By attributing responsibility for all problems to the 1 per cent of the population that holds the lion’s share of wealth, we nevertheless overlook another form of inequality – or injustice – that exists within the remaining 99 per cent, which few people talk about: that between generations. Yet intergenerational inequalities are on the rise, and not only in developed countries, as can be seen in India. One need only look at the figures. To name but a few examples, since 2000 the proportion of public spending allocated to education has fallen in all European countries. Among those that have seen the sharpest decline are Italy (from 9.6 to 6.9 per cent) and France (from 10.4 to 7.8 per cent). Over the same period, pension expenditure has risen everywhere. In Italy, it rose from 26 to 30 per cent; in France, from 20 to 24 per cent. In other words, we are spending less and less on young people and more and more on the elderly, even when accounting for demographic trends.

The reason is simple: the relative number of voters. More and more older people are voting, whilst fewer and fewer young people are doing so. Elections are not won with policies favouring young people, but rather by promising favours to older people, or to those who are about to become older. The best-known example in Italy is ‘Quota 100’, with its promise of a generational handover – ‘one retired elderly person replaced by three young people’ – which turned out to be a blunder.

Looking at the range of measures taken in recent years, both on the tax side and on the expenditure side, the impact is almost always skewed in favour of the elderly. Even an extremely generous measure – if we are to call it that – such as the Superbonus has benefited those who already owned a home. The housing shortage, particularly for students in major cities, has worsened in recent years. Not to mention the barriers to competition, which prevent young people from setting up new businesses. Italy is the European country with the lowest rate of new business start-ups.

The quality of public spending directed towards young people, such as education, has also deteriorated significantly over time, as demonstrated by international tests. The proportion of pupils leaving the Italian school system with a level of education considered adequate has fallen to worrying levels. This is partly due to the fact that Italy was among the countries that imposed the longest period of distance learning during the Covid pandemic.

Youth unemployment has fallen over the course of this century, from around 30 per cent to just over 20 per cent in 2025, but this improvement is no different from that seen in the rest of the population and is due to the sharp decline in the labour force participation rate. Italy is among the European countries with the highest proportion of young people who are neither in education nor seeking work. Compounding the situation is the fact that the redistribution of resources to the detriment of young people is being funded through debt, creating a burden that grows over time and will therefore fall on future generations. Over the last 25 years, Italy’s public debt per citizen has risen from 22.5 to 52.5 thousand euros. The ratio of public debt to per capita income has risen from 96 per cent to 137 per cent. Meanwhile, the average wage has remained essentially unchanged, after adjusting for inflation.

Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the number of young Italians emigrating abroad is rising every year, half of whom are university graduates. Nor should it come as a surprise that those who remain are dissatisfied with their situation and the prospects open to them. And that they wish to express their discontent. Perhaps without this giving rise to violent side effects – for which they are not responsible.