Between jihadism and supremacism. The new paths of radicalisation

Three arrests in less than a month for recruitment for the purposes of international terrorism do not constitute proof, but they do warrant some reflection. Following the attempted massacre in Modena by an Italian citizen of Moroccan origin on 16 May, two young men were arrested in Florence and Reggio Emilia. The first is a 15-year-old Tunisian who, according to investigators, was interacting online with circles linked to Islamic State and claimed to be ready to receive operational instructions. The second is a 22-year-old Italian of Moroccan origin who is said to have expressed the intention to carry out a knife attack and to have had contact with an ISIS supporter. Yesterday in Bologna, the latest case emerged: the arrest of a 16-year-old as part of an investigation that reportedly revealed a convergence between jihadist propaganda and white supremacist extremism, involving the possession of propaganda material and manuals for the construction of homemade weapons and explosive devices. “I wouldn’t call these isolated incidents, but neither would I describe them as a new wave of organised terrorism,” Daniele Garofalo, an analyst who monitors phenomena linked to jihadist terrorism, security and international threats through his own strategic intelligence platform, tells Il Foglio. The common thread is that these are very young individuals, radicalised predominantly online, who develop a propensity for violence without necessarily belonging to a traditional terrorist organisation, explains Garofalo. This is a very different scenario from that of the organised cells that Europe experienced between 2014 and 2017. “Today, the trend is towards the spread of individual or micro-collective radicalisation pathways, fuelled by transnational digital ecosystems.” With one defining feature: less structure and greater speed.

The point, then, is not to determine whether Italy is experiencing a new wave comparable to the years of the Caliphate, but to understand whether the pool of individuals vulnerable to digital radicalisation has become broader and more difficult to identify. The risk of confusing serious episodes of individual distress with collective phenomena does exist, the analyst admits. But contemporary intelligence distinguishes between vulnerability and radicalisation: “Vulnerability can take the form of social isolation, an identity crisis, family problems, exclusion or a search for a sense of belonging. Radicalisation begins when these vulnerabilities are exploited by an ideological narrative that provides three fundamental elements: an enemy, a cause and a justification for violence.” These are words that feature prominently in contemporary political and social debate, marked by wars that polarise the world even more than ideas do. It is in this context that fragility can meet radicalisation. And it does not even matter which flag one represents, as the story of the 16-year-old from Bologna, seduced by both jihad and white supremacy, shows us. “This is probably the most interesting issue to have emerged in recent years. At an ideological level, white supremacy and jihadism are incompatible. On a psychological and operational level, however, they can converge.” The points of contact lie not in doctrine but in approach. “Glorification of violence; friend-or-foe logic; an apocalyptic worldview; the cult of martyrdom or militant heroism; hatred of the Western liberal system; a fascination with violent action as a tool for political transformation” are the traits the analyst identifies. And these traits align with jihadist, supremacist, accelerationist, conspiracy-theory-based, subversive, anarchist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic content. It all fits together, provided one abandons the categories of the past. Starting with the notion of religious war as the main motive for terrorism. “Many radicalised young people display a superficial understanding of religion. Religion often becomes the language through which a choice is justified – a choice born of anger, identity, a search for belonging, a desire for redemption or a wish to give meaning to one’s existence,” explains Garofalo. “A white supremacist can become radicalised without any religious reference. A jihadist, on the other hand, almost always ends up framing their actions within a religious narrative. Religion is not always the starting point, but in jihadism it almost always remains the main factor legitimising violence.”

Anger, identity and a sense of belonging are perhaps the elements that warrant the most careful consideration, looking beyond the news cycle. “One aspect that is often underestimated concerns young people who develop a sense of global injustice. Contemporary propaganda almost never speaks of theology in the first instance. It speaks of Gaza, Ukraine, discrimination, wars, international crises and alleged persecution. Subsequently, these issues are reinterpreted within an extremist framework.” Beware of oversimplifications: “The issue is not the Palestinian cause in itself. The issue is who uses that cause to promote narratives of hatred, the delegitimisation of democratic institutions or the legitimisation of violence. Jihadist groups, networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, pro-Iranian, pro-Hezbollah and pro-Hamas media outlets, and extremist actors seek to exploit issues such as Gaza or similar ones to stir up emotional mobilisation and political polarisation.”

The point of contact between subjectivity and radicalism today is not to be found in traditional social networks, with the classic model of the recruiter contacting the victim directly. For this reason, an analysis focused exclusively on physical places of religious gathering risks failing to capture the transformation of the phenomenon. On the contrary, it is isolation that leads to heavy use of the internet and can draw people towards certain ideologies. “A person might start by watching videos about the war in Gaza, move on to channels discussing alleged global conspiracies against Muslims, then come across content glorifying Hamas or Islamic State, followed by jihadist propaganda and finally operational manuals,” observes the analyst, who believes the same mechanism can occur in white supremacist or neo-Nazi circles. “Open platforms serve as the initial point of exposure. Closed chat groups are used for advanced radicalisation. People often start on Instagram and TikTok, then move on to Telegram and Signal, and finally end up using browsers such as Tor and apps such as Rocket.Chat or Chirpwire.”

Recent reports of the arrests would seem to suggest territorial continuity. But according to the analyst, the thread linking them is investigative and sociological. “The link between Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany does not necessarily indicate the existence of a local network, but is characterised by densely populated and highly connected areas, a strong presence of young people and diverse ethnic and religious communities, and the presence of very active and specialised investigative units.” Judging by the facts, the authorities’ work appears to be well-directed. “They are not waiting for an attack to happen; they intervene at the mobilisation stage,” notes Garofalo, who believes this is the result of years of investment in prevention, online monitoring and cooperation between the Digos, the Prevention Police, the ROS and specialist analysts. “France, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom have shown that seemingly marginalised individuals can rapidly turn into violent actors. The first lesson to be learnt from these experiences is to avoid underestimating the threat.” The second, the analyst continues, is to avoid polarisation. “When public debate and civil society organisations turn every issue into an identity-based clash, extremist groups thrive. Jihadist propaganda, white supremacist propaganda and that promoted by certain radical pro-Iranian circles or those linked to political Islamism all share a common goal: to divide society into opposing and incompatible blocs.” The best antidote lies in understanding the phenomenon and in the ability to translate that understanding into preventative action, including from a cultural perspective. “The effective response is not scaremongering,” concludes Garofalo, “but the ability to identify processes of radicalisation at an early stage, always distinguishing between legitimate political dissent, ideological activism and support for violence. This distinction will likely be one of the main internal security challenges for Europe over the next decade.”