The long history of Europe’s development, from Herodotus to databases

All members of that community we call Europe have a threefold attitude towards the Union: they are happy to benefit from their membership of it; they complain about its shortcomings (bureaucracy); and they criticise its incompleteness. This attitude is more complex than a simple love-hate relationship and can only be understood by looking back at the history of the formation of this unique social and political entity, highlighting the visible and invisible threads that bind Europeans together.

Europe did not come into being in the middle of the last century. The idea of Europe predates its political organisation by many centuries. Its history can be seen as a transition from a geographical concept to a cultural community, then to a political project and finally to a legal system. The name originated in the Greek world. In Herodotus, in the 5th century BC, ‘Europe’ referred to one of the great parts of the world, distinct from Asia and Libya. It did not yet denote a political or cultural community. Rome, on the other hand, conceived of its dominion as universal and Mediterranean, not European.

Following the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire, Latin Christianity became the unifying force. Europe was conceived primarily as Christianitas. Charlemagne is already referred to in medieval sources as pater Europae. Between the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Wars of Religion, the word ‘Europe’ gradually replaced that of ‘Christendom’. With the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a system of sovereign states—formally independent and equal—emerged. Europe became a community of states united by international law, permanent diplomacy, the balance of power, trade and a shared cultural heritage.

Political fragmentation gave rise to numerous proposals for peace and federation: Pierre Dubois, in the 14th century, proposed a league of Christian princes; Émeric Crucé, in 1623, envisaged a permanent assembly of states; William Penn, in 1693, proposed a European parliament; the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, in 1713, drew up a plan for perpetual peace; Rousseau critically examined its feasibility; Kant, in 1795, proposed a federation of free states in Perpetual Peace. The prevailing idea was not yet that of a European state, but rather a confederation capable of preventing war.

La République des Lettres, or the Republic of Letters, was the supranational community of European scholars, philosophers, scientists and intellectuals that developed between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It was a network based on correspondence, the circulation of books, academies, universities, salons and periodicals. Its members regarded themselves as citizens of an intellectual community that transcended political, religious and linguistic boundaries. Latin, and subsequently French in particular, facilitated communication between scholars from different countries. Erasmus, Bayle, Leibniz, Voltaire and Montesquieu were leading figures within it. The Republic of Letters contributed to the formation of a European public sphere: it facilitated the exchange of knowledge, critical discussion and the dissemination of new scientific and Enlightenment ideas.

The French Revolution and Napoleon spread common principles across Europe – citizenship, civil equality, codification – but through conquest. In the nineteenth century, the national principle prevailed. Alongside nationalism, however, the idea of the ‘United States of Europe’ survived. The phrase was used, among others, by Giuseppe Mazzini and Victor Hugo. In his speech to the Peace Congress of 1849, Hugo envisaged the day when France, Russia, Italy, England and Germany would unite in a ‘European brotherhood’.

The First World War shattered faith in Europe’s superiority and progress. In 1919, Paul Valéry wrote: ‘We, as a civilisation, now know that we are mortal.’ Yet in 1929, Aristide Briand proposed a ‘European federal union’. Nationalism, fascism and Nazism, however, led to the Second World War.

After 1945, unification was no longer viewed merely as a cultural ideal, but as an institutional solution to the problem of war in Europe. The following events took place in succession: 1941: the Ventotene Manifesto by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi; 1948: the Hague Congress; 1949: the Council of Europe; 1950: the Schuman Declaration; 1951: European Coal and Steel Community; 1957: European Economic Community; 1992: Maastricht Treaty and the birth of the European Union; 2000–2009: Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty of Lisbon. The novelty of the Community method lay in creating common institutions endowed with their own powers, rather than limiting itself to diplomatic cooperation between governments.

With the Van Gend en Loos judgement of 1963 and the Costa v ENEL judgement of 1964, the Court of Justice of the European Communities affirmed the direct effect and primacy of Community law. Europe thus became a community governed by law in which individuals are also subjects and addressees of the rules. National legal systems do not disappear, but are progressively integrated into the European legal system. The Italian Constitutional Court, in Judgment No. 71 of 2026, describes the system of the Union and those of the Member States as ‘increasingly integrated and interdependent’, whilst remaining distinct and without a simple hierarchy between them.

A brief overview of history allows us to say that European integration is a long process, which began a long time ago, consisting of visible and less visible elements, and which unites many countries: Cavour was a regular visitor to France and England in the mid-19th century, whilst he never travelled south of Florence during his lifetime. The process concerns ideals and culture, interests, law, the economy, and, later on, public administrations and the judiciary. It is a legal framework, a system of thought, a conceptual order – fluid because it adapts to historical changes, and flexible because it is subject to external influences, such as the American influence, which began in the first half of the nineteenth century and represents a great example or precedent of democracy and federalism.

Of the many threads that bind national societies in Europe, one – the most criticised – is the administrative one, because there is a European administration made up of two parts: one that is strictly European, and a second, mixed one, composed of national administrations. Let us see how this second part is organised.

The European administration does not present itself as a unified body hierarchically superior to the administrations of the Member States. Rather, it constitutes a composite administrative system in which EU institutions and bodies, national ministries, independent authorities and local authorities all contribute to the development and implementation of European policies. Integration therefore does not entail the absorption of national administrations into a supranational structure, but rather their stable inclusion in common procedures, networks and organisations.

This integration is already evident at the stage of formulating European policies and regulations. National officials participate in Council working groups, expert groups set up by the Commission and numerous technical and consultative bodies. In this way, they make the expertise of national administrations available to the European institutions and, at the same time, represent the needs of their respective legal systems. The preparation of European decisions takes place through continuous interaction between the supranational and national levels, which makes it difficult to draw a clear distinction between the European and national phases.

A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is the so-called comitology procedure. This concerns the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission by Article 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. When the Parliament and the Council adopt a legislative act requiring uniform conditions for its application, they may confer on the Commission the power to adopt implementing acts. However, the Commission does not normally exercise this power in isolation. The draft act is submitted to a committee composed of representatives of the Member States, generally officials from the ministries or national authorities responsible for the matter in question. The committee is chaired by a representative of the Commission, who directs the proceedings but does not take part in the vote. The committees’ decisions may be advisory or binding.

Comitology illustrates particularly clearly the composite nature of the European administration. The final decision is formally attributed to the Commission and constitutes an act of the Union; however, it is drawn up through the organised participation of national administrations. This results in an interplay between administrations which does not eliminate the distinction between the Union and the Member States, but rather integrates it into a common decision-making structure.

Administrative integration is also achieved through European agencies and networks. Bodies such as the European Medicines Agency, the European Food Safety Authority, the European Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority operate in constant liaison with their national counterparts. National administrations participate in the agencies’ governing bodies, provide information, collaborate on technical assessments and implement decisions taken at European level within their respective territories. The agency does not necessarily replace national authorities: it links them together, organises their cooperation and contributes to the development of common criteria. This results in a networked model, in which the unity of administrative action does not depend on a hierarchical chain, but on the sharing of procedures, information and technical standards.

A further tool is the shared management of the Union’s policies and financial resources. In areas such as agricultural policy and economic and territorial cohesion, the Union sets the objectives, conditions and general constraints, whilst national and regional administrations select beneficiaries, make payments and carry out checks. The Commission retains supervisory responsibility and may correct, suspend or recover funds used irregularly. Here too, the implementation of European policy is shared between European and national bodies with complementary responsibilities.

In many sectors, this gives rise to complex administrative procedures. A preliminary investigation may take place before a national authority, the scientific assessment may be entrusted to a European agency, the decision may rest with the Commission, and implementation may then revert to the national authorities.

Finally, integration is achieved through the exchange of information, shared databases, the interoperability of IT systems, mutual assistance and the recognition of decisions taken by the authorities of other Member States. The European Consumer Protection Cooperation Network, for example, enables national authorities to coordinate investigations and measures against infringements involving traders and consumers established in several countries.

Administrative Europe is therefore built not by replacing national administrations, but by linking them together and integrating them into a common framework of procedures, rights, obligations of cooperation and controls. This network contributes to the formation of a public authority – the European one – which exhibits many characteristics typical of states. The pages written by one of Germany’s leading scholars, Armin von Bogdandy, in a recent article shed light on this aspect. We are publishing a few excerpts, translated into Italian.

Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The Future of EU Law in a Fraying International Legal Order: Continuity, Atrophy, Statehood – Three Scenarios Under Its Constitutional Core’, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Law Research Paper Series No. 2026-06

The scenario of statehood. I begin with a simple question: why is statehood regarded merely as a future scenario for the Union, rather than a description of its present condition?

The Union has a territory. It distinguishes between internal and external affairs. Internally, it guarantees a single market and an area of freedom, security and justice. Externally, it defines its borders and ensures their protection through Frontex. In the public perception, it is at the Evros River in Greece that the European border is defended. The fact that this protection is imperfect and insufficient in the face of powerful adversaries does not set the Union apart from most other states.

Equally significant is the personal dimension. The European Parliament has been directly elected since 1979. European citizenship has existed since 1993 and, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon elevated it to a central component of democratic legitimacy. In 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that “Union citizenship constitutes the fundamental status of the citizens of the Member States”. Pursuant to Article 2 TEU, these citizens are members of European society.

There is no shortage of public authorities either. The EU has an active legislature, a powerful executive and a judiciary endowed with considerable authority. It regulates markets, imposes sanctions and mobilises billions. Sanctioning powers have been expanded since the 1990s; the European Public Prosecutor’s Office began operations in 2021; enormous fines are imposed for infringements; and, with just a few decisions, the European Central Bank forced a reluctant Greek government to fall into line with the European stance. All Greeks can attest to the power of the European Central Bank. The absence of a Union army or police force does not contradict this conclusion: even federal states distribute coercive power across different levels of government, and the Union is founded on a similar division of enforcement powers.

What, then, is missing? Not the structure, not the power, not the legal consolidation; what is missing, above all, is the political will to establish a state. The question of founding a European federal state has always been on the table, and the absence of a positive response has always been regarded as significant. The Treaties do not begin with the phrase ‘We, the people’, but rather with ‘His Majesty the King of the Belgians’. Under Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), it is ‘the High Contracting Parties’ who establish the Union. The first article of the Treaty on European Union thus makes it clear that it does not establish a European federal state. This is reflected, amongst other things, in the rigidity of the rules governing the revision of the Treaties (Article 48 TEU), in the express right of withdrawal (Article 50 TEU), in the Union’s weak fiscal framework, and in the absence of a general federal power of coercion over Member States.

European public law has long been based on a conceptual distinction: statehood remains with the Member States, whilst the Union is conceived as a non-state political order. Statehood, however, is not a remote possibility, and both political will and public perception can change, particularly in the face of a serious external threat. Since 2022, Russia’s challenge to ‘our values’ has lent new significance to this possibility. Since 2025, the perception of the United States as less reliable has further reinforced this possibility, whilst at the same time accelerating the erosion of the international legal order. In this context, the scenario of statehood is re-emerging with force: might the very logic of Europe’s difficult situation – marked by security imperatives and geopolitical pressures – push the Union beyond the threshold of statehood?