Putin, the man on the wane, as China and America vie for the future

Trump and Xi discuss AI and robots, whilst Putin talks about history and the past. The war lost due to an obsession with past conflicts

20 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, Chinese President Xi Jinping, centre, and US President Donald Trump attend a trilateral meeting at Kylin Villa in Shenzhen, in Guangdong province, southern China, on Thursday 19 November 2026. (Sergei Bobylev/Sputni
For Vladimir Putin, the primary aim of the entire meeting in Shenzhen was simply to be there. To be there, in the spotlight, sharing a table with two powerful men: the US President, Donald Trump, and the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. Putin feels just as powerful as they do; he is not troubled by the Russian economy’s decline, but he was keen to show that Russia’s isolation is a regional issue that does not concern two international powers such as China and the United States of America. Trump referred to him as "friend." Before departing Shenzhen, he was escorted to his car by Xi. The summit was an event in its own right, requiring no specific outcomes for Putin, who managed to have at least a couple of points of great interest to him included in the very sparse final declaration (out of a total of four). 
In particular, the second point on the stabilisation of oil flows “is perhaps the most significant piece of news in the joint statement”, Sergey Radchenko, a lecturer and historian specialising in the Cold War, tells Il Foglio. “It essentially shows that the United States is opposed to sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sector, the production of which is one of Moscow’s main sources of income. Then there is an amusing fact. China is a net importer; it does not produce petroleum products, yet the statement makes no distinction and includes it as if it did.”
Putin shook hands with the people who mattered. There was nothing to win or lose at this summit; the mission was to make an appearance. He has revived that aura of grandeur bestowed upon him by the summit in Anchorage, Alaska, where, on 15 August 2025, he walked along the red carpets laid out by Trump and, thanks to American incompetence, managed to discuss Ukraine without Ukraine being at the table.
Yesterday, he emphasised the symbolic importance of the trilateral summit because, apart from the symbolism, there was little to gain; moreover, Vladimir Putin thrives on symbolism. “He is a self-proclaimed historian; he knows how to focus on pragmatic issues, but all he ever does is talk about history,” analyses Radchenko. Putin attempted to imbue everything that happened in Shenzhen with a historical dimension, to forge a link between wars that have ended and those he has started. Sitting at the table with Trump and Xi, he said that they were the leaders of the countries that had won the Second World War and founded the United Nations, and therefore the weight of the world’s future rested on their shoulders. It was not Russia, but the Soviet Union; it was not the People’s Republic of China, but the Republic of China; yet Putin distorts and misrepresents the facts in order to cast the present in the mould of the past. It was Kremlin propaganda that promoted the summit as a new Yalta, and in Shenzhen, Putin could not stop making such comparisons. At his final press conference, when he was alone in front of Russian journalists, he said that Yalta was not the moment when the victorious powers divided up the world, but when they triumphed over Nazism and ratified the post-Second World War order. “Yalta marked the victory over Nazism,” said the Kremlin leader, “so how could I possibly be opposed today to marking the victory over neo-Nazism?” – referring to Ukraine, against which, almost five years ago, he declared the start of a ‘denazification’ operation. “The comparison with Yalta today is embarrassing for Russia; it has not even managed to win the war or to conquer the Donbas. There is no continuity between the Soviet achievements and the current situation,” argues Radchenko.
“What is democracy?” – Putin asked at a press conference – “Is it perhaps a liberal order that certain circles are still trying to impose on the whole world? It is a liberal attempt to monopolise power. It is a sort of dictatorship.” In a 2019 interview with the Financial Times, the Kremlin leader had described the liberal idea as “obsolete”, suggesting that the future lay instead in the hands of people like himself. In Shenzhen, Putin sought to explain the present through history, to justify it with the past. He was moving backwards, and this is the key difference between Russia and the other two countries with which it sat at the table: China and the United States. At the heart of the discussions between Xi Jinping and Trump lie topics such as artificial intelligence and the definition of relations between the world’s two largest economies. Their relationship centres on shaping the future. The White House leader speaks of friendship, but Washington and Beijing exist in a state of constant competition – a race from which Moscow is excluded. “Putin is not addressing the issue; he has left his country out of the race for artificial intelligence.” It is a steady, slow decline, a being trapped in the past as if in a spider’s web. “Moscow is not taking part in the race for artificial intelligence or robotics,” says Radchenko. “Russia’s situation is pathetic in many respects. Putin, on the other hand, prefers to bask in the international spotlight. It is a sad story and illustrates how he is condemning the country to irrelevance in a world that has no tolerance for irrelevance.” His companions seated at the table discuss topics from which he has excluded himself whilst pursuing his old wars. “Russia is fighting a nineteenth-century war in a twenty-first-century world, where nobody should care about the Donbas, where there ought not to be an army fighting over that patch of land to hand over to a country that should be investing its resources elsewhere,” concludes the historian. Putin, on the other hand, cannot take his eyes off the Donbas, let alone think about Ukraine as a whole. He is in decline; he speaks in the past tense.