World
geopolitical balances •
To defend itself against the hybrid threat, the EU must protect its neighbourhood
Albania and Montenegro are about much more than just enlargement. Foreign interference is a test for Brussels; the EU must be capable of stabilising and integrating its neighbourhood to avoid jeopardising the balance of power. For Italy, this is a strategic priority; for Europe, it is a test of the gap between its geopolitical ambitions and its willingness to shoulder the responsibilities that come with them.

(Photo: Getty)
In recent days, thousands of Italian schools have received emails announcing the presence of explosive devices. A few days earlier, similar threats had targeted several European flights, including some bound for Rome, forcing the authorities to activate emergency protocols, deploy military fighter jets and divert aircraft. No bombs were found, but the consequences were very real. Responsibility has yet to be established, and it would be premature to attribute these incidents to foreign involvement. The mechanism, however, is familiar to those who study hybrid threats: achieving destabilising effects that are disproportionate to the resources employed, by exploiting the vulnerabilities of complex and interconnected societies.
The response from the Italian and European authorities demonstrates just how important internal resilience is. But it also highlights a limitation in the European debate on security. We can strengthen intelligence, cyber defences, critical infrastructure and internal response capabilities within the EU. But how secure can a Europe be when it is surrounded by fragile countries, susceptible to the influence of hostile actors and criss-crossed by transnational criminal networks?
This is a particularly pressing issue in the Western Balkans, where two countries, Albania and Montenegro, are moving towards accession to the European Union. For Italy, this is not a distant geopolitical periphery. Tirana and Podgorica are linked to the peninsula by trade flows, investments, diaspora communities and economic networks, both legitimate and illicit. Their vulnerabilities are already part of our security environment.
Albania appears to be a reassuring case. Ninety-two per cent of the population supports EU membership, the country is a member of NATO and its geopolitical orientation appears well-established. Yet political alignment does not automatically guarantee institutional resilience. In 2022, Tirana was the target of a sophisticated Iranian campaign that combined prolonged infiltration of government networks, information theft, destructive cyber-attacks and information manipulation operations, with the aim of undermining the functioning of the state and citizens’ trust in institutions. Since then, Tirana has invested heavily in cybersecurity, strengthening its national agency and cooperation with European and American partners. Russia, too, is attempting to exploit political tensions and internal discontent, though it lacks the deep-rooted networks of influence found elsewhere in the region.
Albania’s most profound problem probably lies in its internal structural weaknesses. Despite the progress made by the anti-corruption authorities, organised crime, corruption and illicit financial flows continue to pose significant challenges. Powerful Albanian criminal networks have transnational connections that extend to the Italian and European markets. These structures offer foreign actors opportunities for access, financing, coercion and the recruitment of local intermediaries. Criminal networks provide hostile state actors with opportunities that can quickly turn into strategic vulnerabilities not only for Albania but also for Italy and Europe.
In Montenegro, the situation is different and more insidious, as geopolitical competition directly permeates politics, society and national identity. Serbia and Russia have networks of influence that extend to political parties, organisations, the media and religious institutions. The Serbian Orthodox Church exercises an authority that extends beyond the spiritual realm, fuelling disputes over Montenegrin identity and sovereignty.
In Montenegro, too, the narrative of a shared national identity can become a tool for challenging the country’s political autonomy. This dynamic is reminiscent – albeit with substantial differences – of Russia’s use of language, religion and cultural affiliation to justify its influence over Ukraine and Moldova.
Serbian and Russian hybrid and influence operations often converge. Serbian nationalist politicians, Russian media and regional news networks coordinate their efforts to disseminate anti-European narratives. The expulsion last October of members of the Russian news network Rybar, including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk, further highlighted these actors’ interest in Montenegro. The severe cyber-attacks that struck Montenegrin government infrastructure in 2022 – attributed to Russia – also highlighted profound vulnerabilities in the area of cyber-security. Despite the progress made since then, these vulnerabilities remain a security concern for Italy and Europe as well, given the growing interconnection of their respective infrastructures and economic systems.
The most politically interesting finding concerns European accession. Montenegro is aiming to join the EU in 2028, and public support for integration is so high that even forces traditionally pro-Serbian and sympathetic to anti-Western positions have had to tone down their rhetoric. Openly opposing accession currently carries too heavy a political cost.
The credibility of European enlargement therefore already constitutes a tangible constraint on the actions of political forces and external actors whose interests do not align with those of the Union. But this is a fragile balance, particularly in the run-up to the various general elections in 2027.
A failure of Montenegro’s accession would fuel polarisation, mistrust and new opportunities for interference, with regional consequences: if even the most advanced candidate were unable to join the EU, what credibility would Brussels retain in the eyes of the other Balkan countries?
This is where the strategic dimension of enlargement comes to the fore. For Tirana, the risk is leaving unresolved criminal and institutional vulnerabilities that are already spilling over into European territory. For Podgorica, it is the loss of political consensus that currently limits the room for manoeuvre of actors hostile to integration. For both, a failure to enlarge could leave countries on the Union’s doorstep increasingly exposed to interference, instability and hybrid threats, with consequences bound to extend beyond its borders.
Joining the EU would not magically eliminate these vulnerabilities, nor should it take place regardless of reforms. But giving up on a credible prospect would mean weakening one of the most effective tools available to Europe for tackling them.
In a world where geopolitical competition simultaneously affects territories, economies, infrastructure and societies, the security of neighbouring countries becomes an integral part of internal security. A Union that still aspires to be a credible player must be capable of stabilising and integrating its neighbourhood, before others determine the balance of power there. For Italy, this should be a strategic priority. For Europe, it is a test of the gap between its geopolitical ambitions and its willingness to shoulder the responsibilities that come with them. Defence against hybrid threats also hinges on this.