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the third wheel •
Shenzhen and the waning friendship between Moscow and Beijing
All is not well between Russia and China. A review of concessions and snubs between Putin and Xi. The Kremlin, obsessed with Ukraine, is turning a blind eye to the damage it is causing in the east

The first time Vladimir Putin met U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping together in Shenzhen yesterday was for the group photo. Trump was already standing next to Xi when the Kremlin leader arrived. Putin shook hands with the American first, then looked at the Chinese leader and seemed on the verge of stepping between the two for the photo, when Xi invited him to move to his left. Putin was ready to take his place next to the host, but Xi intended to move him one place further along – not beside him, but next to his wife. Putin seemed to quickly get over his disappointment, whilst international commentators have added the seating arrangement in the group photo to the list of instances of unequal treatment between the Russian and American leaders.
Trump was the guest of honour, and Xi even paid him a visit directly at the airport: he was waiting for him on the runway – something that had never happened before for anyone. Putin was the architect of the trilateral meeting, which he discussed with Trump for the first time during their latest telephone call in early October, but in Shenzhen the Kremlin leader did not take centre stage, despite the fervour with which his press covered and anticipated the event. Not everyone in Russia is happy with Putin’s relationship with Xi Jinping; a quick browse through nationalist Telegram channels is enough to realise that a criticism keeps resurfacing insistently whenever a meeting with the Chinese comes up: Moscow is looking west and has forgotten to look east. Nationalists support the invasion of Ukraine, but believe that one must also keep an eye on the other end of the spectrum, where interesting events are unfolding that do not align with Putin’s belief in a Russia that never yields. To the east, with China, Moscow is giving in and Beijing feels freer – this is the deal Putin had to accept in return for the war in Ukraine, and the relationship between him and Xi is no longer one of mutual benefit; it is he who bows his head, he who falls into line, he who must make do.
In 2023, one year after the start of the ‘special military operation’, the Ministry of Natural Resources in Beijing mandated the use of historical Chinese names on official maps to refer to certain Russian localities, including Vladivostok, which is now identified as Haishenwai, ‘Bay of Sea Cucumbers’. Vladivostok means ‘ruler of the East’, and this conquering name was a message to the Chinese who had lost the city, which had been annexed by the Tsarist Empire. Annexations are not forgotten, and the renaming of places on Chinese maps has had the intended effect: to signal that the territory was Russian. Yet Beijing is waging a bold and relentless campaign of commercial seduction, and in some cases – at least initially – the flag matters little. Moscow, which seeks to defend Russians and the Russian language wherever they may be, has not intervened; it has accepted the situation and, along the Amur River – which has always marked much of the border between the two countries – has even allowed an increasing number of tributes to cross-border friendship to spring up. For decades the river has been a dividing line; now plans are multiplying for bridges, cable cars and ‘houses of friendship’, through which China is establishing a presence in a virtually uninhabited part of Russia, setting it against, on the other side of the border, the country’s main north-eastern provinces, where the population stands at around one hundred million Chinese. Territorial claims are also defended on demographic grounds, and Moscow is unable to find a solution; whilst it once turned a blind eye, it is now unable to reject China’s demands.
China moves in wherever it sees Russia yielding and Moscow making concessions. In May, during his visit to Beijing, Putin announced that discussions were under way regarding Chinese navigation on the Tumen River, which would give Xi access to the Sea of Japan. China has always managed its side of the riverbank, but navigation has been the prerogative of Russia and North Korea. Moscow has always been so protective of this that it has pursued infrastructure projects designed to prevent the passage of large commercial vessels, such as those Beijing would wish to send through; today, these would run aground or crash into the Friendship Bridge linking Russia and North Korea. So far, it appears to be the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un who has been opposed to the idea, whilst Putin is prepared to relinquish the monopoly exercised by his ports in the region to please Xi, who, however, is granting him nothing – not even the coveted project for a new gas pipeline.
For Russian nationalists, Moscow is capable of holding the East and West together; Putin is looking in only one direction and, in order to secure Ukraine, is making concessions, losing ground and allowing Beijing the opportunity to reclaim historical victories – behind which, the changes to place names conceal a long-term campaign of conquest.
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Micol Flammini è giornalista del Foglio. Scrive di Europa, soprattutto orientale, di Russia, di Israele, di storie, di personaggi, qualche volta di libri, calpestando volentieri il confine tra politica internazionale e letteratura. Ha studiato tra Udine e Cracovia, tra Mosca e Varsavia e si è ritrovata a Roma, un po’ per lavoro, tanto per amore. Nel Foglio cura la rubrica EuPorn, un romanzo a puntate sull'Unione europea, scritto su carta e "a voce". E' autrice del podcast "Diventare Zelensky". In libreria con "La cortina di vetro" (Mondadori)
