Yesterday, U.S. President Donald Trump landed in Manila, the first stop on a short tour of Asia that will also take him to Shenzhen, China, tomorrow. Right up until the last minute, it was unclear whether Trump intended to stop off in the Philippine capital, where the summit of ASEAN leaders – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – is currently drawing to a close; this summit precedes the annual APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) leaders’ summit, which is being chaired by China this year.
It is in Shenzhen that the eagerly awaited trilateral meeting will take place between the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the host, Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Never before have the two summits – ASEAN and APEC – had such different, almost opposing agendas: the Chinese APEC summit is a propaganda piece for the stability of Beijing’s leadership; the Philippines, on the other hand, have structured the negotiations in an attempt to secure approval from the South-East Asian countries and partner powers for a ‘code of conduct’ in the South China Sea, a means of curbing the bullying and coercion exercised by China in those waters. The code of conduct was not signed. Trump arrived late at the Manila summit, probably just to reassure the hawks in his administration who are pushing for a more hardline stance from Washington towards Beijing. But yesterday Trump made no mention of the Chinese ships bullying their Philippine counterparts; he reiterated that he did not wish to take any action that might “offend China”, and in fact merely praised the Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., telling him that he trusted him because “genetics don’t lie” – Marcos Jr. is the son of General and dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and has worked for years to soften the authoritarian image inherited from his father: all undone by a single remark from Trump. According to many observers, the Philippine president, elected in 2022, had set out with a clear vision of how to curb China’s expansionist policy, leading a coalition of the willing to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Now, however, with Trump having drastically scaled back US military patrols, Marcos is returning to direct talks with Beijing.
The U.S. president pursues a personalized foreign policy; he is fascinated by strong, authoritarian figures – Xi, Putin, and even Kim Jong Un, the North Korean dictator who may well make a surprise visit to Shenzhen himself in the coming days, with China facilitating a bilateral meeting with Trump – but at the White House, handling the China dossier has become a problem. On the eve of his third private meeting with Xi Jinping, several American media outlets yesterday highlighted the rift – now impossible to hide – between hawks and doves, between those who advocate a hard line and those in favour of a stable agreement with Beijing, which, however, also entails abandoning the idea of American influence in the Asian region, and perhaps beyond. Representing these two opposing worldviews – as Trump himself explained – are two members of his administration: on the one hand, the Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent; on the other, the Secretary of Commerce, Howard Lutnick. This stalemate has only been exacerbated by the disastrous handling of the advanced chips that the American giant Nvidia was supplying to China. Senator Marco Rubio, who was once subject to sanctions by Beijing, has also, since the start of his term, pushed for a tougher stance against the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its ability to exploit loopholes in US national security: according to the New York Times, “the US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, and much of the staff at the National Security Council” share this view. In a move welcomed by the hawks, on Monday the US Department of Commerce imposed a requirement on data centres located outside the United States to obtain a government licence before selling significant computing capacity to companies based in China (as well as in Russia and Iran). Shortly afterwards, however, Trump praised Lutnick’s work, and the suspicion is that the new regulation, which has been awaited for months, is merely a bargaining chip for the president to use in negotiations with Xi. Trump’s former National Security Adviser, H.R. McMaster, told the newspaper that Trump believes he can negotiate everything with the Chinese leadership; the important thing is that he does so personally with Xi Jinping, but “rather than adopting a consistent line of opposition to China’s policy of economic aggression, he often ends up wavering, thereby weakening his own position”. This wavering stance is also reflected among America’s allies, who until a few years ago relied on Washington for guidance on how to deal with Chinese aggression.