Instead of scrambling at the ‘Big Three’ table, the EU could make the most of what it already has with Kyiv

Whilst European capitals are jostling for a seat at the table with Trump, Putin and Xi, the game in which the EU can truly make a difference remains wide open. Kyiv’s accession offers political and strategic leverage already in the hands of the EU-27, as well as a security outlook founded on European solidarity
18 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Image of Instead of scrambling at the ‘Big Three’ table, the EU could make the most of what it already has with Kyiv
‘We must speak directly to the Kremlin,’ said Alexander Stubb, the Finnish president, in an interview with the Financial Times, following the debate on Europe’s presence at the negotiating table regarding Putin’s war against Ukraine – a presence that Russia has already ruled out, because it has no intention of negotiating anything with anyone; it wants to press ahead with the war because it is convinced it can win it, and it says so – indeed, it says so very clearly. However, many Europeans resent this exclusion and look on with fear at the summit of the three leaders: Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
Stubb says of Thursday’s meeting in Shenzhen: it could turn out like Yalta in 1945, when Eastern Europe was handed over to the Soviet sphere of influence, or like Helsinki in 1975, when tensions between East and West eased and the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity were enshrined. ‘Is America more in the spirit of Yalta?’, asks the Financial Times, and the Finnish president says that it probably is, although he hopes it isn’t – at least not forever – but in the meantime Europeans must join the group. ‘Putin is ready for engagement with Europe’, Stubb repeats, against all evidence, having spoken on the phone with the Russian president a month ago. In the same British newspaper, Gideon Rachman says: what Yalta? The ‘Big Three’ cannot shape a new world order, even if they wanted to, because they are too fragile. Yaroslav Trofimov, writing in the Wall Street Journal, is more incisive: to carve up the world, one would first have to win a war, and this is not the case for today’s ‘Big Three’.
Europeans are struggling at the crossroads of three powers seeking to project a power they do not possess, yet which share an unprecedented alignment – certainly as far as the Americans and the Russians are concerned. They are struggling to find a unified voice; they have devised a negotiating format that excludes ‘the Baltic’, the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, but they still lack a clear mandate as to what they wish to convey to Putin, and in any case are agonising over implausible plans concerning a future that the Russian president himself has no intention of working towards – namely, ‘when the war ends’. Yet the war will end only when those waging it—in an increasingly brutal and ruthless manner—cease hostilities, and there is nothing to suggest that this is the Russian president’s intention. Therefore, rather than attempting to overturn a table at which they are struggling to sit, Europeans would be wiser to focus on the table where they are key players—namely, the one they share with the Ukrainians. This is where military, financial and civilian aid is discussed, and this is where Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is discussed—a process which today represents the most powerful political tool available to Europeans.
There has been a resurgence of discussion regarding Ukraine’s other potential membership – that of NATO – but apart from the fact that this is an American offer which the Russians are not even considering (in what film would the Russians, who are demanding that the Alliance return to the 1997 borders, accept Ukraine into NATO in exchange for the devastated Donbas?), the relationship between Kyiv and NATO – and NATO itself – has changed significantly. The Ukrainian army is the most effective in the Alliance; it knows how to fight modern warfare, something the Americans have shown they are unable to do. Membership of the Alliance entails the formidable Article 5 – mutual solidarity in the event of an attack – but with this Trumpian America, no one is any longer certain that Article 5 would be triggered automatically. That is why Ukraine’s accession to the EU today represents a far more manageable security prospect for Europeans, because they have control over this process, whereas they have no such control over NATO, over US-Russian relations, or over the ‘Big Three’.
Moreover, Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union is comparable to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty: if this is a European war, mutual solidarity will inevitably be European too. Of course, the accession of a country like Ukraine is alarming; of course, farmers are concerned and Ukrainian chicken is the spectre that the Polish plumber once was; of course, EU enlargement is a lengthy process involving harmonisation and reforms – but we are facing a unique situation: a country that has been at war for five years. Its defence is already a European affair, because the EU funds it and because the EU’s security depends on Ukraine holding firm: it takes courage, of course, but this is the forum in which a broad, lasting, democratic and attractive alliance is forged – the exact opposite of what Russia, America and China boast about.