Even Syrians in America are turning their backs on Trump. And Barrack is at risk

It is hardly surprising that Ahmed al Sharaa was among those who awaited Tuesday’s US mid-term elections with some trepidation. In recent years, the interim president of post-Assad Syria has managed to make the world forget his past as an Islamic terrorist in the ranks of al-Qaeda, largely thanks to Donald Trump, who opened the doors of the international community to a former jihadist. Now the US president’s electoral debacle could have consequences in Damascus, but also amongst those who have so far been directly involved in handling the Syrian dossier. The first to bear the brunt of this could be Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and the White House’s special envoy to Syria and Iraq. “I believe he will resign by the end of the year,” Ayman Abdel Nour, a former aide to Bashar al-Assad and now a political activist in the United States, tells Il Foglio. With the Democrats’ victory, “we will return to the official channels of diplomacy, namely a special envoy from the State Department, not the White House”. Abdel Nour, who has been following developments in US politics and their impact on Syrian politics for years, believes there could be two alternatives to Barrack: “One is to hand the portfolio over to Jacob McGee, the current Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs. Or Trump may appoint someone else, but in that case he will need the approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which could take time and would not be a foregone conclusion, given the Democrats’ majority.”

Everything revolves around the new balance of power in Congress, although amongst the expats who form part of the large (and wealthy) Syrian diaspora in the United States, the election results were not received with too much resignation. “In fact, we supported the Democrats because, in recent years, the Republicans have consistently attacked Islam rather than focusing on the character of individual candidates, their agenda, their ideology and their plans,” Abdel Nour adds. “For this reason, the majority of Syrians in America voted for the Democrats, even though they had preferred Trump in 2024.”

In short, even those who, since 8 December 2024 – the day Assad fell – owe (almost) everything to the American president, are not yet prepared to beat their breasts over his defeat. And even the idea that we are heading towards a marked shift in American policy towards al Sharaa is played down by the Syrians in America themselves. “I don’t expect any major changes,” Bakr Ghbeis, a member of Citizens for a Secure and Safe America (C4SSA) – an American organisation that supports the democratic transition in Syria – tells Il Foglio. “For example, one of the leading voices in US policy on Syria is Senator Jeanne Shaheen, who is a Democrat, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and will remain in her post.” Sanctions remain at the heart of the matter. Although al-Sharaa and his entourage were removed some time ago from the list of terrorists, and Syria has been removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism since last August, other restrictions remain in force. “There is still discussion to be had regarding Syria’s removal from the E-1 list – the countries subject to export restrictions. And we know that sanctions hold significant importance for the Democrats,” Ghbeis explains further. “I believe we will proceed with more thorough hearings within the committee. In general, the US approach to Syria will be less based on personal relationships and more focused on institutional channels and a focus on human rights.”

Yes, because the issue of minorities in Syria obviously plays a part in the anti-Trump vote, but so does the war in Gaza. Ghbeis explains: “Many voted for Abdul el Sayed and for every other candidate who criticised Israel and the aggression against the occupied territories. A minority certainly continued to support Trump, but the war in the Middle East caused him to lose popularity”.

The shift in the U.S. approach—more formal and less casual—comes at a decisive moment for Syria’s economic recovery. A few days ago, Ambassador Barrack painted a stark picture of the country’s situation: “Syria is not a country that generates wealth; it has only just been removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism; we have a very young and capable president who is a defector from al-Nusra and who was widely labelled a terrorist. We have an economic system that lacks cooperative banks, and not even the Central Bank can stabilise the situation. Then there is the problem of integrating Druze, Alawite and Kurdish fighters. For all these reasons, finding anyone willing to come to Syria to invest is almost impossible.” For Vittorio Maresca, a senior analyst at the consultancy firm Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, the economic outlook is less bleak: “Even in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s fall, the forecasts were pessimistic; the World Bank predicted 1 per cent growth, but now the International Monetary Fund has indicated that, in reality, the economic recovery is gathering pace and that by 2026 the Syrian economy’s growth is expected to reach double figures”. Yet Damascus still expects a great deal from Washington. According to Maresca, “as well as removing Syria from the E-1 list, which imposes export restrictions, a fresh impetus is needed to foster dialogue between the American and Syrian banking sectors. The United States should push harder to ensure that banks such as Citibank or JP Morgan can operate in Syria in an environment that is more conducive to commercial transactions, perhaps by covering the due diligence costs that many small and medium-sized enterprises would have to bear in order to resume trade with Syria”.