Satellite restrictions are hampering the Kyiv army at a crucial moment, says Barros of the ISW

Washington. Whilst the debate continues over whether it was Elon Musk or Donald Trump who decided to slow down Starlink and its military counterpart, Starshield, to prevent Ukraine from attacking Russian refineries, these restrictions and the reported difficulties in accessing US intelligence threaten Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, says George Barros, a Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The Washington-based think tank has been monitoring the invasion on a daily basis since 2022, and its front-line maps are a regular reference point for Western governments. But restricting access would not stop the attacks on refineries, he tells Il Foglio. “Neither Starlink nor Starshield, nor any SpaceX communications technology, has ever been granted to Ukraine for use on the territory of the Russian Federation.” 

“It has always been geographically limited to operating solely within Ukraine’s borders,” says Barros. Starlink is helping Ukraine defend itself against new Russian weapons – jet-powered drones – which are causing damage in Kyiv and elsewhere. “The Ukrainians have developed their own interceptors that use Starlink communication technology to intercept those drones,” notes Barros.

In addition to Starlink, U.S. intelligence also plays a crucial role for Ukraine, both in striking Russian targets across the entire front line and in providing early warning of ballistic missile launches, giving civilians a few minutes to reach shelters. “This is extremely important and is not something that can be replaced by private companies or foreign governments,” says Barros. Beyond military use, without those warnings “people will die because ballistic missiles will strike and people will not know about it and will not take the necessary protective measures”.

Throughout 2026, Moscow’s net advance slowed to less than one square kilometre per day across the entire front line, he notes, citing assessments from recent months by the Institute for the Study of War. “2026 was a highly successful year for Ukraine on the front line,” explains Barros. “Since the summer and into the autumn of this year, Ukrainian forces have actually recaptured more territory than Russian forces have gained.”

The most significant breakthrough took place north of Lyman, where the Ukrainian Third Army Corps has been conducting Operation Vivaldi since May. On 14 October, the corps reported that it had captured a further 101 square kilometres by deploying bomber drones and ground robots behind Russian lines and securing local control of the airspace.

“All this is possible thanks to the Ukrainian campaign of medium-range strikes, which has significantly degraded Russian logistics at intermediate ranges,” says Barros. Medium-range attack drones such as the Hornets and Darts are targeting Russian lorries and supply lines between 40 and 150 kilometres behind the front line, guided by Starlink terminals integrated directly into their bodies. Consequently, disrupting the Starlink satellite system “is very damaging to Ukrainian forces because it helps Russia to erode Ukraine’s advantage on the battlefield,” he says, “and the momentum that Ukrainian forces currently have”.

Another key tactic employed by the Ukrainian army that has contributed to its successes on the ground has been the reintroduction of armoured vehicles into combat, despite them being considered vulnerable in an environment dominated by drones. “What we are witnessing today in Ukraine is truly the story of two armies,” said Barros. Faced with skies full of Ukrainian drones, Russia has sidelined its tanks and is sending soldiers forward on foot in groups of two or three, accepting that most will die along the way. Ukraine is moving in the opposite direction: first it takes out Russian drones in a sector of the front, then it brings armoured vehicles back into battle, as it did near Lyman. “A force that knows how to use vehicles will defeat a force that can only move in small groups of two or three people,” argued Barros.

What links all these tools is Delta, a Ukrainian-developed system that Barros describes as the country’s most significant military innovation. Created in 2015 by a group of tech volunteers and now used across all branches of the armed forces, Delta functions as a sort of Google Maps for the military: drone feeds, satellite imagery and reports from the front line all converge in a single place, sometimes even on a mobile phone. According to Ukrainian officials, it has reduced the time between identifying a target and striking it from a maximum of three days to around two minutes. “It is an intelligence advantage that deprives Russian forces of the ability to take Ukrainian forces by surprise, despite their numerical and equipment superiority.”