Three ways to counter Putin’s shadow war against Europe

A drone laden with explosives strikes a cargo plane at Leipzig Airport. A few days later, Poland uncovers a plot to kill a US-Ukrainian citizen in Warsaw. Estonia points the finger at Russia as the mastermind behind an arson attack on a robotics factory. Another arson attack, this time targeting a Latvian charity supporting Ukraine. All this in the month of August alone. To be added to the list of Russian ‘hybrid’ attacks against Europe, whether suspected or confirmed: the plot to assassinate a Rheinmetall executive, the explosives on a DHL cargo plane, the severed cables in the Baltic Sea, the sabotaged railways in Poland, and the drones that paralysed airports in Belgium and Denmark.

The pattern is unmistakable. Russia is waging – and escalating – a shadow war against Europe. A war aimed at frightening and intimidating Europeans into withdrawing their support for Ukraine, but which also serves to test our responses, both operational and political. By constantly testing the waters, Moscow is gathering valuable intelligence for its military planners. The shadow war against Europe follows the same script as the kinetic war against Ukraine.

Europe has taken note. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has put forward a proposal to establish a European Security Council and an emergency security protocol to deal with the possibility of an attack resulting in casualties – a scenario that is bound to become a reality sooner or later, given Russia’s increasingly brazen attacks. EU member states are discussing how to manage the escalation. This is good news. But Europe must face up to three harsh truths.

Firstly: the label ‘hybrid’ has become part of the problem. It encompasses everything from the jamming of GPS signals to arson, from disinformation to murders. This all-encompassing definition downplays the danger posed by these attacks, some of which could be considered state-sponsored terrorism, whilst others are kinetic in nature. It also makes it more difficult to justify a robust response to the European public. By using the ‘hybrid’ label, we are placing these attacks in a separate category from armed aggression, when in fact they could be the prelude to an armed attack.

In the run-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia had carried out a wide range of ‘hybrid’ attacks against Kyiv. With the benefit of hindsight, we realise that these were intended to pave the way for the invasion. They were an integral part of the attack plans, not a series of separate actions. Can we afford to interpret Russia’s ‘hybrid’ attacks against Europe differently?

Secondly: Europe has invested heavily in deterrence by denial. We are securing undersea cables, installing radar to detect drones, and strengthening cyber defences to protect ourselves from attacks. Building resilience is useful, but it is not enough. Vladimir Putin will not stop just because he sees that our critical infrastructure is protected. He will redouble his efforts. Russia only needs to succeed once, whereas we must succeed every time. Resilience is not a sufficient strategy. We need deterrence through punishment. Moscow must see that its attacks will provoke retaliation at such a high cost that the attack becomes unviable.

So far, Europe has done little to deter through punishment. The drone attack in Leipzig is a case in point. Berlin set an example with its decision to attribute the attack to Russia in clear and unequivocal terms. But the response was then primarily diplomatic: the closure of the consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin, the expulsion of intelligence agents operating under diplomatic cover, and the summoning of the Russian ambassador. These measures were all highly effective, but did they really impose a significant cost on Russia? There is no doubt that Moscow has taken note of the response. An attempt to blow up an aeroplane in Europe led to diplomatic retaliation. This is how the test works: Russia tests a threshold, observes the reaction and calibrates its next attack. The weaker the response, the stronger Russia’s push will be. Berlin has undoubtedly calibrated its response to impose a cost whilst avoiding escalation. But what appears to be a de-escalation move is in fact an escalation move, because the conclusion Moscow draws from it is that next time it will be able to go further and with greater force.

The problem for Europe is that we are often unwilling to take symmetrical countermeasures against Russia. We live in democratic states founded on the rule of law: much of what Russia does is off-limits to us; we will not kill Russian businesspeople or blow up Russian cargo planes.

We can, however, respond decisively in an asymmetric manner, striking at Moscow without resorting to kinetic action. A European strategy must focus on these pressure points. Increasing military support for Ukraine, for example by supplying it with Taurus deep-strike missiles, is an obvious step. The Ukrainians are ready to retaliate blow for blow: we can give them the means to do so. Confiscating frozen Russian assets and handing them over to Ukraine could be another response, as could dismantling Russia’s shadow fleet. The cyber domain offers many opportunities to strike hard.

The third point: the threat of escalation is implicit in all Russian attacks. Russia is challenging Europe to react, warning that it is ready to intensify the conflict. It is playing on European countries’ fears that the situation will spiral out of control and degenerate into armed conflict. Yet Russia’s threats of escalation are largely a bluff. Moscow has a long history of backing down in the face of genuine resistance. When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 in 2015, Moscow made a bit of a fuss but was quick to defuse the tension and normalise relations with Ankara. In Ukraine, the war can be seen as a long litany of threats – from attacks in Crimea to Leopard tanks, from HIMARS to F-16s – none of which have ever materialised once Russia’s supposed ‘red lines’ have been crossed. Moscow had also threatened consequences against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO, but nothing came of it. Equally empty were the threats of retaliation against France and the United Kingdom over the seizure of oil tankers from the ‘shadow fleet’.

In drawing up a strategy to counter Russia’s undeclared war, Europe must call a spade a spade. These attacks are not ‘hybrid’, but part of an undeclared war against Europe. Resilience is part of the answer, not the whole answer. To deter Moscow, Europe must impose real costs – costs that really hurt. And this is only possible if we expose Russia’s bluff.