Egypt is still afraid of going to war against the Houthis

Sisi announces a defensive military operation alongside Saudi Arabia, but Parliament is playing for time. There are many doubts, but also a great deal of money at stake

20 OCT 26
Translated by AI
Image of Egypt is still afraid of going to war against the Houthis
Egypt is ready to go to war against the Houthis and to stand alongside Saudi Arabia for defensive purposes, but the announcement, made on Saturday by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi during a ceremony at the Police Academy, remains subject to parliamentary approval, which was expected today but has been postponed until 26 October. It is unclear what is meant by a ‘defensive’ operation; many MPs have voiced their doubts – which is not to be taken for granted in a body often subservient to the president’s will – and there is a risk that the intervention against Yemen could be perceived as a favour to Israel, thereby rousing public anger and, above all, making Egypt a target for the Houthis. (Gambardella continues in Supplement III)
Last but not least, a negative opinion has been issued by Al-Azhar, the religious centre of the country and of the Sunni world, which has stated that it favours the diplomatic route in Yemen. In short, Sisi’s plan – already tentative in its intentions, not least because it would require an explicit request for assistance which Riyadh has not yet formalised – to deploy anti-drone and anti-missile defences in Saudi Arabia has not yet become a reality. It is possible that the Assembly’s vote in favour has merely been postponed, but the delay is in itself already newsworthy for what is, to all intents and purposes, a military dictatorship. For Sisi, demonstrating his readiness for military intervention in the Gulf carries great significance and is a necessary move to breathe new life into the regime.
The timing of his announcement is no coincidence. Last Friday, an article by Asharq Bloomberg revealed negotiations between Riyadh and the Central Bank of Egypt regarding the renewal of bank deposits totalling $5.3 billion, due to mature in October. This is cash that the Saudis are injecting into the central bank, which is vital for addressing Egypt’s precarious economic conditions. Beyond the financial aspect, the solidarity offered by Sisi to Mohammed bin Salman also constitutes a long-awaited response to the substantial damage inflicted by the Houthis on the Egyptian economy. Since 7 October 2023, Egypt has lost $11 billion, according to estimates by the Foreign Ministry in Cairo, due to the closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which has also had repercussions on traffic through the Suez Canal. According to some observers, Sisi’s decision is also influenced by a desire to respond to the interventionism in Yemen – which, to be honest, has been more talked about than actually carried out – by Turkey and Pakistan, which are allied with Riyadh through the Mecca Pact. Finally, another crucial factor taken into account by the president is the large Egyptian population living and working in Saudi Arabia, who are seeking protection from Houthi attacks.
The country’s economic and social stability also hinges on the war in the Gulf, and it is here that Sisi’s great obsession emerges: that of preserving the regime, at any cost. For months now, at every public appearance, the Egyptian president has done nothing but sound the alarm about the risk of a new Arab Spring, and the dangers that would arise from institutional chaos should the people take to the streets to protest once more. “Speak out, tell the people, report what has happened,” he said on Saturday, referring to the Arab Spring. “Because they are trying to distort and erase memory, replacing it with words that – by God – are lies. By God, falsehoods. By God, fabrications.” There was no democratic urgency, no desire for freedom – says Sisi – only chaos. On 29 September, whilst meeting with representatives of local institutions, the president had delivered a more cryptic message: “Any attempt – and this is the effort currently underway – is aimed at pitting the state against itself. If we manage to create problems between the institutions, so much the better. It’s not my fault, it’s the bad guys: the Ministry of the Interior against the judiciary, the army against someone else.” Sisi fears that cracks are appearing within his inner circle – the very group that, in 2013, legitimised and protected the legacy of the military coup. It is a fear the president has voiced at every opportunity. To safeguard the regime, Sisi would even be prepared to step aside. Also on Saturday, he assured that “in 2030 my term as president will end, and this is beyond any question”. According to Mada Masr, one of the country’s few independent news sources, Sisi is said to have gone so far as to tell some MPs that his decision would be dictated by the lessons of the past: “I will not wait for the defence minister to tell me to go to Sharm el-Sheikh,” the president is reported to have said, referring to what happened to former President Hosni Mubarak at the hands of the former defence minister, Mohammed Tantawi.
But behind the formal statements, few analysts genuinely believe the dictator is stepping down – he has made similar announcements in the past, only to renege on them time and again – although this time he has gone so far as to indicate where his successor should be sought. Obviously from within the Armed Forces, and it is no coincidence that Sisi gave this clue during his speech at the Cairo Police Academy, the heart of the regime’s security apparatus. According to the Egyptian journalist and historian Hossam el Hamalawy, “the Military Academy has become a tool for militarising the civil bureaucracy, selecting recruits and subjecting teachers, diplomats, civil servants and other professionals to military training and ideological indoctrination. Sisi is now proposing to extend this model to the political ruling class itself”.
The general’s son, Mahmoud al Sisi, remains in the running – a possibility so far ruled out by the president, whose word, however, is anything but final.