Drones and know-how. How Kyiv became an industrial partner for European defence. Mistakes to avoid

Ukraine is becoming a key issue in the European election debate, but politicians continue to portray it through an increasingly outdated lens: that of a country which receives weapons, consumes Western resources and represents a cost to taxpayers. This is a misrepresentation, which risks obscuring the most significant transformation brought about by nearly five years of large-scale war. Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of European aid.

Ukraine has become a contributor to the continent’s security, a technological and industrial partner capable of offering expertise that Western armed forces and industries have an interest in acquiring. This reality should be at the heart of the political debate in Italy and France. Instead, just as new elections approach, military support for Kyiv is being used as a tool for internal political rivalry. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni continues to declare her support for Ukraine, but her rhetoric does not match the timely delivery of new aid packages. On the left, differences over military aid risk undermining the formation of a centre-left alliance. In France, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, both frontrunners in the polls, are challenging the continuation of various aspects of the Western strategy – albeit from different starting points – and are promising to halt arms deliveries to Ukraine.

Yet, whilst the political debate continues to portray military aid as money that leaves Paris or Rome and vanishes into Ukraine, a far more complex industrial reality is taking shape. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, responding to a question about the prospects of a possible Le Pen victory and a potential cut in aid, hit upon precisely this point when he said that Le Pen does not have a proper understanding of the details of military cooperation between France and Ukraine. Kyiv is no longer merely a recipient of Western weapons; it has become a partner with operational expertise. This expertise holds military and industrial value – the value of Ukrainian experience, which is difficult to replicate through exercises and simulations.

The Russian invasion has forced a rapid development of drones, interception systems, electronic warfare, sensors and software. The Ukrainian military has had to continually adapt to Russian countermeasures, modifying techniques and systems within timeframes often incompatible with normal Western industrial development cycles. The knowledge gained through this process does not belong solely to Ukraine; rather, through cooperation, it can become a resource for European defence. Indeed, Western companies have already begun to test technologies, identify vulnerabilities and develop more effective solutions. Furthermore, agreements with Ukrainian industry are fostering collaboration in research, maintenance and production. In Italy, opportunities are available for various companies seeking to cooperate on drones, unmanned systems, air defence, vehicles and related components.

It is this reciprocity that the debate on aid tends to overlook. When Italy authorises a military supply, the cost does not necessarily constitute the full budget for the operation; such collaboration can open up industrial opportunities, develop expertise and contribute to a security system on which Italy itself also depends.

In France, the industrial dimension is even more evident. Ukraine has announced an initial order for sixteen Rafale fighter jets, whilst programmes have been outlined for four Samp/T Ng air defence systems, radars, missiles and aircraft armaments. The opportunities involve Dassault Aviation, Thales, MBDA and Safran, as well as the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam. Cooperation initiatives have also been launched regarding the licensed production of systems such as the Aster 30 and the Scalp, as well as joint innovation projects. Not all of these programmes have yet resulted in deliveries or recognised revenue, but they demonstrate how the relationship with Kyiv can support industrial activities that go far beyond the simple donation of military equipment.

In this context, Ukraine is not merely the end market for Western products; it is also a partner that can contribute to their development. This cooperation enables French and Italian industries to understand which technologies actually work, which are vulnerable and which need to be updated. Operational information, when shared through appropriate agreements, can reduce development times and improve systems intended for the European armed forces. Therefore, the value generated is not measured solely in terms of sales to Kyiv; it can also be reflected in the international competitiveness of businesses and in the military preparedness of European countries.

According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, Italy’s military aid to Ukraine has totalled 3 billion euros (approximately 0.13 per cent of GDP) since 2022, whilst France’s has amounted to 6.2 billion (0.21 per cent of GDP). After nearly five years of war, the debate often continues to portray these interventions as a one-way expense, despite the fact that they are decidedly modest compared to the challenges that the Russian war in Ukraine poses to European security and an increasingly fragile global order. There is a lack of sufficient reflection on the value of technological cooperation and on Ukraine’s contribution to common defence. If Kyiv develops technologies, provides operational expertise and participates in production, the question is not merely how much it costs to support it, but how much it would cost Europe to forgo this collaboration. And to forgo it for the sake of electoral expediency would risk proving a costly choice, not only for Ukraine, but for the security of those who are currently debating whether to continue doing so.