Glucksmann’s challenge: the socialist seeking support from the left and the centre-right

Nice. Raphaël Glucksmann’s victory in the Socialists’ open primaries is not a neutral development in the race for the French presidential election. His clear victory in the first round already gives him strong political legitimacy, despite the fallout from the internal contest. Some within the party leadership, such as Secretary Olivier Faure or Ségolène Royal, have suffered a heavy defeat and may be tempted to work against him. Within the Socialist Party, however, there is a strong desire to regain competitiveness following the disappointing results in the last presidential elections: Benoît Hamon secured just 4.6 per cent in 2017, while Anne Hidalgo managed only 1.7 per cent in 2022. Glucksmann had led the Socialist list to 13.84 per cent in the 2024 European elections. The dynamics of the presidential race are certainly different, not least because his pro-European and pro-Ukrainian message was very strong in the European elections. But one should not underestimate the ability of a moderate candidate – one who has never been compromised by Emmanuel Macron – to rally support. The incumbent president has become a sort of kryptonite for French politics, and those who have been close to him emerge weakened.

Now, following his election victory, Glucksmann must work to reunite the Socialist Party around him: the party structure is a key lever for financial and organisational resources. His stance – anti-Mélenchon and pro-European – is very clear and reflects the candidate’s strong identity, as someone who stands against anti-Semitism and has a long history of working in Ukraine. Glucksmann is also the product of a family history that is anything but ordinary, intertwined with that of the European left: Ashkenazi Jewish activists from Central Europe, French communist partisans and, above all, the role played by his father André in the French intellectual landscape following 1968. It is a very strong identity, which lends him multiple dimensions and also makes him the bearer of a post-communist reformist legacy. In many respects, he embodies a certain Parisian world, which could prove to be a major limitation for a candidate who does not appear to be rooted in the heart of France. Yet this identity, which also encompasses his Jewish heritage, is a passive, inherited trait that leaves the candidate complete freedom to manoeuvre in other political arenas. This became apparent straight away: Glucksmann has launched a strategy to win back the left, prioritising environmental, economic and social issues.

All this could pose a problem for Mélenchon, who has built his party’s identity as a left-wing protest party – partly through the systematic condemnation of police violence – but also as a pro-Muslim party, which pushes him towards an anti-Israeli stance that often borders on anti-Semitism. La France Insoumise (LFI) rejects Glucksmann because he represents aspects of identity perceived as hostile. We can therefore expect a fierce, at times violent, attack from Mélenchon’s party, and this is not a favourable scenario for LFI: a contest on the left will ensue in which Glucksmann’s camp will come under fire, at times even facing physical aggression, and this will further alienate moderates from Mélenchon. Of course, Mélenchon will secure the full support of his protest electorate and may even capitalise on the current wave of demonstrations in France. But none of this will enable him to broaden his support base.

On the other hand, whilst Glucksmann is engaged in the battle on the left to attract voters tempted by a ‘tactical vote’ in favour of Mélenchon, he is in fact also a candidate capable of drawing in moderates from the centre-right, thanks to the clarity of his international, pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian stances. Potentially, therefore, Glucksmann takes votes away from Macron’s successors, Attal and Philippe. So far, Philippe has appeared to be the passive ‘lowest common denominator’ candidate – the one on whom moderates could rally in the absence of any other option to challenge Marine Le Pen in the second round. If Glucksmann generates momentum following the launch of the primaries, he could establish a competitive challenge capable of siphoning off some support from Mélenchon and, above all, winning over a section of Attal and Philippe’s electorate. The relatively low levels of support for these leaders – a far cry from the 30 per cent attributed to Marine Le Pen – mean that even small shifts in support can carry significant weight. Whilst the picture on the centre-left is becoming clearer, the centre-right remains dominated by three candidates (Attal, Philippe and Retailleau), a number that already appears problematic, given the likely cannibalisation of their respective voter bases.