Why has support for Israel eroded so much in America?

The Israeli version of 11 September had long-term consequences for the Jewish state similar to those experienced by America in the years following the attack on the Twin Towers. The outpouring of international solidarity that followed the horror of September 2001 was succeeded by a wave of anti-American sentiment – in the Middle East but also in Europe – linked above all to the war in Iraq. The consequences are still being felt today, a quarter of a century later. Similarly, the Hamas massacre of 7 October 2023 initially generated support for Israel, which then shifted dramatically as military operations in Gaza intensified. This happened to some extent all over the world, but three years on, it is surprising to discover just how deeply that moment has marked America, both politically and culturally. This shift is surprising given the depth of the bond that has always united Washington and Tel Aviv, and the special relationship that the Jewish state has enjoyed with the United States since its inception.

Since 2001, Gallup pollsters have been measuring Americans’ sympathies towards Israelis and Palestinians on an annual basis. Israel has always led the poll, but in February this year the tables turned: 41 per cent of Americans side with the Palestinians, 36 per cent with the Israelis (the remainder are undecided). Three years ago, the figures stood at 54–31 in favour of the Jewish people over their Arab neighbours, and at the start of the century they were around 55–15. Support for the recognition of a Palestinian state and for the ‘two-state’ solution is at an all-time high.

While Republicans as a whole have not shifted their positions significantly, it is primarily Democrats, young people and independents who have radically changed their views on Israel. This shift could have a significant impact on the mid-term elections in November and, above all, on the 2028 presidential elections. It is a landmark development in a country which, from the end of the Second World War to the present day, has managed to argue internally about just about everything, yet has usually remained unwavering on one issue, regardless of the administration in power: support for Israel. This stance is rooted in a decision made on 14 May 1948: eleven minutes after David Ben-Gurion had declared Israel’s independence in Tel Aviv, Democratic President Harry Truman responded from Washington by recognising the newly-born state (even going against the advice of Secretary of State George Marshall).

Since then, the ironclad alliance with Israel has been a constant feature of American foreign policy. Not always without friction, to be honest. Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, Eisenhower forced Israel, along with France and Britain, to withdraw from Egypt. But the course had already been set. John Kennedy was the first to sell sophisticated weapons – Hawk anti-aircraft missiles – to the Jewish state, in 1962. Lyndon Johnson, after the Six-Day War, deployed American fighter jets over Israeli airspace. And in October 1973, with Golda Meir’s army in dire straits during the Yom Kippur War, Richard Nixon ordered an airlift which, in the space of a month, transported over twenty thousand tonnes of military equipment to Israel.

From then on, every president has left their mark. Jimmy Carter with the Camp David Accords between Begin and Sadat in 1978; Bill Clinton with the handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993. Not even the most strained personal relationships have undermined the pact. Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu never saw eye to eye, and in 2015 he saw Netanyahu come to Congress to speak out against his nuclear deal with Iran. The following year, however, he signed off on the largest military aid package in history: $38 billion over ten years.

During his first term, Donald Trump moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, which was inaugurated on 14 May 2018, exactly seventy years after Truman’s decision. He then brokered the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain. In Congress, meanwhile, voting in favour of Israel was a formality: in 2021, funding for the Iron Dome missile defence system passed the House with 420 votes in favour and 9 against. Then came 7 October. Eleven days later, Joe Biden was at Tel Aviv airport embracing Netanyahu. On 25 October, the House passed a resolution in support of Israel by 412 votes to 10. It was the last time America found itself so united.

This year, American aircraft struck Iran alongside Israeli ones, yet the country has never been so divided over the Jewish state. The figures clearly illustrate the divide. A week after the Hamas massacre, an Economist/YouGov poll found that 48 per cent of Americans supported the Israelis, compared with 10 per cent for the Palestinians. At the end of September this year, the same question yielded a 26 per cent to 25 per cent split: the narrowest margin since the institute began asking it in 2011. The Pew Research Centre, which instead measures Americans’ views on Israel as a country, saw negative views rise to 60 per cent – almost twenty percentage points higher than in 2022. Those with a "very unfavourable" view have almost tripled, from 10 per cent to 28 per cent. Among Democrats, negative views have reached around 80 per cent. The most unexpected sign, however, comes from the right: 57 per cent of Republicans under the age of fifty now view Israel unfavourably.

For years, the distinction between the Netanyahu government and the Israeli people has acted as a buffer. That distinction is now also eroding: according to Pew, negative views of Israelis have risen from 28 per cent in 2024 to 42 per cent this year. In June, according to Quinnipiac, 48 per cent of voters believed that America supports Israel too much. This is the highest figure since the question was first asked in 2017. The war with Iran has accelerated the trend. Today, according to AP-NORC, 69 per cent of Americans believe that war was not worth fighting.

The shift is also evident in Congress. For the past two years, Senator Bernie Sanders has repeatedly tabled resolutions to block individual arms shipments to Israel, and each time he has garnered more support amongst Democrats. In April 2025 there were 15; by July, 27. On 15 April this year, 40 out of 47 voted to block the sale of military bulldozers, whilst 36 voted against the sale of 1,000-pound bombs. The resolutions were rejected by the Republican majority.

The role of AIPAC, the pro-Israeli lobby that for decades has courted both Republicans and Democrats with equal success, has also changed. Once, its support was a golden ticket. Today, in the Democratic primaries, it has become a toxic label. Progressive candidates, as well as moderates and those aspiring to the White House, are announcing that they will reject its funding. Opponents now wield the label ‘AIPAC candidate’ as a weapon. Within the Republican camp, however, its influence remains undiminished: in May, it helped determine the outcome of the most expensive House primaries in history, those in Kentucky, where Trump threw his full weight behind ousting the outgoing MP Thomas Massie, who has long opposed him.

The outcome of the mid-term elections in early November will reveal the extent to which pro-Palestinian stances and criticism of Israel – which characterised the campaigns of progressive and social-democratic candidates, particularly that of Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan – have paid off, as well as the attacks on Netanyahu by New York’s mayor, Zohran Mamdani. But even on the right, the anti-Israel wing (which at times even descends into anti-Semitism) boasts powerful and influential voices such as those of news presenter Tucker Carlson, former MP Marjorie Taylor Greene and former counter-terrorism chief Joe Kent. Following the November election, taking a stance on Israel will become a decisive factor in the long run-up to the 2028 presidential election and could become a central issue for figures such as J. D. Vance, Marco Rubio, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Gavin Newsom. Deciding whether and how to support Israel in the future is no longer a foregone conclusion and will be a difficult call for anyone aspiring to the White House.