The intertwined destinies of Israel and Ukraine

It is clear who we are referring to, is it not? Some time has passed, of course, but by now it should be evident to everyone what is at stake when we discuss its defence, when we recall that its borders are also ours, when we endeavour to remind ourselves that its enemies are our enemies, and when we attempt to explain that safeguarding its freedom often goes hand in hand with defending our own. It has been some time, to be sure, but as the years pass, it becomes necessary to return to first principles in order to recall what is at stake—when we discuss its history, its sovereignty, or its borders under assault. It has been a while, of course, but never more so than today, given the times we live in, is it worth making the effort to remember why its history is there to remind us every day of some fundamental principles concerning a crucial asset: the defence of our democracy.

It is important to remember that the attack on its borders does not arise by chance but develops over time: it builds up, becomes entrenched, gains legitimacy, and when it escalates, one wonders how it could have happened. It is essential to remain vigilant and avoid falling into the trap set by those who seek to confuse victims with aggressors, placing them on the same level, minimising the aggression in order to demonise the defence. We must also be careful not to be drawn into the fallacy of equating a terrorist act with an action taken to defend oneself against terrorists. 

We must remember that defending its existence, its integrity and its very survival does not simply mean wanting to engage in foreign policy by meddling in affairs that might concern us to a certain extent; rather, it means, quite simply, realising that the integrity of that border concerns the integrity of our own borders, our society and our future. We must also remember that every time that country defends itself against an Iranian drone, every time it defends itself against Russian interference, every time that country defends itself to repel an attack, it is not merely defending its own citizens, but is defending all those around the world who dream of weakening that axis of terror – pampered by Beijing – which stretches from Moscow to Tehran via Hamas and Pyongyang.

It must also be borne in mind that the rearmament which should, of course, be a cause for concern is not its own but, if anything, that being carried out by its enemies amidst the indifference of international public opinion: if a democracy rearms, as we know, public opinion tends to call it ‘escalation’; if, on the other hand, an enemy of democracy rearms, public opinion tends to call that rearmament ‘resistance’. This distinction should be kept in mind, but there is much more to consider. It should be remembered that, in the face of its defensive war—which is a war to defend its very existence—being a non-hypocritical pacifist does not mean calling for the white flag to be waved, but rather hoping for its victory on all fronts.

It should also be remembered that democracies at war make mistakes, and when they do, even whilst at war, the people remind them of this, as does public opinion; but it should also be remembered that, however much a democracy at war may err, there is a huge difference between those who fight to strike military targets and those who fight to strike civilian targets. This distinction should be kept in mind, and it is also worth recalling, finally, that when there is a victim of aggression and an aggressor, it is worth asking ourselves, every now and then, when speaking, reasoning, debating, writing or engaging in politics, whether one is beginning to take the side of the aggressor rather than that of the victim – and when one’s own ideas bear a striking resemblance to those of the aggressor, one must perhaps ask oneself whether one is not doing something to turn the aggressor into the victim and the victim into the aggressor. Finally, it should be remembered that, when discussing its defence, safeguarding one’s own security does not merely mean intercepting: it means reducing the adversary’s ability to continue striking; it means knowing how to forge alliances; it means not being afraid to talk about deterrence and to put it into practice. All this should be remembered, but it should also be borne in mind, when discussing its existence and its borders, just how dangerous double standards are – standards that lead us to harbour a deep sense of guilt towards those who, in a war, most closely resemble the West – and how much it can, on the other hand, play into the hands of those who sponsor terror to portray those fighting a war – even in self-defence – as villains until proven otherwise, who always have something to be forgiven for.

If you have reached this point in the article and are wondering who we are talking about, you will have understood the point we have been trying to make. Ukraine and Israel are different countries, fighting different wars, but facing symmetrical adversaries, mirror-image threats, wars of aggression they did not seek, and terrorist attacks against them that they did not want. Two sovereign countries that must contend with an international public opinion which, quite casually, tends to portray two democracies under attack as two democracies that are the aggressors. Two countries under attack which, every day – with their problems, mistakes and difficulties – stand there, before us, defending the frontiers of freedom and democracy, fighting against the global sponsors of terror; and which, every day, whilst the West nurtures its sense of guilt, do nothing but act to defend a right we often forget: the right to exist.

It has been a while, of course, but by now it should be clear to everyone what is at stake when we speak of defending its and their interests, when we are reminded that its and their borders are also our borders, when we try to remember that its enemies are our enemies, when we attempt to explain that safeguarding its and their freedom often goes hand in hand with defending our own freedom. Those who defend Ukraine’s right to exist but not Israel’s, and those who defend Israel’s right to exist but not Ukraine’s, end up defending only half of freedom. And as Filippo Turati taught us long ago, half a freedom, sooner or later, ceases to be freedom.