Europe is spending more on defence than it has in thirty years. But it is not ready

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has never spent so much on defence. According to EU sources consulted by ANSA, in 2025 the 27 member states’ defence spending reached 418 billion euros, 2.2 per cent of the Union’s GDP, and could rise to 547 billion by 2029. The figures come from the annual Defence Readiness Report, drawn up by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in collaboration with the Commission, and presented today to Coreper. The full text of the report has not yet been made public. The European roadmap stipulates that the annual report is to be submitted to the heads of state and government at the European Council in October.

Reuters, however, has read the executive summary prepared for the leaders, and the verdict is clear: the EU is not rearming quickly enough or effectively enough to be ready to defend itself against Russia by 2030. The agency writes that national plans “do not appear sufficient” to address the shortfalls in air and missile defence, land combat, naval forces, ammunition stocks and drones. To achieve this, more needs to be done – and much faster than at present. The report acknowledges progress on spending, capability development and industrial readiness, underpinned by closer partnerships, particularly with Ukraine. But the message to governments is that this is not enough.

The date given is no coincidence. 2030 is the deadline set by the March 2025 Defence White Paper: citing intelligence, Commissioner Andrius Kubilius had stated that Moscow was preparing to test NATO’s Article 5, and that within five years, or even sooner, it might be capable of attacking one or more EU countries.

In short, the money is there, and it is growing faster than expected. Between 2022 and 2025, spending rose by 47 per cent. In 2025, equipment purchases reached 115 billion, and twenty-three member states spent at least 2 per cent of their GDP. The forecast for 2026 stands at 454 billion, 2.4 per cent of GDP. But turning those billions into ammunition and drones is no easy task. As early as July, the EDA warned that the race is being held back by the armed forces’ capacity to absorb and spend the funds: industrial lead times, administrative processes, personnel, and long-term sustainability. And then there is the age-old flaw in European defence: fragmentation. In 2025, purchases made with other partners accounted for just 24 per cent of the total – a long way from the EU’s target of at least 40 per cent of equipment being procured jointly by 2030. More is being spent, but each country is acting on its own.

Brussels’ response, for now, lies in projects. Last Monday, five European defence projects of common interest were formally approved: drones, air and missile defence, military space, maritime and seabed security, and defence of the eastern flank. These are precisely the areas that the report identifies as gaps. But approving a programme does not mean having armed forces ready. Years can pass between the signing of a project and the delivery of an anti-aircraft battery. There are only four years to go until 2030 and, unfortunately, Europe does not set the timetable. This week, Moscow handed NATO a non-paper in which it threatens to use its entire arsenal should the Alliance attempt to isolate Kaliningrad. The money, at last, is there. Time, however, is in much shorter supply.