After Sudan, Tigray: yet another diplomatic fiasco for America

In Tigray, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, fighting has resumed between the rebels and the Addis Ababa-based armed forces. But the war, which claimed over 600,000 lives between 2020 and 2022 alone, now risks becoming entangled with all the other conflicts in the region – those in Sudan, Somalia and the Red Sea – each with its own humanitarian crisis. Ever since the Pretoria Agreement was signed four years ago, both the rebels of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Ahmed Abiy’s government have accused one another of breaching the peace. U.S. sanctions had, until now, curbed the risk of a new conflict. That was until 18 September, when Washington allowed the sanctions against Eritrea to lapse and lifted those against Ethiopia. 

As if a trigger had been pulled, just two days later the TPLF signed an agreement with the Fano, the ethno-nationalist militia of the Amhara region, and with five other armed rebel groups, all united by a single objective: to overthrow what they call the regime of Ahmed Abiy, ironically the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize laureate for having brought an end to the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Just a few days later, on Wednesday, the TPLF attacked and seized control of all three airports in Tigray, triggering Ethiopia’s counter-offensive. The rebels then declared that they were in a state of ‘defensive war’, thus marking the beginning of a second dramatic chapter in the war.

The rebel alliance describes Abiy’s government as dictatorial and genocidal, guilty of concentrating all wealth in the hands of a few, transforming Addis Ababa into a futuristic and modern capital whilst leaving mere crumbs for the outlying areas, each with a distinct ethnic identity. Abiy, on the other hand, regards the TPLF as a puppet in the hands of Eritrea. The dictator of Asmara, Isaias Afwerki, in turn, fears that Tigray is merely the first step and that the next will be Assab, the port on the Red Sea which Abiy dreams of getting his hands on to gain access to the sea.

For the time being, the fighting is concentrated in the northern regions of Afar and Amhara, both of which are strategic: the former is the transit route for supplies arriving in Ethiopia by sea via the port of Djibouti, whilst the latter provides the route to Addis Ababa. The superiority of the Ethiopian Armed Forces – which, unlike the rebels, are equipped with an air force – is made all the more overwhelming by the ongoing friction between the various rebel groups, divided by their aspirations and ethnic affiliations. Nevertheless, observers agree that the risk lies in the war spreading across the region, leading to an even longer and more dramatic conflict. There are many potential actors involved. Eritrea, which already supports the Fano, could take action against Ethiopia at any moment. There is also speculation about Sudan’s involvement, where the central government in Khartoum is hostile towards Addis Ababa due to the latter’s support for the Rapid Support Forces and its close ties with the United Arab Emirates. Finally, there is the regional instability stretching from the Red Sea – which has come under attack from Yemen’s Houthis – to Somalia. All these conflicts now risk becoming intertwined, whilst the Trump administration is proving unable to fulfil its role as mediator between the warring parties. Following the diplomatic disaster in Sudan, on Wednesday the U.S. ambassador to Addis Ababa, Ervin J. Massinga, openly defended the government, describing the rebels’ mobilisation as “a wrong decision”. In doing so, Washington immediately relinquished any potential claim to act as an impartial arbiter.

In this highly unstable scenario, Italy is among the most vulnerable of the Western countries. A cornerstone of the Meloni government’s strategy in Africa and a key partner in the Mattei Plan, Ethiopia is also at the heart of a complex network of trade and investment links with Italy. Following the construction by the Italian firm Webuild of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile – Africa’s largest dam and hydroelectric power station, but also a controversial project due to the geopolitical implications of Nile water management between Ethiopia and Egypt – other major infrastructure projects remain on hold. These include the construction of the Koysha hydroelectric dam, a 1,800-megawatt project that had been held up by the enormous foreign debt accumulated in recent years under President Abiy’s administration. Just ten days ago, Bloomberg reported a significant step towards unblocking the project’s completion: the imminent conclusion of an agreement with three Italian banks for a loan of 400 million euros. The deal was expected to be finalised by October, but it is unclear whether and how things will now change, given the resumption of the war in Tigray.

Then there is the diplomatic aspect which, as is well known, recently reached its most complicated point with the recall to Italy of our ambassador, Sem Fabrizi, which took place in circumstances that have still not been clarified by the Meloni government. About ten days ago, news emerged of the appointment of his successor, the former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom, Riccardo Smimmo. Whilst it is true that the Ethiopian president is said to have pushed for Fabrizi’s removal due to various misunderstandings, our new representative will face the arduous task of managing relations between Rome and Addis Ababa during one of the most complex periods in recent history. Whilst during the first Tigray conflict both the rebels and Addis Ababa were implicated in war crimes documented by the United Nations, the new war looks set to be yet another humanitarian disaster.