The responsibilities of those who call everyone a warmonger except Putin

Perhaps the time has come to stop talking about the Russian war against Ukraine as if it were a conflict confined to the trenches of the Donbas. In recent weeks, Russia has been extending its aggressive actions ever closer to the heart of Europe: drone attacks, cyber operations, sabotage and covert activities. Germany has attributed to Moscow an attempted drone attack on Leipzig Airport; a drone was shot down in Lithuania; two Italian Air Force fighter jets took off from the Šiauliai base, also in Lithuania, to intercept and drive off two Russian jets; the Danish authorities have raised the alarm over preparations for possible sabotage operations against the defence industry; Emmanuel Macron stated that in recent weeks the Russian hybrid threat against Europe and France has intensified and that, should a physical attack ever occur, there would not necessarily be any warning. And Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, based on information received from the intelligence services, warned that Russia could carry out ‘accidental’ attacks using drones or missiles against NATO countries, including Poland, precisely with the aim of paralysing or weakening the allies’ resolve to react and invoke Article 5.

At this point, we must ask ourselves a difficult question: if this were actually to happen, who would be responsible, apart from Russia, of course?

It would be all too easy to answer by simply naming Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, Giuseppe Conte, Roberto Vannacci or the other politicians who have helped to promote, in varying ways, a strongly critical view of Western support for Ukraine and the policy of deterrence towards Russia.

No. The responsibility, should we ever reach that point, would be far greater. Because any Russian attack on a European country resulting in death and destruction would not arise in a vacuum; it would also be the result of a perception that has developed over time: that of a politically divided West and Europe, of societies increasingly unwilling to bear the costs of their own security, and of public opinion that has been told for years that war could have been prevented simply by making a few concessions, a few more phone calls or a few more rounds of negotiations. In this regard, responsibility lies with all those who have helped to create this illusion.

Not those who called for peace – calling for it is obvious and legitimate. But, limiting the analysis to the Italian case, those who for years downplayed Russian threats and the Kremlin’s intentions; those who presented the invasion as the inevitable result of the West’s mistakes; those who helped convince Italians that all this could have been avoided simply by taking another step towards Moscow; those who claimed that negotiation alone would suffice; those who led people to believe that peace depended almost exclusively on Ukraine’s willingness to cede territory, describing the Russian invasion as a territorial dispute rather than a matter of European security; those who accused the European Union of being ‘warmongers’ because it supported Ukraine’s ability to defend itself; those who for years called for a mythical ‘European negotiator’, knowing – or having a duty to know – that no negotiator can impose a compromise on a power that believes it can achieve more through force; and, above all, those who turned Ukraine’s security into a ‘Ukrainian issue’, when it was clear that it concerned the entire European continent.

All of these individuals have contributed, each within the scope of their own responsibilities, to making it more difficult for European democracies to explain to their citizens why security comes at a cost and why deterrence is necessary.

Political rhetoric does, in fact, shape a society’s perception of its own responsibilities and security. And a society that has been told for years that deterrence is provocation, that rearmament is escalation, that supporting a country under attack means ‘wanting war’, and that every problem can be resolved through a new compromise, may find itself unprepared when that solution is no longer sufficient.

Once again, the problem is not having argued for the need for diplomacy or negotiation – indispensable tools of international politics; the problem is having often presented them as though simply wanting them were enough to make them possible, without seriously questioning the other side’s willingness to reach an agreement. For years, the European Union has been accused of not doing enough on the diplomatic front, and there have been persistent calls for Europe to appoint its own negotiator. But a mediator can only secure an agreement if there is a genuine willingness on the other side to reach one. If the Kremlin’s political objective is not a compromise, but the subordination of Kyiv to its policies and the redefinition of the European security order, the absence of negotiations cannot be explained simply by Europe’s inability or ill will.

Even more serious was the portrayal of the war as a mere territorial dispute, leading a section of the Italian public to believe that a compromise between Russia and Ukraine could have brought it to an end. This was despite the fact that the conflict has always simultaneously concerned territory, sovereignty, security and the international order. For this reason, simply referring to the ‘Ukrainian issue’ was a strategic error, the political consequences of which cannot be ignored. Indeed, part of the public debate ended up portraying, directly or indirectly, the European Union as a ‘warmongering’ force, pitted against a supposed Russian willingness for peace, thwarted by European intransigence. The result has been a gradual erosion of trust amongst some Italians in European institutions and in the need for a common response.

And this is where the Italian debate of recent years takes on a responsibility that can no longer be dismissed as a mere difference of opinion. Because deterrence does not rely solely on tanks, missiles and defence budgets. It also relies on political credibility. If the adversary believes that a society is so deeply divided that it cannot distinguish between aggressor and victim, between deterrence and provocation, between defence and offensive warfare, that division can become a strategic vulnerability.

In recent years, Moscow has been observing not only Europe’s military capabilities, but also its public debate, its political cohesion and its ability to take decisions. It has seen how easily a measure to support Ukraine can be turned into a test of ‘warmongering’ and how simple it is to pit peace against security, as if they were alternative concepts. Above all, it has assessed how credible Europe’s willingness to act in unison really is.

Deterrence also depends on the adversary’s conviction that, once a certain threshold is crossed, the response will be united and resolute. Should this conviction falter, our divisions would themselves become a risk factor. And if the Kremlin were to conclude that an attack on a European country would not provoke a united response, that perception could contribute to increasing the risk of aggression.

This is why the responsibility for public debate is enormous. It does not mean demanding that everyone support the same policy, nor does it mean preventing dissent over how to support Ukraine. It does, however, mean insisting that the reality is explained to voters in all its complexity: what Russia’s stated and observable objectives are, what the risks to European security are, what the costs of the various strategies are, and what conditions would actually make negotiations possible.

Peace does not come any closer simply because it is called for. Negotiations do not become possible simply because they are proposed. And a compromise is not necessarily a solution if one of the parties believes that time, the opponent’s divisions or the threat of force might enable it to achieve more.

For this reason, if tomorrow a Russian drone were to strike Polish, Lithuanian or Romanian territory with fatal consequences, or if a Russian missile were to reach the territory of some other NATO country – whether deliberately or under the guise of an ‘accident’ – we could not simply ask ourselves why Putin decided to do so; we would also have to ask ourselves why he believed he could do so without provoking a truly unified European response.

So it will not be enough simply to point the finger at Trump, Salvini, Conte or Vannacci. We must also look at all those – from politicians to journalists, from ‘geopolitical experts’ to columnists – who, in recent years, have contributed to undermining the awareness within European society, and in our case within Italian society, that security comes at a price, that deterrence requires credibility, and that an attack on Ukraine does not concern only the Ukrainians.

Peace is not defended by telling voters what they want to hear. Peace is defended by telling them – even when it is uncomfortable – how much it can cost to lose it.