In Iraq, the new geometry of the ‘axis of resistance’ is taking shape

The axis of resistance has changed shape. Its head, based in Tehran, is extending its tentacles through a leaner and more effective organisation, suited to the changed scenario following 7 October. On the ground, confirmation came on 29 July, following a US airstrike in Iraq. It was then discovered that among the victims was a Houthi commander, known by his nom de guerre Abu Khalid. The presence of Yemeni military personnel in Iraq confirmed rumours that had been circulating for about a year: Houthi terrorists had been deployed to Iraq to fight the pro-Shia militias’ war against the Americans and the Saudis. Last Sunday, a drone attack launched from Iraq destroyed the oil pipeline that cuts the Arabian Peninsula in two from east to west. This incident may be the result of this new form of collaboration between Iraqi militias and the Houthis, orchestrated by Iran. The attack was presumably launched from the Maysan-Babil-Wasit triangle, which stretches from the capital, Baghdad, to the south-east of Iraq. Months ago, sources at the Arabic-language newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported on a headquarters in Jurf al-Sakhar, a pro-Iranian stronghold 60 kilometres from Baghdad. A cell of Houthi militants is said to have been operating there since June 2024.

Co-operation between the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq is nothing new. Even before 7 October, coordination between the forces of the ‘axis of resistance’ was the norm, also involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. What has been changing recently is the structure and purpose of this co-operation. In the past, the Pasdaran were mainly engaged in media campaigns or in training allied forces in proxy countries. In exceptional cases, the Pasdaran would intervene for defensive purposes through liaison officers stationed abroad. The current model has changed, and last March it was Esmail Qaani himself – commander of Iran’s Quds Force special forces, which handle special missions abroad – who explained how. Qaani spoke of “unifying the operations centres”, placing them under more centralised control that reports directly to Tehran. Technically, this involves creating combat cells comprising just a few dozen members selected from various disparate militias. This not only makes it more difficult to identify and neutralise them but, above all, removes them from the control of the individual militias, concentrating that control in Iran. The problem of fragmentation among Iraqi armed groups – and Tehran’s difficulty in keeping them all under its control – had become particularly apparent after 7 October. Whilst some militias had joined the all-out war declared by Iran against Israel and the United States, others remained neutral, whilst still others carried out attacks without claiming responsibility. The world “will have to get used to this new order in the region”, Qaani had said, articulating this sort of corollary to the Soleimani doctrine – named after his predecessor, who had devised the system of Iranian-led proxies in the region.

Whilst the ‘Axis of Resistance’ adapts as times change, the Iraqi government remains unable to do the same. In mid-July, when he travelled to Washington to meet U.S. President Donald Trump, Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi promised what many analysts deemed impossible: to persuade the pro-Iranian militias operating in the country to lay down their arms and join the regular Iraqi forces by the end of September, just in time before the last American soldier left the country, as planned by the White House. As we reach the middle of the month, the number of militias persuaded to sever the umbilical cord linking them to Tehran remains meagre. Yesterday, the Yazidi Resistance Units, which took part in the war against Islamic State, declared themselves willing to lay down their arms, but they number only a few men, and are, moreover, far more malleable than the more die-hard groups. From Kataib Hezbollah to the Badr Brigades, via Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, all the military formations technically incorporated into the Popular Mobilisation Forces and paid by the Baghdad government continue to answer exclusively to Tehran and also rely on the support of pro-Iranian political parties in Parliament and television broadcasters. Having described al-Zaidi as a ‘warrior’ during his visit to Washington, Trump’s doubts about the Iraqi Prime Minister’s actual ability to keep his promise now appear to be growing. Kurdish sources repeatedly emphasise the Americans’ anger, as they would like to revive a threat previously mooted during the time of al-Zaidi’s predecessor, when Abu Shia al-Sudani was head of government: to freeze Iraqi bank accounts held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where all the money derived from oil production ends up. For Iraq, this would mean economic collapse; for the United States, it would be the spark to ignite the chaos that Trump says he is so keen to avert.