It is all-out war in Ukraine. Analyst Bielieskov speaks out

Kyiv. On 8 September, at 3:30 a.m., residents of Kyiv were jolted awake by loud explosions caused by ballistic missiles. Fires broke out in seven districts of the city, and thick plumes of smoke filled the sky. Five people were killed, 24 were injured and 14 buildings were damaged. Several warehouses were also hit. The missile threat ceased at 5.40 am, but an hour later, an alarm was raised in Kyiv due to the presence of drones. At 11:20 a.m., a drone damaged the headquarters of the ‘We Are Ukraine’ television channel, just as journalists were broadcasting live. Five staff members were injured. “The hardest-hit areas were the newsroom and the staff offices,” the channel said in a statement.

Only 24 hours had passed since U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, had left Kyiv. Their brief trip, first to Moscow and then to Ukraine, did not lead to a breakthrough in the peace talks, but it did secure three days of calm for Kyiv. As soon as the Americans had left, the shelling resumed with renewed vigour.

“We are truly in a ‘total war’,” Mykola Bielieskov, a senior analyst at the Come Back Alive Foundation, told Il Foglio. “Russia has been waging this kind of war for some time and continues to intensify its terror behind the front lines. Aware of the shortage of interceptors, it is striking cities with ballistic missiles and using jet-powered drones. Ukraine, for its part, has this year begun actively targeting the enemy’s economy: oil refineries and markets. New plans include a blockade of air traffic.”

Both sides are prepared to take even greater risks to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. “The point of a total war is that the very functioning of the country is under attack,” says the expert. In such a situation, everything depends on who can organise logistics and deploy resources most effectively. “Paradoxically, it will be harder for Russia to adapt,” he argues. It is logistically isolated. Ukraine also has the advantage of its geography and proximity to Europe. Consequently, the country has access to petrol and diesel, even though it does not produce them. Russia, which produces and refines fuel, is beginning to suffer shortages due to Ukrainian attacks. “Ukraine wants to deprive the enemy of its resources and create serious, irreversible economic problems,” explains Bielieskov, outlining the objectives of the attacks. Moscow has a different rationale: it wants to further increase the suffering of the Ukrainian population and fuel social tensions caused by the deteriorating security situation.

“On the front line, the Russian army has not achieved any significant successes this year,” notes the analyst. In 2024–2025, Ukraine was losing much of its territory. But in 2026, it managed to slow the enemy’s advance considerably. Bielieskov attributes this result to the active use of three technologies: medium-range strikes, interceptor drones and ground-based robotic systems. From January to July, the Ukrainian army destroyed 260,000 Russian drones, both those attacking the rear and those striking the front line. “Ukraine now feels more secure on the battlefield, despite all its problems,” he says. Among its advantages are a competitive defence market and the absence of an enemy equivalent to Starlink and the Ukrainian Delta (a digital situational awareness and combat management system).

Russia, on the other hand, continues to adhere to the logic of the Second World War, which requires a huge number of infantrymen. “But in modern warfare, holding positions is no longer possible with such a large number of infantrymen,” says the expert. Technological advances have led to a significant rise in casualties amongst Russian troops. This has prompted increasing talk of a possible mobilisation for the Moscow-led army. Should the Kremlin take such a step, it will be primarily to buy time. “Putin himself has created a situation in which it is easier for him to risk Russia’s future than to admit that his entire policy towards Ukraine is the result of a series of mistakes.” According to Bielieskov, Putin is prepared to go for broke, raising the stakes in the war in the hope that Kyiv will capitulate more quickly. Ukraine’s objective, however, is to hold out longer than its enemy.

Given the situation on the battlefield – the stalemate and the ongoing casualties amongst the soldiers – it is natural to wonder why Russia is not pursuing a diplomatic solution. Bielieskov is convinced that Putin is playing for time and banking on political factors: that those opposed to aid for Kyiv will gradually come to power in Europe and that the unity of its allies will crumble. Ukraine, on the other hand, has far more modest objectives. “It is not aiming to destroy Russia,” he observes. Its aim is to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible whilst preserving its sovereignty; it is therefore only natural that it will continue to fight and resist.