From formaldehyde to Tibet, China’s grip on information is a tool of power

 In recent days, the South Korean government has stepped up checks on Chinese cabbage imported from the People’s Republic after a video that went viral in China revealed that some traders were soaking the vegetable in formaldehyde, a substance banned in food and classified as carcinogenic. The main concern in Seoul centres on kimchi, the Korean national dish made from Chinese cabbage, much of which is imported. This incident clearly illustrates Beijing’s relationship with one of its most sensitive issues: food safety, public confidence in the system that is supposed to guarantee it, and the Xi Jinping leadership’s obsessive drive to control information regarding any kind of crisis – which would otherwise be seen as signs of failure or vulnerability. 

Food safety has long been a sensitive issue for the Chinese Communist Party. It is no coincidence that most food scandals in China are uncovered by Chinese citizens through local media: the formaldehyde-tainted cabbage scandal was revealed by a Chinese blogger on 22 August, when he published a video filmed in Kangbao County, Hebei, showing cabbages soaked in the banned substance. Shortly afterwards, local authorities confirmed that traders were using formaldehyde to preserve the cabbages during transport. The story quickly blew up; the newspaper The Paper traced the cabbages’ possible route to Anhui and Jiangsu, and in Suqian authorities stated that they had inspected the produce and found no formaldehyde levels exceeding the limits. Yet cabbage prices plummeted nonetheless, as wholesalers and consumers alike abruptly ceased purchasing the vegetable, suspecting that someone in the supply chain was lying. It is precisely this mistrust, even more than the formaldehyde contained in a single batch, that poses a problem for the Party, because food safety has always been a thorn in its side.

In 2008, the melamine milk scandal caused at least six deaths and health problems for around 300,000 children. In 2024, it was the turn of tankers used to transport both chemicals and edible oil. Each time, Beijing responds with investigations, inspections and exemplary punishments to demonstrate a tough stance: even in the 2023–2027 National Action Plan for Food Safety, the State Council defines food safety as a political responsibility and calls on local authorities to ensure that ‘food safety is a shared responsibility and that food safety is effectively safeguarded’. According to several observers, however, by doing so the leadership is focusing more on managing the scandal than on the violations themselves, thereby preventing any talk of a ‘structural’ failure. This is the same logic by which Xi Jinping’s leadership also manages other crises, controlling what information can circulate and what meaning it should be given. The day before yesterday at the SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin, whilst meeting Xi, expressed his condolences for the victims of the floods in Tibet. However, this reference was omitted from the Chinese account of the bilateral meeting released by the state news agency Xinhua, which instead focused on relations between the two countries and strategic cooperation. According to various media outlets and NGOs, Beijing is also selectively filtering and disseminating information regarding the scale of the damage and the number of casualties following the disaster that struck the border between Tibet and Nepal last Wednesday. It is as though the real poison for Beijing were not formaldehyde, but the doubt instilled in its citizens regarding the system that is supposed to protect them – the realisation that it is no longer sufficiently reliable.