World
Middle East •
Qatar is America’s cheeky ally. And the bridge to Tehran that it does not fully trust
After the United States opposed the agreement proposed by Iran and Trump threatened to bomb Muscat, Doha is seeking to revive diplomatic ties with Washington and break the deadlock over the Strait of Hormuz.

Photo: Ansa
Washington. The Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, was in Tehran last week, where he met President Masoud Pezeshkian and other leading figures from the regime. Doha is seeking to revive diplomatic ties with Washington and break the deadlock over the Strait of Hormuz. For Qatar, this is a matter of urgency: since the start of the war, its exports of liquefied natural gas have plummeted by 96 per cent, at a cost of around $24 billion. Before the conflict, Qatar supplied around a fifth of the world’s LNG. “Qatar differs from the other GCC states in its relations with Iran, because it shares the world’s largest gas field with Tehran,” Anas Al Qaed of the Gulf International Forum in Washington tells Il Foglio. “That is why they have a cordial and close working relationship with the Iranians.”
When the war broke out, Iranian missiles and drones struck Qatar, including the Al Udeid base, whilst missiles damaged Ras Laffan: the small Gulf state is situated a short distance from Iran, just off the east coast of Saudi Arabia. “The only Gulf state that has not sought an alternative to US security guarantees is Qatar,” says Al Qaed. “They do not make any significant moves in the Middle East without consulting the Americans. The other GCC states, on the other hand, do not do this.” Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remain important security partners of the United States, but have pursued a more independent policy, building relations with China, Russia and Iran on their own terms. Oman has gone even further, negotiating directly with Tehran over the Strait of Hormuz. Washington opposed the proposed agreement and Trump threatened to bomb Muscat. Now Qatar is seeking to advance the same process. It is unclear whether the visit to Tehran was coordinated with the White House. “They have no influence over the Iranian leadership, but they do have important ties,” explains Arash Azizi, an Iranian-Canadian historian and writer. “Qatar has sought to capitalise on its closeness to Trump to present itself to Iran as a very important interlocutor.”
Qatar hosts the forward headquarters of the US Central Command at Al Udeid and now enjoys a US security guarantee. The decision came as a sort of consolation prize after Israel had bombed several Hamas figures in Doha last September. Doha also maintains relations with Iran and, historically, with Hamas and other Islamist movements. Qatar regards these channels as part of what makes it valuable to Washington.
“The Americans rely on Qatar to establish confidential channels with various parties, particularly with non-state actors with whom we cannot communicate,” says Al Qaed. “They also see it as a cheeky little partner, seeking to protect and balance its own interests in an extremely unstable region.” In the US Congress and elsewhere, Qatar is accused of supporting Hamas – a terrorist organisation designated as such by the United States – by funding the group, hosting its leaders and offering refuge to Islamist movements. The controversy flared up again when Qatar gifted the United States a Boeing 747-8, which was subsequently converted for use as Air Force One. The Foundation for Defence of Democracies estimates that since 2000, Doha has spent, invested, donated or pledged at least $400 billion in the United States, including nearly $296 million on lobbying and public relations activities and $8.8 billion allocated to universities and educational institutions. This represents an extraordinary level of influence for a country roughly the size of Abruzzo and with a population of around 330,000. Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund alone is estimated to be worth over $500 billion. “It is a controversial issue in American politics,” notes Azizi, “but it is a fact that some Qatari leaders have, at one point or another, had a certain affinity, shall we say, with the Islamist movement in the broadest sense,” including Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.
In 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, accusing Doha of supporting Islamist movements and of being too close to Iran. Trump initially backed the pressure, accusing Qatar of funding terrorism. One of the blockade’s main demands was that Qatar shut down Al Jazeera. Doha managed to hold out thanks to help from Turkey and Iran, and the dispute was resolved in 2021 through American and Kuwaiti mediation. Al Jazeera was at the centre of the pressure on Qatar because it allows a tiny country to exert influence far beyond its size. “The Qataris regard it as a tool for controlling Arab public opinion,” says Al Qaed. “It’s a huge asset for them.” Washington has inflicted enormous damage on Iran, and the Gulf states continue to depend on the United States for their security, whilst remaining exposed to Iranian missiles and drones. Without a decisive resolution to the conflict, it is likely that Qatar and its neighbours will continue to seek room for manoeuvre.