Moscow’s winter projects need Beijing

The demands remain the same: whenever Vladimir Putin holds a closed-door meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, he always has the same cards on the table: the gas pipeline to transport fifty billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to China, known as Sila Sibiri 2, in Italian ‘Potere della Siberia’, and in English ‘Power of Siberia’. The most he has achieved is an agreement to reach an agreement – the setting up of working groups to take the project forward. Putin makes proposals, Xi remains vague, and the scene repeats itself every time the two meet, including yesterday in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 

The meeting took place on the sidelines of the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which the Kremlin leader tries not to miss, even though, with each passing year, the summit has come to symbolise the changes in his relationship with Xi Jinping. This year, the SCO met in Kyrgyzstan; this Central Asian country is a member of the organisation alongside, amongst others, the countries that were once part of the Soviet Union and which have become the physical space in which Russia has allowed itself to be overtaken by China. The war against Ukraine has played a decisive role in this overtaking.

Yesterday, Putin met with Xi Jinping in Bishkek, as well as the Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko, the imposed leader of a country which, unlike those in Central Asia, remains firmly aligned with Moscow – so much so that it is involved in the invasion of Kyiv. Lukashenka has allowed Russian soldiers and military vehicles to be stationed on Belarusian territory and to launch their attacks from there; he has provided Putin with a front line and now, in order to have certain sanctions lifted, he is showing himself willing to release political prisoners under pressure from Donald Trump’s United States. Lukashenko has remained aligned with Putin, whilst in Central Asia a gradual distancing from Moscow is underway, coinciding with a rapprochement with Beijing – driven in part by a desire to avoid the fate of Minsk and not to be drawn into Russia’s demands regarding Kyiv.

Yesterday, the guest of honour was Xi Jinping; Putin travelled to Bishkek primarily to have the opportunity to speak with him. The Kremlin leader has a plan for the winter: to step up the pace of the war against Ukraine, to send more troops into the field – at least 300,000 new soldiers to be mobilised from September – and to launch relentless attacks on Ukrainian cities, even during the day. To do this, he needs economic backing: the additional weapons required for the attacks must be produced, and the men sent to the front will be taken out of the workforce. He needs China’s support; so far, China has helped Moscow circumvent sanctions and also build military synergies. In this context, it is Putin who is in need, whilst Xi Jinping is the one who continues to appear hesitant in the face of the offer of a major infrastructure project such as the Sila Sibiri, which the Kremlin desperately needs.

Yesterday in Bishkek, amidst a reception from a part of the world caught between Russian and Chinese influence – a region that is increasingly turning towards Beijing – Putin witnessed the impact of his war in Ukraine. Central Asian leaders are forging an increasing number of economic and energy agreements with the Chinese. Kyrgyzstan, like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and even Belarus, is part of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation); it hosts Russian military bases on its territory, but conducts business with Beijing, which has become Bishkek’s leading trading partner and the main source of direct investment. Russia remains important; Kyrgyzstan does not question the alliance, but is nevertheless aligning itself economically with China. The same is true of Kazakhstan, led by a president, Qasym-Jomart Tokayev, nicknamed ‘the Chinese’ for his fluent Mandarin and for having chosen to shift Kazakh interests increasingly towards Beijing – interests that also run through the oil pipeline linking the fields near Astana to Chinese refineries.

In early 2026, Russian MP Konstantin Zatulin said that the relationship between China and Russia was similar to that between the European Union and Ukraine. According to Zatulin, Beijing was not doing enough for Moscow, and furthermore, the comparison suggested a relationship of dependence. The debate died down quickly, but outside the Kremlin, the idea that Putin has accepted a relationship of subordination is fuelling discussions that are trying to keep a low profile. And the first defeat has come in Central Asia.