While Xi casts his net wider in Bishkek, Washington doesn't know where to turn

Chinese leader Xi Jinping will arrive in Bishkek tomorrow for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit from a position of strength. Beijing is already the linchpin around which the non-aligned countries belonging to the organisation revolve, but this summit will above all be an opportunity to showcase Chinese leadership to the rest of the world. Also expected in the Kyrgyz capital are the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin (with whom Xi will hold bilateral talks on Monday), and the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will also be in the same room. The SCO has often been described as a sort of anti-NATO group, but it is neither a military alliance nor a cohesive political bloc – far from it. It is a platform for forging relationships, exchanging information and, together with countries with divergent interests but similar objectives, shaping the strategic dialogue with the West.

The Bishkek summit comes at a delicate moment for American influence around the world, but above all for the United States’ projection of power under the Trump administration. There is increasing talk of a very real problem concerning the distribution of American weaponry across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Whilst Russian intelligence believes that the war against Iran has weakened the United States, the day before yesterday the Pentagon’s Under-Secretary Elbridge Colby was received at NATO headquarters for consultations. 

Colby spoke of the “overhaul of the military structure”, returning to the theme of “NATO 3.0”, which would be capable of functioning even in the event of “simultaneous crises”, with allies assuming primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defence. All these simultaneous crisis areas – which are undoubtedly also discussed at SCO meetings, and which could jeopardise US operational readiness – are a cause for concern not only for Europe, but also for the Indo-Pacific. This week, Washington cancelled a joint amphibious landing exercise with South Korea, which was due to take place in September, explicitly citing the ‘limited availability’ of US forces due to the war in Iran. Many US warships that are usually deployed in the Indo-Pacific, as a deterrent against Chinese ambitions, have been diverted to the Middle East. South Korea, like Japan, Taiwan and other US partners in Asia, “relies on Washington as its main supplier of conventional weapons and faces years of backlogs”, the Washington Post wrote a few days ago.

Delays are also occurring because deliveries scheduled for recent months have been diverted to US arsenals, and consequently to the Middle East. Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei are trying to go it alone, but Chinese military pressure against the de facto independent and democratic island – which Beijing claims as its own territory – is constantly increasing. The day before yesterday, the Taiwanese Parliament passed a bill worth approximately 7.3 billion dollars over six years to develop and procure unmanned systems – the point debated for months by the majority and opposition in Taiwan concerned the proportion of investment to be allocated to building an autonomous domestic industry. The law stipulates that military systems must be suited to the various stages of a potential Chinese amphibious operation, starting with coastal surveillance, followed by a coastal assault and support from small kamikaze naval drones. However, building an entire industry takes time, and in the meantime, the US arms package for Taiwan, worth around $14 billion, remains stalled at the White House, and Trump will certainly not sign it before meeting leader Xi Jinping next month. Earlier this month, Politico revealed that Colby had tried several times to secure an invitation to China to re-establish high-level dialogue with officials in Beijing, but had failed to do so. And so, whilst Xi expands China’s network, Washington finds itself having to choose where to focus its efforts, apparently without any coordination or planning.