Distancing itself from Putin becomes government policy in Armenia

Yerevan, Armenia. There is a substantial difference between distancing oneself from an ally and setting this out in a government document. Armenia has just taken the second step. On 25 August, Parliament adopted the government’s action programme for 2026–2031 by 63 votes to 24; this document will translate Nikol Pashinyan’s election victory – his fourth consecutive term since 7 June – into concrete policies. And it is a plan that leaves no room for ambiguity regarding Russia. The Russian Federation is no longer a strategic ally, but a partner whose relationship needs to be redefined. The 2021–2026 programme spoke of a deep strategic alliance, aimed at strengthening military, energy and infrastructure cooperation. Central to national security was support for the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the defensive military alliance created in 1992 by six former Soviet republics. The new document very diplomatically redefines the hierarchy: the section dedicated to Moscow is entitled ‘Transforming and deepening partnership relations with Russia’. A general commitment to existing relations remains within a framework of “mutually beneficial multi-sectoral cooperation”. Russia, the first country mentioned in 2021, slips to eighth place, after Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, Georgia, the European Union, the United States and France. The CSTO, already effectively frozen by Yerevan since 2024, when Armenia suspended its financial contributions to the organisation, has disappeared from the text. Another detail is also significant: whilst the government continues to use the word ‘strategic’ in reference to Iran, Georgia, the EU, the United States, France and China, that term has been carefully avoided when referring to Russia.

This diplomatic row follows months of economic friction. Moscow has gradually imposed a ban on imports of Armenian flowers, spirits, mineral water and agri-food products. By the end of July, the ban had been extended to dairy products and beverages. Consequently, the new government programme responds by setting out in writing the diversification of export markets, which have historically been channelled towards Russia – the destination for 35 per cent of exports in 2025. In this regard, the European Commission stated on 25 August that Armenia is closer to Europe than ever before. This is not only due to the July announcement of 200 million earmarked for Yerevan to alleviate Russian economic pressure, but, above all, because of Pashinyan’s recent intention to apply for Armenia’s EU membership. On the infrastructure front, Moscow controls both of Armenia’s key networks: gas and railways. In an attempt to gradually break away from the Kremlin, Pashinyan has reiterated his demand that Russia relinquish the concession for the railway network, which it has operated since 2008 under a contract due to expire in 2038. The prime minister has asked Moscow to sell the rights to a third country acceptable to both sides, suggesting Kazakhstan and Qatar as possible operators — neither of which has commented so far. Moscow, for its part, maintains that the calls for a handover stem from blackmail by the West aimed at securing the promised investments for Yerevan. The political backdrop is becoming increasingly tense. Two and a half months after the election victory, Putin has still not sent a message of congratulations to Pashinyan — in 2021, Moscow congratulated him on a ‘convincing’ victory. Pashinyan has declared that Armenia’s interest in the CSTO has run its course, calling for the country’s expulsion. The Kremlin has responded by leaving the door open for Yerevan’s withdrawal, but warns that a rapprochement with the EU will create deep and damaging contradictions with the Eurasian Economic Union. A few days earlier, during an inconclusive telephone conversation between Pashinyan and Putin aimed at resolving Russian trade restrictions, this issue had already come to the fore. According to sources close to the Kremlin, the Russian Prime Minister is pushing for an Armenian referendum on EU accession.

It is against this backdrop — a programme prioritising normalisation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, an ongoing trade dispute, and growing diplomatic tension with Moscow — that the rhetoric of the ‘Fourth Republic’ must be understood. This is how Pashinyan presented the government’s programme, invoking the ideology of ‘Real Armenia’: the philosophy of the new term of office focuses strictly on the preservation and development of the state within its internationally recognised borders. In other words: farewell to Nagorno-Karabakh. The diplomatic language: distancing from Moscow, economic diversification and openness to new, increasingly Western partners.