Sermons and relics: Kirill even helps Putin at the petrol station

The Russian Orthodox Church is a structure fully integrated into Putin’s vertical power structure. The Patriarchate acts as a catalyst for moral values for a community left without a compass following the collapse of the USSR. More often, however, it appears to confine itself to providing spiritual cover for the decisions of secular power, in accordance with that logic of control and subordination typical of Tsarist caesaropapism. The invasion of Ukraine also falls within the scope of these decisions; far from representing an opportunity to rethink its own subordination, it has provided the Church with a pretext to breathe new life into a certain millenarian worldview, in which Russia is perceived as the ‘katechon’, the only force on Earth capable of blocking the path of the Antichrist.

It should therefore come as no surprise that, as the elections to renew the State Duma – the lower house of the Russian Parliament – draw near, the Church is also actively engaged in supporting a cause that has repeatedly been labelled as existential for the country’s future: victory in Ukraine. It is within this context that the recent move by the Patriarchate’s publishing house can be explained; at the end of July, it published a new booklet designed to better justify the ‘holy war’ in which Moscow has been embroiled for more than four and a half years. It is entitled: “War: Beyond the Visible Causes and Effects” and is a collection of sermons, speeches and interviews by Patriarch Kirill, organised by topic. The book’s underlying message is that today’s war is merely a continuation of those of the past – not only the Great Patriotic War (1943–1945), the very founding myth of modern Russia, but also the wars that came before and after it. In short, there is a common thread linking all of Russia’s military endeavours throughout the centuries: the history of the defence of the fatherland always corresponds to the sacred defence of Christianity against the forces of evil, which largely coincide with the West, torn apart by individualism, decadence and consumerism. Even the development of the nuclear arsenal by scientists in Sarov during the Soviet era – as Patriarch Kirill recalled on 1 August, reviving the so-called ‘nuclear orthodoxy’ – is a manifestation of God’s grace and mercy, a shield protecting Holy Rus’. The lens through which to view the events of war in recent years therefore remains solely the eschatological one of Salvation: rather than judging the special military operation rationally, in terms of rights and wrongs, one must accept it with full readiness for sacrifice and by rallying for victory. Those who do not do so are not worthy of calling themselves Orthodox Christians. Again, on 28 July, on the day of the baptism of Ancient Rus’ – that is, the anniversary of the conversion of Kievan Rus’ to Christianity in the year 988, which the Church and the state celebrate as a feast of pan-Russian spiritual and cultural identity – the Patriarch railed against those pacifist pastors who, instead of remaining united at this historic juncture, have chosen to abandon the Church.

It is against this backdrop of total mobilisation of public consciousness that the recent statements by senior prelates of the Patriarchate regarding the public discontent caused by the fuel shortage in large parts of the country should also be understood. Compounded by attacks on refineries by Ukrainian drones and despite the export ban that has been in force for several months, Russia has been grappling with a severe shortage of petrol and diesel since the end of June: there are kilometre-long queues at petrol stations, and altercations between motorists in the queues are not uncommon. The conditions for social anger to erupt are all there, so much so that the first attempts at popular uprisings in Perm and Volgograd were immediately quashed with arrests and administrative penalties. The Church has added fuel to the fire. Archpriest Alexander Butrin, in a parish near Moscow, has urged the faithful to practise patience and not to complain about the authorities: “There are people in this world who cannot even bear a little bit of hardship,” Butrin snapped during a sermon broadcast in a video by the Sota television channel. “Those who organise protests and demand rights are not people of the Church. Saint Seraphim of Sarov was seen to be angry only once, when he encountered a man who had raised a finger against the state,” the priest thundered.

This strong ideological bond between faith and Russia’s military destiny has, moreover, found its ultimate visual expression in the consecration in 2020 of the colossal Cathedral of the Armed Forces in Moscow, where domes and mosaics celebrate the patron saints of the military and the country’s military history. But the fact that state and Church are dedicated to a single holy mission is demonstrated, most recently, by the sensational discovery of the remains of Dmitri Donskoy, Prince of Moscow, who in 1380 led the first great military victory against the Mongols at the Battle of Kulikovo. Canonised by the Orthodox Church in 1988, his relics were discovered on 18 August in the Kremlin Cathedral. The discovery sparked a wave of enthusiasm in government and religious circles, which were quick to emphasise the ‘providential nature’ of the event, which took place just a few weeks before the elections and in the midst of the conflict with Ukraine. The relics of the man who fought for the unification of the Russian lands and against foreign invasion were immediately venerated by President Putin, and some of them are now set to be sent to the front line. The operation – the timing of which immediately appeared rather suspicious – is effectively aimed at bolstering popular support for national identity at a time when the regime’s popularity is once again wavering under the weight of socio-economic difficulties and growing war fatigue amongst the majority of Russians.