Preparing for the worst: why Italy is lagging behind on civil defence

Preparing for the worst has become part of European security, but not yet of Italian security. The possibility that Vladimir Putin’s war, in various forms and ways, might spill over beyond Ukraine’s borders is no longer merely a remote and alarmist hypothesis, and following CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow, rumours of a possible Russian attempt to test NATO in a more dramatic manner – for example, through a limited action against the Baltic states or other forms of escalation against the United Kingdom – have taken on a more persistent and concrete form. The perception of risk has always been stronger in the countries on NATO’s eastern flank – those which, for historical and geographical reasons, regard Russia as an immediate threat – and in the United Kingdom (last month, hackers linked to Iran caused the shutdown of a power station). But the idea that the war could have direct consequences even far from the Ukrainian front has taken hold across much of Europe, and has altered security policies and societal preparedness. In Italy, however, this cultural and political shift has gone largely unnoticed. The concept of ‘whole-of-society defence’ – that is, the idea that defence is no longer the exclusive responsibility of the armed forces, but involves institutions, businesses, infrastructure and citizens – has never entered the public debate. 

This has not happened, primarily due to the fear that discussing certain matters might influence public opinion – an opinion that ‘rejects war’ but risks having to endure it, unprepared. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto has repeatedly spoken of the need to adapt to the changing nature of war: in his Policy Statement, published just over a month ago, he writes that “we need a military defence that is fully integrated into the broader civil defence framework, because the resilience of democratic institutions, critical infrastructure and essential services is now part of national security”, and confirms that a “civil defence system” is currently “being established”, although very little is said about it publicly.

The information provided regularly by governments to citizens in a transparent and responsible manner, without causing alarm, includes practical advice for daily life, how many days of self-isolation people should be able to manage (around three), and then tests of the alert systems – almost all of which are on smartphones – which help people become familiar with the alerts, the budget, civil-military drills, and above all the number and location of existing public shelters; because if an alert arrives on a mobile phone, how are people supposed to know what to do or where to go? As British officials have often explained – having only updated their ‘Resilience Action Plan’ less than a month ago – an emergency is an emergency: this includes missiles striking by surprise in the night, but it also encompasses an internet blackout, a failure of critical infrastructure, an earthquake or an epidemic. Obviously, the most sensitive logistical operations are covered by state security secrecy, such as operational plans for evacuations, the protection of infrastructure, and the mobilisation and transit of NATO troops across the territory – for example, the German Armed Forces’ Operationsplan Deutschland (Oplan Deu) of the German Armed Forces – a massive manual drawn up following the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is constantly updated and is entirely classified. The Italian case, at European level, is more unique than rare, because everything seems to be covered by state secrecy. Our IT-alert, the Civil Protection’s early warning system, is still in the trial phase and is operational only for certain disasters such as nuclear accidents, earthquakes in the Campi Flegrei area, and the collapse of a major dam. As for air-raid shelters, there is no up-to-date map: the only specific Italian law on air-raid shelters remains the Royal Decree-Law of 1936, and the vast majority of bunkers from that era are either unequipped or inaccessible. There is no record of any recent initiative to carry out a census or to map potential shelter sites.