The Mecca Pact is a complex interplay of interests

Tel Aviv. The Mecca Pact, signed on 7 August between the three Sunni powers – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan – is undoubtedly one of the most interesting developments in the new regional order at a time when the Shia crescent is weakening and rivals are vying to fill the vacuum. But to what extent is it a declaration of intent, and to what extent does it represent a genuine threat, from Israel’s perspective?

Firstly, who are the rivals in the new regional balance of power: for Israel, first and foremost Turkey, with whom tensions have continued to rise since 7 October 2023, although diplomatic relations dating back to 1949 have never been severed. The IDF raid on the Syrian base at Abu al-Duhur, 70 kilometres from the Turkish border, in which Israel claimed to have sent a message opposing the strengthening of the Turkish presence there; the arrest warrant issued against Netanyahu as Erdogan’s immediate response; the rivalry between the two countries not only on Syrian soil and in the Mediterranean (with Israel drawing ever closer to Greece and Cyprus), but also in the Horn of Africa, where Jerusalem competes with Ankara – the TURKSOM camp in Mogadishu is Turkey’s largest military base outside its homeland – by establishing a military presence in Somaliland, a secessionist entity recognised only by Israel worldwide: all these are elements of a widely declared escalation, against which Erdogan is seeking to leverage the weight of the Mecca Pact, particularly in view of a Middle East abandoned by the chief arbiter, Donald Trump, who for the time being is managing to maintain a balance between the two enemies, both of whom he regards as allies.

From the perspective of the signatories to the Mecca Pact, there are many rivals. According to Mohammed Wattad, professor of law and president of Ramat Gan Academic College, “in the sophisticated game of chess that is the Middle East, the main target of the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani triangle is not Israel, but Tehran. When Riyadh pits a bulwark against Iran – backed by Turkish military technology and Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella – this leads to a rebalancing of regional deterrence from which Israel also benefits”. Wattad’s argument is that the pact affords Jerusalem “a strategic, impartial vantage point”. “A wise captain knows how to sail using the winds of others,” says Wattad, quoting a Turkish proverb.

Within the alliance between the three Sunni countries, Riyadh is the only Arab state, a fact which also serves its image by positioning it as the undisputed leader of the Arab-Sunni camp, whilst its strategic cooperation with Israel continues behind the scenes, Wattad points out. In recent months alone, the three countries had also established, together with Egypt, a regional security platform outside the direct sphere of Western influence, a mechanism known as STEP – an acronym for Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. Although the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, has repeatedly stated that Egypt will soon join the Mecca Pact, there are several reasons why, for the time being, Egypt has remained on the outside.

Part of the explanation lies in the rivalry between Riyadh and Cairo. Middle East expert Pinchas Inbari writes that “Egypt still regards itself as ‘Umm al-Dunya’, the mother of the world, and is in no hurry to join in with others’ initiatives”. Inbari highlights other ideological reasons why this prospect may be a long way off: al-Sisi is well aware that Ankara supported the Muslim Brotherhood government, which he overthrew in 2013.

There is also a crucial practical constraint: Egypt still relies heavily on US military aid amounting to $1.3 billion a year and cannot afford to be seen as aligned with a camp perceived as potentially hostile to what remains the United States’ main ally in the Middle East, Israel, with which it maintains key strategic relations – despite the difficulties of the ‘cold peace’ that has prevailed since 1979 – particularly in light of Egypt’s role in the Trump Plan for Gaza.

A detailed analysis by the INSS strategic studies centre identifies three main scenarios regarding the new alliance: the maintenance of the status quo, i.e. a purely declaratory act of deterrence; the intensification of military cooperation within the Sunni triumvirate; and, the most worrying scenario, the extension of the alliance to other states, including Egypt, which is currently considered less likely. “Israel must avoid openly opposing the alliance, as this risks strengthening its cohesion,” write analysts Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss, experts on the Gulf and Turkey respectively.

Essentially, Jerusalem views the Pact more as an instrument of soft power than as a declaration of war, aware that the three Sunni powers are not truly prepared to go to war on each other’s behalf.

A very recent example is the fact that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had already signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, which includes a NATO-style mutual defence clause. Yet there was no sign of Pakistani assistance in Riyadh following the Iranian attacks – an arena, in fact, in which Islamabad acts as a mediator – nor, indeed, against the Houthis, who, even after the signing of the pact, are continuing to cause no small amount of trouble for the Saudis in the Red Sea and for Aramco’s assets. On the other hand, Turkey, too, had been quick to strengthen its military ties with Qatar when the latter was boycotted by the Gulf Cooperation Council between 2017 and 2021 due to its ideological affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, and has maintained an estimated presence of between 3,000 and 5,000 troops there ever since. However, no rescue operations were seen either following Jerusalem’s unprecedented raid on Doha last year or after Tehran’s reprisals against Qatari energy infrastructure.

Hussain Abdul Hussain, an Iraqi-Lebanese analyst at the Foundation for Defence of Democracy, also expresses scepticism about the Pact’s effectiveness. “Saudi Arabia ranks eighth in the world for military spending, possesses hundreds of F-15s, F-16s and F-18s, and is facing its most perilous moment since its foundation in the 1930s,” he said in an interview with I24News. “It certainly cannot be saved by Pakistan, whose missile arsenal is unable to reach it to defend it, nor, of course, by Turkey, which is its historic rival.” In the Syrian theatre alone – the historic Ottoman province of ‘Greater Syria’ – Erdogan’s ambitions clash with those of Mohammad bin Salman, who is instead pushing for a rapprochement between Ahmed al Sharaa and Israel, as demonstrated by the meeting between the head of the Mossad and the Syrian foreign minister following the raid on Abu al Duhur.

Many of the possible developments regarding the Pact will also be dictated by the outcome of the elections in Israel – the only country amongst the regional contenders where free elections are held – and, above all, by the future of the US military presence in the region. At present, Jerusalem’s assessment of the new Sunni triumvirate appears to be framed more within the logic of alliances based on the concept that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’: opportunistic alliances not founded on shared values, which historically have proved to be precarious.