Pakistan’s strategy to become a key player

Behind the agreement signed on 7 August between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey lie pre-existing relationships and complementarities, the key role of the United States and, above all, Pakistan, where domestic politics and foreign policy ambitions are becoming increasingly intertwined. The pact formalises a network of well-established relationships. Pakistan has long provided training and technical assistance to the Saudi armed forces. Recently, Islamabad deployed some 8,000 military personnel, a fighter squadron and an air defence system to Saudi Arabia, as part of the bilateral mutual defence agreement between the two countries, signed in Riyadh in September 2025.

The relationship between Turkey and Pakistan also has a well-established military dimension. The two countries have collaborated on the production and procurement of warships and training aircraft, as well as conducting joint exercises. Saudi Arabia has become a major customer of the Turkish defence industry: in 2023, Riyadh signed contracts with Baykar for the purchase of drones and subsequently agreements to localise their production within the Kingdom. The value of the pact also stems from the complementary nature of the resources that the three countries can bring to the table. It is an attempt to build a regional security network in which each country contributes what the others lack: nuclear capabilities from Pakistan, economic resources from Saudi Arabia, and the defence industry from Turkey.

Pakistan’s nuclear programme is precisely one of the most hotly debated issues. The text made public reveals no commitment on the part of Islamabad to extend its nuclear umbrella. Islamabad’s deterrent is, in fact, tailored to India, and altering its purpose to include Saudi Arabia or Turkey would require a strategic review of enormous scope. But there is no need to go that far, as the nuclear programme plays a significant role regardless. The mere presence of Islamabad in the new agreement increases the potential cost of an attack on any of the three countries.

The Trump administration has insisted that allies – from Europe to the Middle East and Asia – must shoulder a greater share of the costs of their own security, and the Mecca Pact is a step in precisely this direction: three regional partners are pooling resources, military capabilities and responsibilities. For Islamabad, Riyadh and Ankara, this is a response to the uncertainty surrounding America’s willingness to guarantee the region’s security. Recent years have shown the United States’ partners that American policy can change rapidly, whilst the cost of a regional crisis falls on the allies themselves.

This is the only apparent contradiction in the pact: it can be compatible with the American principle of burden-sharing whilst, at the same time, reflecting the partners’ growing desire not to depend exclusively on the United States. The three regional actors are hedging their bets, diversifying their security relationships to reduce the risk arising from dependence on a single external guarantor. More generally, the Mecca pact can also be seen as part of a trend towards more flexible security architectures. A modular framework allows for cooperation where interests coincide, whilst keeping bilateral and multilateral relationships intact: Turkey remains a member of NATO; Saudi Arabia continues to be closely linked to the United States; and Pakistan maintains a strategic relationship with China.

One of the main beneficiaries of the pact is undoubtedly Pakistan. Through these agreements, Islamabad is consolidating its position in West Asia whilst bolstering its international credibility, whilst taking care, however, to ensure that the agreement is not interpreted as a pact directed against Tehran. Pakistan shares a border of approximately 900 kilometres with Iran (straddling Pakistani Baluchistan and Iranian Sistan-Baluchistan), a frontier marked by the activities of armed groups. Since the start of 2026, the province of Baluchistan has recorded 437 incidents of violence and 1,747 casualties, the highest figure since 2000. The region also holds strategic economic importance: it is home to Gwadar, the port developed with Chinese investment as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which forms part of China’s Silk Road. Added to this is the presence of a significant Shia population in the country (the second largest in the world after Iran), a further factor that makes any openly anti-Iranian stance particularly delicate for Islamabad.

Paradoxically, it is precisely Pakistan’s participation in the Mecca Pact that could enhance its capacity for mediation in the conflict between Iran and the United States. If Islamabad manages to demonstrate that the new framework is not a project aimed at containing Iran, its role as an intermediary between Tehran and other regional actors could be strengthened.

The agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey should therefore be seen as a sign of a shifting regional balance. The three countries are seeking trilateral security arrangements at a time when global balances are being redefined and in the face of the unpredictability of the United States. For Islamabad, this new balance offers an opportunity to reaffirm its central role, without sacrificing its relations with Iran and China. The pact therefore represents not the birth of a new bloc, but the embryo of a regional order in which balances are built through flexible partnerships.

Filippo Boni