What it means to be on the left in France today. Mélenchon’s rhythm

To understand the French left, we must go back to 2023. During the first half of the year, the massive mobilisation against the pension reforms appeared to be a defining moment with two important implications: the perception of a ‘people of the Left’ capable of uniting in street protests to defend what they regard as a social achievement, and subsequently prolonging the dispute over the ‘undemocratic’ methods of a government that had sought a vote of confidence on the reform, thereby bypassing parliamentary debate. In some respects, the trade union drive had drawn the parties into a unified dynamic already expressed through the NUPES alliance, which was subsequently transformed into the ‘New Popular Front’ for the 2024 general election. Following these elections, the left-wing coalition secured more seats than any other political group, but Emmanuel Macron continued to form minority governments (Barnier, Bayrou and then Lecornu) without entrusting the post of Prime Minister to a representative of the left, not even on a trial basis. In some respects, this refusal signalled the failure of the unified strategy employed in 2023–2024, which sought to institutionalise relations between the various political groups. With this period now behind us, the long-standing question of leadership on the left resurfaces – a highly sensitive issue because it brings into play the imposing figure of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the secretary of the La France Insoumise (LFI) party. With the 2027 presidential elections drawing nearer, the highly skilled orator Mélenchon has returned to the fray, kick-starting his campaign by announcing his candidacy as early as last May. Whilst the left seemed to have sidelined his divisive personality during the 2023–2024 period, he has outmanoeuvred all other contenders by immediately positioning himself as a strong candidate, thereby scuppering the various initiatives aimed at reaching a consensus on a single candidate. Whilst environmentalists and communists are, for the time being, sticking with their flagship candidates, Marine Tondelier and Fabien Roussel, these strategies appear to be dead ends, given that Mélenchon already effectively holds a dominant position within the most radical wing – and therefore potentially across the entire left.

On the other hand, the Socialist Party, for decades the backbone of the French left, has become rather ossified in the twenty-first century, with governance divided between the Parisian elite and retired civil servants across the country, in contrast to the dynamic grassroots support evident within LFI. Even in this context, we are seeing enormous difficulties in putting forward a presidential candidate: the Socialist Party has struggled to agree on a system of ‘closed’ primaries for October, but this timetable – which saw a surge in minor candidacies – already seems obsolete, whilst Raphaël Gluksmann, the MEP and leader of the Place Publique movement, is about to launch his campaign, not to mention François Hollande, who declares himself ready. They then realised, perhaps a little too late, that Mélenchon had not waited for hypothetical primaries to prepare the electoral ground, relying instead on the strength of his activist base, and had launched a summer campaign in which he is determined to bring to the polls in his favour those groups which, until now, had chosen not to vote. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is particularly adept in the context of presidential campaigns, where he skilfully navigates his own contradictions between provocation and consensual common sense. Mélenchon was a long-standing member of the Socialist Party, where he espoused secularist positions similar to those of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and he frequently refers to the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution to emphasise the role of popular pressure in guiding political action. Today, LFI is banking on the ‘new France’ to prioritise an approach rooted in the sociology of today’s banlieues, shaped by migration history but also by the redefinition of social roles. LFI presents itself as the champion of a certain French-style communitarianism that seeks to counter the far-right’s conspiracy theories about the ‘great replacement’. This ideological vision also has a very concrete manifestation: having won control of the town councils in several major towns during the last local elections (Saint-Denis, Roubaix, Sarcelles, La Courneuve, Vaulx-en-Velin, Vénissieux…), Mélenchon’s movement is also developing its own network of local administrative leaders and, consequently, party cadres. LFI’s cultural strategy includes a policy of reaching out to Muslims. This unscrupulous exploitation of a quasi-religious Muslim identity sets it apart from other left-wing forces, which remain far more secular and class-based, and introduces issues of clientelism in the banlieues that may prove difficult to manage. Anti-Israeli stances reinforce this positioning and make Mélenchon’s party the explicit champion of themes that are widespread in French public opinion, with a claim to anti-Zionism that often borders on anti-Semitism. Whilst these strategies may prove successful to some extent, they also appear highly divisive with the moderate left, illustrating the difficulty – if not the impossibility – of uniting the entire left. On the other hand, to broaden its support base, LFI is aiming to reclaim some of the former Communist strongholds captured by the Rassemblement National (RN) in the North and the Marseille region, in order to channel the protest vote to its own advantage – a strategy that in reality seeks to win back an electorate that rejects people of Muslim origin. However, it is not certain that this will fail, as during the election campaign the RN will likely be forced to adopt right-wing economic policies – necessary for seizing power – which may create discontent amongst the protest-voting section of the electorate.

Mélenchon’s strategy is to come second in the first round of the French presidential election, behind Marine Le Pen, with a result of around 20 per cent, so that he can then present himself as a potential president of a broad coalition, knowing full well that his party will not manage to secure a majority in the subsequent general election, a coalition scenario that might appear less dangerous than the RN seizing power and which would seek to fully utilise the ‘dam’ mechanism to block Le Pen’s path to power. However, this strategy must reckon with the possibility that the left-leaning middle-class electorate will largely rally behind a moderate centre-right candidate, in order to oppose both the far right and the far left by casting a tactical vote as early as the first round. And it is probably this factor that Glucksmann has recognised, which is prompting him to step up his campaign so as not to leave his own electorate exposed. This reaction, however, may well be too late, both because Glucksmann’s elitist persona does not seem capable of uniting the left, and given that the left’s overall electoral base appears smaller than that of the right; consequently, the presidential race is automatically shifting towards the centre-right.