Chinese eyes on our military assets

During a routine cyber security check on the Royal Navy’s new naval drones, the British Ministry of Defence discovered that the cameras fitted to the K3 Scouts, manufactured by the British firm Kraken Technology, contained a component made in China. The component sent a signal – a sort of ‘heartbeat’ indicating that the device was switched on and operational – to an IP address in the People’s Republic of China. An investigation by The Telegraph two days ago revealed the security breach, which was subsequently confirmed by the Ministry of Defence in London. However, the Ministry ruled out having found any evidence of a compromise of its systems or the transmission of sensitive data. Nevertheless, the issue remains embarrassing for one of the world’s most powerful armed forces, as that Chinese component should not have been there.

The UK, like other NATO countries, has in fact taken steps to exclude Chinese components from its military technologies, precisely because of the risk of interference and espionage, particularly regarding sensitive technology such as that used in naval drones. But this case demonstrates just how difficult it is to control the supply chain, and how much China relies on this grey area of vulnerability: the twenty K3 Scout drones in question were purchased for around £12.3 million and have only been in service with the Royal Marines since last March, by which time security measures were already particularly stringent. But the incident, which forced London to disable connectivity on all the cameras, highlights one issue once again: when we talk about secure technology, we are talking about manufacturers who do not attempt to install components for potential espionage. And although Chinese technology is significantly cheaper – particularly when it comes to cameras and, for example in the Italian case, scanners – the risk associated with China remains extremely high. There must be a reason for that.