Putin is dismantling military bases in Syria, but he knows that al-Sharaa needs him

Eighteen months after negotiations began between Damascus and Moscow, an agreement was signed last Sunday marking the end of what were effectively two Russian exclaves in Syria: the port of Tartus and the Hmeimim military airbase in Latakia. The new Syrian authorities have regained sovereignty over these two strategic locations, which, under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, served as Russia’s bridgehead in the Mediterranean. The memorandum does indeed allow for the continued presence of a small Russian contingent, but solely for the purpose of training Syrian forces. Overall, it removes the exclusive use of the bases previously guaranteed to the Russians and re-designates those areas, which were once used as military installations, for civilian purposes only. Among these is Pier 4 at the port of Tartus, which will revert to being a commercial port, bringing an end to the 49-year concession (renewable for a further 25 years) granted by Assad to Moscow in 2017. For Russia, the cost of the new reality that has taken shape in Syria since December 2024 is high. In the wake of Assad’s flight, Syrian President Ahmed al Sharaa tore up the contract with Stroytransgaz, the state-owned company that had been awarded the management of the port of Tartus, and signed a new one with the Emirati firm DP World. This turning point resulted in the fall of the Russian stronghold overlooking the Mediterranean. The Russian military enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity at their bases in Syria; they were able to moor up to 11 ships, whilst the Syrians were not even allowed access to the quays without authorisation from the Russian command. All this went up in smoke with the fall of the regime. 

The new agreement, to be implemented within three months, does, however, preserve what was Vladimir Putin’s minimum objective: to maintain a foothold in Syria, albeit in a different guise. From military bases used to decimate the population during 14 years of civil war, Tartus will become a commercial hub dedicated to the Russians. Some 250,000 tonnes of wheat and flour are expected each month – a lifeline for the country’s economy, which is still struggling. For at the heart of Russia’s partial continued presence lies a simple fact: without wheat and oil imports from the Novorossiysk terminal – in 2025 alone, Damascus received over 16 million barrels of crude oil shipped from the Russian port – and from the occupied Donbas, Syria would have no means of subsistence. The United States, which is engaged in the process of legitimising al-Sharaa, is aware that completely ridding itself of the Russians is impossible, and the line taken in Syria by Donald Trump so far has been one of tacit acceptance of Moscow’s role. After all, the veto power in the UN Security Council gives Putin ample scope, should he wish, to thwart Trump’s conciliatory policy towards Damascus. And without the Kremlin’s approval, neither the lifting of international sanctions on Syria nor the removal of al Sharaa and his entourage from the list of terrorists would have been possible.

Putin knows he is still indispensable to al-Sharaa and that it will take the Syrian president no small amount of time to diversify his food and energy supplies. Until then, there will be three men he has tasked with keeping the dialogue with Damascus alive. The first is Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the Deputy Minister of Defence who was already in charge of relations with Assad. Then there is the new ambassador, appointed at the beginning of August, Dmitri Dogadkin, formerly Moscow’s representative in Oman and Qatar, who is fluent in Arabic and has a deep understanding of the Middle East. Finally, there is Louay Youssef, president of the Russian-Syrian Chamber of Commerce. In a report by the Russian GRU intelligence service last December, which advised the Kremlin to cultivate trade relations in Syria, Youssef was identified as the right man to keep the door to Damascus just ajar.