Limitations and objectives of the defence pact between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Ankara. This is the first time that the region’s leading Sunni powers – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey – have entered into a formal military pact. Under the terms of the agreement, the pact commits the three countries to collective defence, bringing together NATO’s second-largest army, the Muslim world’s only nuclear power and the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, where the Prophet Muhammad is buried. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the historic document in Mecca on the holy day of Friday. Although there is no doubt that the pact aims to counter Iran’s influence, “it does not represent an attempt to establish a military axis or a sectarian bloc”, “nor is it intended as a threat to the security of any country in the region, let alone Israel”, says Rayed Krimly, Saudi Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy.

The risk of an open conflict between the United States’ main regional allies, Israel and Turkey, is the subject of increasingly heated debate, but is considered unlikely, against the backdrop of a war of words between the Israeli and Turkish leaders, who share a need to create an external enemy to appease their respective electoral bases. From Jerusalem’s perspective, however, this is a negative development. It adds a military dimension to a political front that has taken a staunchly anti-Israeli stance. It is also a cause for concern as both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are exploring the nuclear option and have much to gain from close cooperation with Pakistan.

Friday’s signing follows last week’s announcement by Saudi Arabia of a coalition for maritime defence of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, known as the ‘Multinational Coalition for Maritime Defence’. Turkey and Pakistan were among the 14 countries that signed a joint communiqué in Riyadh announcing its formation. The coalition will meet again on 12 and 13 August to define its institutional framework. In April, Islamabad deployed a squadron of Chinese-made fighter aircraft and air defence systems to a Saudi base. The immediate question is whether Turkey, too, will deploy forces – including naval units – to the Arabian Peninsula. This would expand its military presence, which already extends to the Horn of Africa, where it has its largest overseas base in Somalia, and an unspecified number of troops stationed in Qatar.

Riyadh has taken this step because it is aware of its growing vulnerability in the face of the Trump administration’s unpredictable behaviour and in the face of attacks not only from Iran and Shia militias in Iraq, but more recently also from Tehran’s other ally, the Houthis, who have resumed striking the Kingdom and imposed an embargo on Saudi goods transiting through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The United States, which has troops in both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, has been invited to join the Red Sea group but, like most of the 51 countries on Riyadh’s guest list, has not yet formalised its participation. One question remains: would Turkey and Pakistan really commit to direct attacks against the Houthis, thereby openly clashing with Iran? The answer is most likely a resounding ‘no’, despite the collective defence clause. Without US backing, such agreements would tend to be ineffective, especially if they were to pose a threat to Israel. This might explain why Egypt has remained outside the pact, despite being part of the nascent ‘Quad’ – the ‘Mohammed Agreements’ or ‘Arab NATO’ – alongside Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad, formed to counter Emirati and Israeli influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The pact is aimed at deterrence rather than aggression, which is Saudi Arabia’s current objective. For Turkey and Pakistan, the main advantage lies in projecting military power and receiving Saudi aid – at a time when their economies are struggling – without exposing their own troops to direct fire. Both Pakistan and Turkey maintain strong, albeit complex, ties with Tehran, which makes them unlikely targets for new and more intricate fronts of conflict.