This is how Trump has (once again) taken a stand on Iran. The depleted arsenal and Tehran’s determination to raise the cost of war

On 1 August, General Alexus Grynkewich, commander of EUCOM (United States European Command), warned the Pentagon that without additional naval units, the United States would no longer be able to simultaneously maintain a presence in the Mediterranean and address other strategic priorities. The document makes a politically uncomfortable point: the US Navy is exhausting its defensive capacity in the eastern Mediterranean, five months after the start of the conflict. The problem goes beyond the absolute number of units available and affects the sustainability of the entire campaign. The fact-check published by the New York Times on the same day quantifies the depletion of the US arsenal in the air war: 1,200 Patriot missiles out of 2,330, over 1,000 Tomahawk missiles out of 3,000, over 1,100 JASSMs (long-range air-to-surface missiles) out of 4,400, and between 190 and 290 THAAD missiles (high-altitude missile defence) out of 360. Trump attributed the shortfalls to the arms transfers to Kyiv decided by the Biden administration, but those supplies concerned ground-based weaponry, whereas this war is being fought in the air, as the newspaper itself confirmed. The consumption is entirely due to this conflict.

Tehran used the brief spring ceasefire to plan its next moves. The New York Times also reports statements by two Revolutionary Guard officials: the commanders of the Quds Force – the IRGC’s external arm responsible for coordinating the militias of the Axis of Resistance – held virtual meetings with the leadership of Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis and the Iraqi Shia militias to draw up a plan for coordinated escalation to be implemented should the Americans resume bombing. The aim, stated without hesitation by an adviser to the Iranian negotiator, was to make the war as costly as possible for Trump. Consequently, the fronts have multiplied: Saudi oil facilities ablaze, gas tankers set alight near the Suez Canal, missiles fired at Jordan, and a Houthi naval blockade of Saudi exports in the Red Sea. An Iranian analyst described the militias as “chess pieces to be moved at the right moment, for maximum impact”.

The attacks are calibrated to avoid direct confrontation with the Americans and Israelis, which would force Washington to strike Iran as a state entity. The fire at the Saudi facilities dragged Riyadh into the war, but Riyadh’s response was directed at Iraqi militias, not Tehran. Iran reaps the strategic benefits and passes the cost of the risk on to its allies.

Erik Lin-Greenberg, a professor at MIT, analysed the issue from the American perspective in Foreign Affairs on 31 July: Washington’s ambiguity stems from indecision, not from a deliberate strategy. Trump has set out various and often incompatible objectives throughout the conflict, ranging from the degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities to regime change, via control of the Strait of Hormuz and denuclearisation. For Tehran, this contradictory sequence had a specific effect: not knowing how far Washington intended to go, Iran assumed the worst and responded accordingly, with thousands of missiles and drones. Lin-Greenberg argues that a clearly communicated objective from the outset would likely have elicited a more restrained Iranian response, as had been the case following the raids in June 2025. The same ambiguity scuppered the June memorandum of understanding. The text obliged Iran to ensure safe passage through the Strait using its ‘best efforts’: the Americans interpreted this as a complete reopening, whilst the Iranians saw it as confirmation of their authority over the strait, with the right to open only the section closest to their own coastline. That divergence in interpretation, left unresolved in the text, led to fresh clashes within a few weeks of the signing.

Credit must be given to the defence of the American stance: in some cases, the ambiguity has worked. Trump described an Iranian attack on American ships as a mere “spiteful act”, responded with minimal retaliation, and Tehran accepted that interpretation without escalating the attacks. The deliberate vagueness surrounding the terms of the April ceasefire allowed both sides to declare themselves the victors, bringing an end to an escalation before it could widen. These exceptions are real, but each cycle of tension and détente ends more quickly than the previous one, and when Washington attempts de-escalation, as Andrew Leber of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has observed, Tehran has already set the next cycle in motion.

The Wall Street Journal’s account of 2 August sheds light on the decision-making process behind the latest U-turn. Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday 28 July. The following day, Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman met with Vice-President J. D. Vance and then with Trump, conveying the message that the proxy militias had been sufficiently weakened and that the time had come for de-escalation. On Saturday evening, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman rang Trump directly. Netanyahu was not contacted. That night, Trump announced on Truth Social that he had agreed the terms of a deal, describing the complete opening of the Strait and the end of Iran’s nuclear programme, but Tehran denied having requested any pause and described the statement as “yet another lie”.

The active mediators – Qatar, Pakistan and Oman – do not confirm the terms described by the President. Tehran has also made it clear that the talks with Oman concern the arrangements for commercial transit, not a relinquishment of its authority over the Strait. The premise underlying the entire war – that Iran would yield under pressure – has not been borne out by events over five months of conflict, yet US behaviour remains unchanged. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal – which is not hostile to the Administration – has counted eight announcements of an end to the war, and the Gulf allies who are reining in the president rather than following him paint the picture of a power that manages its communications whilst waiting for someone to find a way out, not that of a power waging war with a strategy.

For the Pasdaran, that margin represents a strategic advantage. Sixty-eight per cent of Americans believe the war is not worth fighting, according to a July poll by the Washington Post and Ipsos, and the November mid-term elections are the ticking time bomb that Washington cannot ignore: fuel prices, military spending, and growing unpopularity amongst Republican voters. The proxy strategy has a political attrition dimension designed to operate within that timeframe, which goes beyond any immediate military objective.

Grynkewich’s report highlights the limits reached by US naval capabilities. According to the Wall Street Journal, the death of Senator Lindsey Graham has removed the last hardline adviser amongst those close to the President, leaving the field open to those who did not want the war and now want it ended on whatever terms are available. The Wall Street Journal also describes the Iranian position using a technical term: ‘escalation dominance’ – the ability to control the pace and intensity of the conflict by forcing the adversary to react. The US war continues to redefine its objectives. The Iranian war has never ceased to pursue the same ones.

Wars that are lost do not always end in military defeat. Sometimes they end when those fighting them cease to understand why they are fighting them. At that point, time works in favour of those who have answered the question.