Ultimately, the crisis in Ceuta will be primarily a Spanish one. The alliance between Vox and the Partido Popular

Sánchez’s real problem now is the management of minors and internal redistribution. “When certain migration governance functions are handed over to third countries such as Morocco or Libya, there is a risk that they will then exploit the situation to their own advantage,” explains researcher Francesco Pasetti
1 AUG 26
Translated by AI
Image of Ultimately, the crisis in Ceuta will be primarily a Spanish one. The alliance between Vox and the Partido Popular

Photo: Lapresse

The Hague. An ‘unprecedented’ migration crisis, according to Spain. And political chaos which, despite the widespread alarm – including from the Meloni government – will remain purely a Spanish problem. The wave of irregular migrants reaching the beaches of Ceuta has exceeded sixty thousand people, compared with a population of eighty-five thousand in the Iberian exclave on the African continent. Almost half of the migrants are reported to have already been repatriated to Morocco, often on a voluntary basis. However, not all of them will leave the country, and this is one of the reasons why right-wing forces have attacked Pedro Sánchez’s government.
It is a matter of opportunism, but also of genuine concern: some of these irregular migrants could in fact be diverted to other autonomous communities, many of which are governed by the Partido Popular.
Among the accusations levelled at the president, in addition to inadequate border patrols, is Sánchez’s alleged openness to non-European workers. “It should come as no surprise to anyone that thousands of people want to enter a country that regularises more than a million irregular migrants overnight,” Miguel Tellado, national spokesperson for the Partido Popular, has just stated. Similar sentiments were expressed by Santiago Abascal, leader of Vox: “Mass regularisation has led to an invasion within our borders. Every stabbing and every future rape will have been directly imported by Sánchez.” The sovereigntists are alluding to the recent decree adopted by the government on asylum, which has, however, been exploited for propaganda purposes: Sánchez’s initiative actually concerns the granting of temporary residence or work permits to undocumented migrants with no criminal record who entered the country before 31 December 2025. This affects around 500,000 people, but under no circumstances could the migrants currently in Ceuta also benefit from it. And stabilising a labour market where undocumented migrants who have been here for some time were in fact already active does not mean encouraging pressure on the borders.
“We are facing a crisis of governance and reception: regularisation has nothing to do with it,” explains Francesco Pasetti, a researcher at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (Cidob), to Il Foglio. “The arguments put forward by certain politicians are truly shallow – Ceuta is a case in its own right, finding itself facing a situation beyond its control. Rather than undermining the project of European solidarity, as I hear being said from Italy to Sweden, what is needed is EU-wide coordination: today it is the Spanish exclave’s turn, tomorrow it will be Greece’s, or Lampedusa’s. When certain migration governance functions are handed over to third countries such as Morocco or Libya, there is a risk that they will then exploit the situation to their own advantage. Just a few days ago, Sánchez held a meeting to relaunch diplomatic ties with Algeria, a rival of Rabat, and official statements assure close cooperation between the parties, but it is hard to believe that the timing is merely coincidental.”
The other issue that Ceuta will face, once the humanitarian emergency has passed, if anything, is that of internal redistribution. According to ministerial sources, the new arrivals are said to include thousands of unaccompanied minors: at least seven thousand. Whilst adults – as is already happening – will mainly be turned away or expelled from the exclave, a different legal framework applies to minors. Indeed, their management is not the prerogative of central government; since the end of June, Spain has been subject to a regional reception obligation – a requirement defined by another decree from the Sánchez government, introduced to regulate a situation previously governed by the principle of voluntary solidarity on the part of local authorities. Under the new provisions – which were immediately contested by the Autonomous Communities – minors will therefore be relocated across the country according to certain allocation criteria: the most populous regions, and secondly the wealthiest, will bear the greatest reception obligations. These are Madrid, Valencia, Andalusia and Catalonia. Only Catalonia is not governed by the Partido Popular. In numerical terms, this would not yet constitute an unmanageable influx: up to two thousand children per Autonomous Community. However, the case of Ceuta would set a clear legal precedent, which the regional authorities would like to avoid. And this is further fuelling the right-wing opposition’s criticism of the left-wing government. In short, a purely Spanish issue. One in which other European governments have no reason to fan the flames.