Ukraine’s accession to the EU is an achievable goal, but unanimity is required

A paper explains how to integrate Kyiv in accordance with the Merz formula and keep everyone happy, from "principled conditionalists" to "security maximalists", right through to Hungary, which "is a case in its own right"
25 JUL 26
Translated by AI
Image of Ukraine’s accession to the EU is an achievable goal, but unanimity is required

Photo: ANSA

Berlin. Europe moves forward slowly; Friedrich Merz takes the lead. EU enlargement is back at the centre of the debate thanks to a paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which revisits the proposal put forward in May by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to grant Ukraine associate member status within the EU, allowing representatives from Kyiv to attend meetings of the Commission and the European Council without full membership. This solution was immediately rejected by President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is convinced that Ukraine must be granted membership on an equal footing with the other Member States.
The paper, centred on the Chancellor’s idea – the ECFR’s headquarters are in Berlin – points out that enlargement remains an unresolved issue and that Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Moldova have long been knocking on the EU’s door. The two ECFR experts, Engjellushe Morina and Gabrielė Valodskait, state that whilst none of the candidate countries (with the possible exception of Montenegro) is ready to join the EU at present, “now is precisely the time for the EU and its member states to act”. The paradigm is being turned on its head: whilst the candidate countries must indeed meet the standards required of them, it is up to the host countries to reach a unanimous position.
The issue concerns both method and content: on the one hand, they write, the debate is confined to the European elite – a situation that must change by involving voters ‘so as not to provide fertile ground for populist and far-right narratives’. On the other hand, a framework for accession is needed that is suited to the EU’s geopolitical and domestic challenges: “A coalition called ‘Team Enlargement’ must be formed, comprising ten key states and led, ça va sans dire, by Germany. The paper sets out ‘a four-stage timetable to implement this strategy over the next 18 months’.” The (relative) urgency is easily explained: EU membership will be essential for any peace agreement that Kyiv and the Ukrainian people are willing to accept, and even the United States has made it clear that it regards Ukraine’s accession to the EU as indispensable for peace. However, this is not just about Ukraine: today, they reiterate, “failing to integrate candidate countries bordering the bloc represents a growing vulnerability in economic, political and strategic terms”. Morina and Valodskaitė acknowledge that European leaders “largely” understand the geopolitical imperative of enlargement. “Where they hesitate is in the practical implementation.”
The two authors thus bring some order to the European landscape, where they identify the ‘principled conditionalists’ – Denmark, Germany and Sweden – who favour enlargement based on the rule of law and institutional reforms. The ‘conditional sceptics’ – Austria, France, Italy and the Netherlands – whose support is more contingent on national concerns. Then there are the “security maximalists” – Lithuania and Poland – driven primarily by their exposure to Russia. Finally, there is Hungary, “which represents a case apart, despite being in favour of enlargement in the Western Balkans”. Some fear uncontrolled migration, whilst others fear competition from agricultural goods currently from outside the Union, but “the only real common ground shared by all ten Member States examined is merit-based conditionality: it is the glue that holds this group together”. We must therefore support the Commission’s plans to prevent Orbán-style “setbacks” in democratic practices following the accession of new members, but above all to balance the overlapping needs of the three groups of states (plus Hungary) “in order to devise a credible and watertight enlargement strategy that respects the urgency of the matter”. An example? Allow the French government to state that it insists on rigorous European standards, and the Dutch government to emphasise that it is applying strict principles of fiscal prudence, whilst Rome and Vienna will assure voters that they have received guarantees on migration. And then move forward in four stages: develop the ‘Merz letter’ into a comprehensive concept; craft a compelling narrative; put enlargement to a vote in the European Council; and implement the new framework. There is time until the end of this year for the first three points; for the last one, there is the whole of 2027. The plan is feasible, the two authors conclude, pointing out that even in Hungary “64 per cent of voters are in favour of further EU enlargement, mainly for pragmatic reasons”.