The EU’s minor sanctions: whilst it is so harsh on Zelensky, it is just as divided when it comes to Putin

George Prokopiou, the Greek billionaire shipowner, continues to face problems with his oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz – sometimes they manage to pass through and sometimes, as happened last Sunday, they are targeted by the Iranian regime: a fire broke out on board and the crew was evacuated – but he managed to secure an exemption from the European Union, which, whilst laboriously approving the severely watered-down 21st package of sanctions against Russia, granted Dynagas permission, for at least another year, to sell Russian liquefied natural gas to third countries. According to the maritime portal Equasis, a third of the 27 tankers in the fleet of the company owned by Prokopiou are built to navigate the icy waters of the Arctic around Yamal, a Russian liquefied natural gas plant. According to the Financial Times, Greek shipping companies have earned at least $3.8 billion over the past three years transporting Russian gas and oil, with Dynacom – the parent company of Dynagas – topping the list: between June 2023 and last June, it transported more than 100 million barrels of Russian resources, generating a profit of $900 million. Since 2023, the Ukrainians have been calling for these companies to be included on the sanctions list as ‘international sponsors of Putin’s war’, but the Greek government has consistently avoided doing so. It did so again yesterday, after holding up European negotiations on the 21st package for more than a week, agreeing in return to extend the price cap to $44.10 per barrel for the next twelve months – without this agreement, the price would have automatically risen yesterday to $58 per barrel, which is well below the current market price but still represents a significant windfall fuelling Vladimir Putin’s relentless war machine. 

The sanctions package has also included further vessels from Russia’s shadow fleet (which, of course, does not comply with the price cap and which sometimes carries out so-called ‘hybrid attacks’ or warning strikes, as happened recently in British waters), bringing the total number of vessels barred from docking at European ports to around 600. In addition, the list includes Russian banks, cryptocurrency platforms and trading platforms for oil and metals, as well as 250 individuals and companies that support the war against Ukraine, spread propaganda or help circumvent the sanctions.

But the overall effect of these negotiations is indeed worrying: whilst former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was playing the role of the anti-Ukrainian bully, the conflicting national interests of the other EU countries were masked. Now they are no longer hidden, and European unity is constantly being undermined. The pressure from Greece has certainly been the most visible, but it is not the only one, and the ambition that existed just a month ago, at the start of negotiations on the 21st package – when even the Trump-style anti-Ukrainian rhetoric had softened somewhat and when the Ukrainians’ ‘sanctions that work’, namely attacks on refineries and industrial facilities within Russian territory, were dealing the blow to the Russian economy that was supposed to push Putin towards a ceasefire – has been scuppered. Estonia had already proposed in March to introduce a ban on entry to the EU for Russian combatants and former combatants in Ukraine, and Sweden took up the idea, given that between 2022 and 2025 the number of visas issued to Russians has risen again: more than 170,000 in France, nearly 160,000 in Italy, and nearly 100,000 in Spain. However, France and Italy – which do not wish to forgo the revenue generated by tourism – have managed to water down this proposal by challenging its legal basis: how is a combatant defined, and who bears the burden of proof – the consular offices? And if they make a mistake, who handles the appeals? Consequently, the Commission has decided to grant each Member State considerable flexibility in issuing visas.

The same thing happened with the restrictions on imports of certain fish products from Russia, including the ban on cod and Alaska pollock, which is very similar to it. In 2025, the EU imported around 750 million euros’ worth of these products from Russia, which, as far as cod is concerned, represents around a quarter of the EU’s total imports. However, pollock is the main ingredient in frozen fish fingers, so Germany and other countries opposed the ban; and cod is practically a national dish in Portugal, so Lisbon also opposed it. The Commission proposed switching from a ban to a quota system, but this was not enough: cod and pollock are no longer included in the package (they account for 2.7 per cent of the EU’s total imports from Russia).

There have been other national victories, such as Bulgaria’s opposition to the inclusion on the individual sanctions list of Kirill, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Vagit Alekperov, the billionaire founder of Lukoil: neither appears in the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. And if we look back at the past week, we find European officials and experts extremely concerned about the government reshuffle in Kyiv – each with their own theory about Volodymyr Zelensky, the most calculating, his star minister Mykhailo Fedorov, the most popular, and General Oleksandr Syrsky, the most maligned – and indeed rather annoyed with the Ukrainian president, who takes the liberty of reshuffling his own government with all the money the Europeans are giving him, whilst the tools the EU actually possesses – and which, if used properly, work a treat – were being torn to shreds. This is how the EU is jeopardising Ukraine’s stability, whilst pontificating on who the best defence minister or general for Kyiv might be, and on the ground it is only the Ukrainians who live and die.