Mali, President Trump’s eighth front

The Trump administration is considering military action in the West African country of Mali to target an al-Qaeda-affiliated group known as JNIM, according to current and former US officials familiar with the discussions. If approved, the operation would add an eighth country to the list of those where President Donald Trump has ordered strikes since the start of his second term – a phase of his presidency that he had initially promised to devote to ending global conflicts and redirecting American resources towards US citizens. Within the administration, however, there is no consensus on whether to proceed. Among the most staunch supporters of the use of force is Sebastian Gorka, senior director for counter-terrorism at the National Security Council, according to current and former officials, who, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss military planning. The jihadist group, whose full name is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has established a stronghold in Mali and in recent years has stepped up attacks in the coastal countries of West Africa, establishing itself as the best-equipped armed group in the region and one of the most powerful in the world. A spokesperson for the Malian government did not respond to requests for comment. Gorka also did not respond to requests for comment. The Pentagon declined to comment.

When asked about the matter, the White House declined to clarify whether the President intends to authorise the attacks, but an administration official stated that the United States is encouraging the governments of North and West Africa “to purchase US equipment and services to support their efforts in the war against terrorists”. According to the same official, terrorism in the Sahel – the vast semi-arid belt south of the Sahara – represents “a multinational problem”. “We call on regional partners and NATO allies to support the Alliance of Sahel States in the fight against JNIM and ISIS,” the official added, referring also to the Islamic State, which originated in the Middle East and subsequently spread across the African continent through its affiliates. The Alliance of Sahel States comprises Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: three West African countries in which, in recent years, the military has overthrown democratically elected governments, drastically reduced ties with the West and sought Russia’s support on security matters. The administration official, however, attributed responsibility not so much to the local governments as to their Russian partners, arguing that Moscow “has proved to be an ineffective security partner for Mali”. “We hope that other African countries will take note of Russia’s poor performance in the fight against terrorism,” he added.

The fact that the Trump administration is considering military options in Mali had not been reported previously. Mali, a landlocked country with a population of nearly 25 million, has in recent years been ravaged by violence perpetrated by jihadist groups, as well as by abuses committed by the ruling military junta itself and by Russian mercenaries hired to restore order. Armed groups, in particular JNIM, have grown increasingly powerful and have turned Mali and its neighbouring Sahel countries into the global epicentre of terrorism. Last year, militants affiliated with al-Qaeda imposed a fuel blockade that paralysed much of the country. This spring, they launched a series of coordinated attacks across the country: fighters appeared on the streets of the capital, Bamako; they captured a strategic town in the north of the country, wresting it from the Malian army and the Russians; and they killed the defence minister in a suicide bombing. Meanwhile, IS Sahel, an affiliate of the Islamic State and a rival of JNIM, has consolidated its presence near the border between Mali and Niger. Last year, its militants kidnapped the American missionary Kevin Rideout, who is believed to still be held captive in Mali.

To combat the violence, the Malian military junta has hired Russian mercenaries, initially through the Wagner Group and now through Africa Corps, which has closer ties to the Russian Ministry of Defence. The Russians have been accused of a series of atrocities, according to reports by human rights organisations and previous articles in the Washington Post. The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. Héni Nsaibia, a senior analyst for West Africa at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project, stated that the Malian army and its Russian backers are responsible for the deaths of hundreds more civilians than JNIM and IS Sahel combined. Last year, the Malian army and its Russian partners were responsible for 925 civilian deaths, according to ACLED, compared with 232 caused by Islamist militants. “It is extremely problematic that a government such as the US government, or any other Western partner, should provide support to these regimes, whose legitimacy remains contested and which are incredibly fragile and repressive,” he said, referring to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

However, last year, as part of a Trump administration initiative to rebuild ties with Mali, the United States stepped up the sharing of intelligence with the Malian government, according to statements made at the time by both serving and retired US officials. This information was used in attacks by the Malian army, which had been largely sidelined by the Biden administration due to its refusal to set a timetable for a return to democratic elections and its collaboration with Russia. However, such cooperation has so far remained limited, a far cry from the scope of the US-Nigeria security partnership, which intensified last year and included US air strikes and a ground mission that killed one of the top leaders of the Islamic State in Africa. Any direct US military involvement in Mali carries the risk of triggering hostilities with Russian forces in the region. It could also require de-escalation efforts between Washington and Moscow similar to those implemented in Syria during the civil war. When asked about Senator Marco Rubio’s support for military intervention in Mali, the State Department sidestepped the question, stating that the United States “unequivocally condemns terrorist activity in Mali”. The department also stated that the Trump Administration is “committed to promoting accountability and regional cooperation against terrorist threats and to monitoring indicators and alerts relating to threats to our homeland”. A US military intervention against JNIM would add Mali to the list of countries against which Trump has ordered attacks: Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela. The administration has also conducted a controversial military campaign against alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, which has resulted in numerous casualties.

Wassim Nasr, a Sahel specialist and senior researcher at the Soufan Centre, said that the United States might be more helpful by intervening in ‘conflict resolution’, forcing the Malian junta government to engage in dialogue with JNIM – which has focused not on global objectives but on the application of Islamic law in local governance – and with other political opponents whom the junta has largely silenced. “Opting once again for a military solution will not resolve the situation,” explains Nasr. “The French have been trying for ten years. The Russians have been trying for five. The situation has only got worse.” France launched its military intervention in the Sahel in 2013 at the request of the then Malian government. The French Armed Forces quelled the insurgency in Mali and restored a degree of order. This initial mission was followed by a second, Operation Barkhane, which eliminated key militant leaders but failed to halt the spread of various armed groups. Anger towards France – fuelled by neo-colonial mistakes and Russian disinformation – has grown over the years, contributing to the coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021 and in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. President Emmanuel Macron subsequently withdrew French forces. Nasr added that if US strikes were to weaken JNIM, they could in turn benefit ISIS in the Sahel, whose growth has been curbed by the rival group affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Peter Pham, a former official in the Trump administration, was less pessimistic about the use of military force, but stated that a prerequisite should be the restoration of trust with the governments of Mali and Niger before launching any security cooperation initiatives. “Whilst we have very limited economic or other interests in these countries, we do not want jihadist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda to gain a foothold there,” said Pham. Gorka has long made aggressive counter-terrorism policies a cornerstone of his ideology. However, his impact on policy since the start of Trump’s second term has been modest, a US official said: a source of relief for his critics, who take issue with his hardline approach, and a disappointment for his supporters. In the spring, Gorka entered into talks to become the next director of Trump’s National Counter-Terrorism Centre, following the resignation of Joe Kent, who had left the administration embittered by the president’s decision to start a war in Iran. But those talks did not result in Gorka’s appointment.

US officials, both serving and retired, have stated that Gorka was heavily involved in the negotiations for the repatriation of Rideout, the captured missionary. One of the Administration’s main objectives last year was to secure overflight rights over Mali, a source said, so that US officials could fly aircraft and deploy other surveillance technology over Malian airspace to better monitor his movements. This desire to secure overflight rights underpinned the Administration’s decision to lift sanctions against key members of the junta, including Defence Minister Sadio Camara, who was a key supporter of the Russian intervention in Mali and was killed in the JNIM attack on 25 April. According to current and former officials, Gorka was also involved in an operation to kill Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, the leader of an al-Qaeda cell based in Algeria, whose influence has waned in recent years. Although US officials had hoped last summer that US intelligence had been used in an attack in Mali to eliminate al-Anabi, as previously reported by the Washington Post, his death has never been confirmed.

Corinne Dufka, an independent expert on the Sahel, said there is a risk that any US strikes could prompt JNIM to target the United States or American citizens in the region – something it has not done so far – or to bring the group closer to the main al-Qaeda organisation, from which it has distanced itself in recent years. “If the US were to help the Malian authorities kill JNIM members, it could backfire on them,” she explained. “And they could squander an opportunity to deradicalise and demobilise one of the most sophisticated jihadist organisations in the world.”