un foglio internazionale
What does smartphone use have to do with the demographic decline?
The decline in the number of couples and children, and how birth rates will shape the geopolitics of the future, in Oscar Bockel’s book: “Society in 2010 was not archaic. The big difference compared with 2010 is smartphones, which create an addiction to expectations,” the author tells Le Figaro
14 SEP 26
Last updated: 08:25 AM
Translated by AI

In the book "La Bombe de la dénatalité. Comment le monde entre dans l’hiver démographique" (Le Cerf), senior civil servant and diplomat Oscar Bockel identifies the advent of the smartphone as one of the main causes of the collapse in fertility and believes that demographics will disrupt political and geopolitical power balances in the future. “We must distinguish between two demographic transitions,” he tells Le Figaro. “The first involves a shift from around six children per woman to two; the second, which we are experiencing today, involves a shift from two children to one, or even zero. These two transitions are not driven by the same determining factors,” Oscar Bockel tells Le Figaro before adding: “The first is linked to modernity: the fall in infant mortality, which reduces the need for ‘spare’ children; women entering the labour market; and urbanisation. Since the early 2010s, we have entered the second phase, the causes of which are different. Why have we gone from more than two children per woman in 2010 to 1.53 today? Society in 2010 was not archaic. The major difference compared with 2010 is smartphones, which have led to a decline in the number of couples and changed attitudes. Having children is no longer a given, but one goal amongst many, which is achieved once all the ‘boxes’ in life have been ‘ticked’.” What are these ‘boxes to tick’ that now take precedence over having children? “It is an ever-increasing level of aspiration, accompanied by a growing difficulty in fulfilling it: owning a home, completing one’s studies, finding a stable job, finding the right partner. These needs follow one another and consequently postpone the decision to have a child or lead to people giving up on the idea altogether,” Bockel explains to Le Figaro. “The question,” the author continues, “is therefore to understand how smartphones affect these two areas. First and foremost, they radically disrupt the way we use our personal time. We are seeing a collapse in all social and collective activities, whether positive or negative: the number of friends, the time spent with them, even alcohol consumption, which is often a social activity. All these activities are losing ground because our time is shifting towards screens, with social networks becoming increasingly immersive and increasingly attuned to our desires. It is only natural that relationships should also be affected. Furthermore, our aspirations have changed. Instagram promotes certain ideals of life, particularly those centred on travel and the search for the perfect partner, further reinforced by dating apps that give the illusion of endless choice.”
Bockel demonstrates that groups which have eschewed smartphones, such as Orthodox Jews and the Amish, have seen their fertility rates remain stable or increase. Is this not, above all, due to these groups’ rejection of contraception? “Smartphones are obviously not the only factor that distinguishes the Amish from the majority population,” says Bockel, before adding: “After all, of my two demographic transitions, the Amish have not even experienced the first. It is nevertheless surprising that they manage to maintain such a high fertility rate – the same applies to Orthodox Jews. By contrast, Roma populations, amongst whom smartphone use is on the rise, are seeing their fertility rates plummet. From a geographical perspective: Latin America has a very high rate of smartphone penetration relative to its level of development, whilst certain regions of South Asia lag significantly behind, particularly regarding uptake amongst young women. This explains the differences in timing. The level of human development does not explain why fertility has plummeted in Guatemala whilst remaining stable in Bangladesh. Yet it is precisely the case that smartphone ownership among young women has been much slower to take hold in Bangladesh, whilst in Guatemala it is almost universal. Several studies also show that in the United States, the regions where the iPhone first became widespread are also those where fertility has fallen the most.” Bockel proposes a sort of map of the major powers of tomorrow and those destined for decline, in the light of demographic data. Where will France fit into this picture? “For much of its history, France was what was known as the ‘China of Europe’ – the most populous country on the continent, more populous than Russia, and four to five times more populous than England, which made the King of France the most powerful sovereign in Europe. In the 18th century, a highly paradoxical phenomenon occurred: the French fertility rate plummeted suddenly, and France became the first country to experience the demographic transition. This changed the course of its history. Today, whilst China and, to a lesser extent, Europe are experiencing a demographic decline, the United States and India, with more favourable demographic conditions, enjoy significant advantages. ‘For Africa, everything will depend on the continent’s ability to increase its human capital,’ according to Bockel. In the West, populist movements thrive above all amongst the working-age population. Is the upper limit of populism perhaps the ageing of societies, since age dampens the desire to ‘turn the tables’? ‘An ageing population makes a society more conservative, not necessarily in an ideological sense, but in the sense of a greater attachment to existing structures, particularly the pension system,’ explains Bockel. “In many countries,” the author continues, “there is real tension on this point; indeed, it is surprising to note how so-called populist parties adopt, depending on the country and their electoral strategy, very different positions on this issue, avoiding challenging the pension system so as not to alienate a decisive electorate. This is a vicious circle: an ageing population makes any challenge to the existing balance politically risky, which places a growing burden on workers to fund pensions; this in turn affects fertility rates, since it is precisely these workers who are, or intend to become, parents, and who therefore lack the necessary resources to do so, which in turn exacerbates the ageing of the population. It is difficult to break this vicious circle without a political awareness of the crucial importance of demography.” (Translation by Mauro Zanon)