Ukraine knows how to wage war. And it is changing the nature of warfare

Like Napoleon, the trenches of the Great War and the blitzkrieg of the Second World War, the defence of Kyiv today is rewriting the rules of military strategy

31 AUG 26
Translated by AI
Image of Ukraine knows how to wage war. And it is changing the nature of warfare

Photo: ANSA

‘Wars reshape war: new weapons, new tactics and new strategies produce results that no one had foreseen or thought possible,’ writes Michael Barone in the Washington Examiner. “The levée en masse of revolutionary France and Napoleon’s daring attacks prevailed over the static siege warfare of the 18th century and subjugated Europe. Aggressive assaults resulted in horrific casualties, but failed to move the trenches on the Western Front by more than a few metres during the First World War. Less than twenty years later, the European theatre of the Second World War was the scene of blitzkrieg attacks: France, with the largest army in Europe, was overrun in six weeks, followed by mechanised Allied forces advancing at the speed permitted by logistics. The war in Ukraine seems to be rewriting the history of warfare once again. When Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops to march on Kyiv in February 2022, he expected them to be welcomed with open arms, whilst US intelligence assumed they would encounter no serious resistance and recommended evacuation.
Both nuclear superpowers assumed that superior conventional forces would prevail. Volodymyr Zelensky’s response — ‘I need ammunition, not a lift’ — was deemed naïve, and the stalemate in his 2023 counter-offensive was seen as proof that Russia would win. Subsequent U.S. presidents operated on this assumption. Joe Biden pressured Ukraine not to launch missiles into Russian territory for fear of a wider war. Donald Trump, in Anchorage in August 2025, pressured Ukraine not only to accept Russian advances in Donetsk, but to cede even more territory to them. Both underestimated the ingenuity and morale that enabled Ukraine to transform relatively cheap and unsophisticated drones into weapons capable of winning the war (…) One question concerns a factor that is always critical in war, always difficult and sometimes impossible to measure: morale.
If one looks at the election results in Ukraine prior to the Russian invasions, it is clear that pro-Russian parties were competitive, perhaps even more popular than their rivals. But today, and ever since Zelensky’s call for ‘ammunition, not a pass’ in February 2022, there is no doubt that the vast majority of Ukrainians oppose the Russian conquest. Certainly, the ingenuity of the Ukrainians in waging war with drones is a sign of high morale. Conversely, the morale of the Russian conscript army – recruited largely from disadvantaged ethnic groups and subject to enormous rates of casualties and deaths – is undoubtedly at rock bottom. Polling data further indicate that, while Ukrainian drones strike Russian oil and energy infrastructure, the Russian public—though not yet prepared to turn its back on Putin—is thoroughly fed up with the war. Here at home, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s emphasis on the warrior ethos and opposition to political correctness has been accompanied by increases in recruitment and perhaps an improvement in morale. However, the President’s failure to lay the groundwork or explain his justification for the conflict with Iran, his wavering back and forth between negotiations with the mullahs’ regime and military action, has left the morale of civilians – and voters – at a low ebb. When wars are waged, political leaders have a duty to help voters understand the consequences and what might be required of them.”
(Translation by Giulio Meotti)