Israel doesn’t need friends

‘The classic definition of a Great Power is that of a country capable of waging war without allies,’ writes Edward Luttwak in Unherd. ‘Unbeknown even to its own leaders, Israel must have been a Great Power from the day of its birth, when it had absolutely no allies and was invaded by Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and the Arab Volunteer Liberation Army. Worse still, the new Jewish mini-state had to contend with the very active hostility of the British and American governments, which used their then-pervasive influence to close every Mediterranean port to shipments of arms and ammunition. For the 650,000 Jews of the new mini-state, who were singing and dancing on that day in May 1948, the extremely strict embargo was far more than a mere inconvenience. The British had already supplied their best fighter aircraft and tanks to the Egyptians, and armoured cars fitted with cannons to the Transjordanian Arab Legion – the finest Arab army, still led by British officers. Meanwhile, the British authorities governing what remained of the Mandate of Palestine until midnight on 14 May 1948 had done their utmost to halt any attempt to smuggle weapons into the future State of Israel, with full American backing: a number of Jews from Las Vegas – not necessarily accountants, doctors or lawyers – ended up in prison for sending simple pistols to their fellow Jews. The intention, clearly, was to ensure an Arab victory – the exact opposite of the myth of Anglo-American aid to Israel that is taught as fact throughout the Muslim world. President Truman recognised Israel immediately, at the urging of his comrade-in-arms from the Great War and best friend, Eddie Jacobson. But the Secretary of State, retired five-star General George Marshall, who had led the United States to victory over Nazi Germany, was vastly more influential than former Vice-President Truman. He simply ignored Truman’s recognition, categorically refusing to receive the new state’s first envoy, who would certainly have requested weapons that Marshall was determined to deny. Focused on keeping the Russians from overwhelming Europe, Marshall had no time for a fleeting microstate that would soon vanish in defeat. American interests in the Arab world were not yet that significant – the gigantic Ghawar oil field in Saudi Arabia had only just been discovered – but Arab oil mattered, whilst the tiny Jewish state could never amount to anything. It was true that the State Department was run by anti-Semites, but that was irrelevant at that point, because Marshall was not an anti-Semite: his solution for the Jewish refugees still in the European camps was to suspend the anti-immigration laws and bring them all to the United States. The determined Anglo-American attempt to strangle Israel at birth was partly thwarted by the newly liberated Czechoslovakia, which had an abundance of machine guns and surplus ammunition, as well as a number of Spitfires and other fighter aircraft that it was eager to sell.

The Jews, for their part, had a few transport aircraft and pilots, but could not reach Israel without a refuelling stop. The State Department and the Foreign Office were fully aware of this desperate attempt to circumvent their embargo, and took steps to deny Israel the use of every single European airport. Only Tito’s Yugoslavia granted the use of a single runway in Montenegro, at the insistence of Mosa Pijade, a Jew from Sarajevo and a close wartime comrade of the Marshal. In the end, that tiny shipment was enough to secure Israel’s independence. Yet even after the Jews had defeated their Arab enemies, the State Department did not give in, strenuously and successfully opposing any sale of American arms to Israel, even after the Soviet Union began sending hundreds of aircraft and thousands of tanks to Arab governments. The United States only relented after Israel defeated the Arabs in June 1967, once again without any weapons supplied by the United States and relying instead on second-hand British tanks and new French fighter jets purchased for cash. This story matters because it disproves the notion that Israel depends on American generosity. There are people, including some in the Trump administration, who imagine that cutting US aid would irreparably damage the Jewish state. Israel’s population today is not 650,000, but nine million, including two million loyal Arab citizens who account for one in four of its doctors and a large number of engineers. And precisely because of that long history of refusals and embargoes, those nine million are sufficient to sustain disproportionately large and diversified military industries. These would mitigate any restrictions on American support, particularly as Israel has no need for aircraft carriers or the B-2 bombers that flew all the way from Missouri to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan. This raises the long-standing issue of Israel’s nuclear weapons, long known to include bombs, as well as tactical warheads and those for ballistic missiles. But it also raises a great mystery: why did the United States have to bomb three centrifuge facilities? Only one of these, the Natanz enrichment plant, had a vast 2,500-square-metre hall at ground level and two underground halls of similar size with space for up to 50,000 centrifuges – far more than enough to enrich the uranium needed for a number of bombs. Furthermore, whilst Natanz alone dwarfs Israel’s nuclear weapons centre on the road to Dimona – which is fully visible to passing travellers – Iran has built another large centrifuge hall beneath a mountain at Fordo near Qom, and yet another, three times the size, south of Isfahan. Taking these sites together – along with other large facilities at Parchin – it becomes clear that Iran has spent many times more than Israel, without having completed a single bomb. Then there is the question of time. Israel acquired its first bomb by 1967, nine years after the project began with a small 24-megawatt French research reactor, when it was still an agricultural country of 1.8 million people with no industry to speak of. By contrast, Iran bought its first centrifuge from Pakistan in 1989, and went on to spend ever-increasing sums for a further 37 years, without ever acquiring a weapon. In the Middle East, there is always one and only one explanation for all these mysteries: corruption, to which fanatics devote themselves with equal enthusiasm. On 27 November 2020, the Revolutionary Guards’ leading nuclear expert was assassinated by a machine-gun fired via satellite as he was returning to his villa in Absard, an elegant hilltop town outside Tehran. That luxurious, long journey to sleep far from Tehran’s pollution proves nothing in itself. But its sheer extravagance hints at why the centrifuge facilities were tripled in size, and the entire centrifuge programme was complemented by a 40-megawatt heavy-water nuclear reactor. With their priority access to Iranian funds, at the expense of much-needed water, gas and electricity projects, the Revolutionary Guards can afford to do everything on a grander scale, including monumental headquarters in Tehran and several other cities. Take Professor Ernst David Bergman, for example. Born in Karlsruhe, he directed Israel’s nuclear bomb project with Germanic discipline from start to finish, living with his family in a two-bedroom flat with a kitchen on the premises of his laboratory. This, too, explains how a nation of nine million can research and produce the world’s heaviest main battle tank, a full range of tactical and strategic missiles, and the interceptors that, two years ago, marked humanity’s first foray into space warfare. Israel became an enthusiastic military ally of the United States when it received its first fighter aircraft in October 1968: a twin-engine, two-seater McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom. Its arrival at a remote desert base was supposed to be a state secret, but I learnt of it that very same day from a taxi driver whose son, a base supply officer, had heard a pilot who’d just landed exclaim: ‘What a plane! I’d marry it if I could.’

Having survived until then on surplus war materiel and a handful of French aircraft, the Israelis initially responded to American military aid with deep and genuine gratitude, eagerly seizing every opportunity to reciprocate. The Israeli Mossad was operating within the Soviet Union – which the CIA could only observe from afar – and shared everything it uncovered. Israel’s enemies always portray it as cynical regarding its alliance with the United States, but in my numerous meetings over the years, right up to the current war, this is not what I have sensed. Quite the opposite, in fact: a deep concern at any sign of American weakness in the face of the Chinese, the Russians or anyone else, including the self-destructive Iranian fanatics. A deep sense of satisfaction when the United States suddenly springs into action, as it always does, after appearing to be on the brink of being overtaken, as happened recently with AI and the Chinese. And, of course, a great willingness to draw on Israeli research and development expertise, the fruits of which are now integrated into some of America’s most capable weapons, most notably the F-35 fighter, whose innovative helmet-mounted display system was developed entirely in Israel. Within NATO, it has long been understood that the US Navy must rely on European minesweepers and minehunters for its potential requirements in the Persian Gulf, as it cannot incorporate such short-range vessels into its perpetual transoceanic deployments. Yet no European navy even attempted to seek permission to join the US Navy in the Gulf when that assistance was needed. Israel would never refuse any military assistance it is able to provide, as countless American officers have known for decades. This counts for a great deal in a world where the United States’ allies give ingratitude a bad name.”