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The Art of Leadership
On the streets today, law enforcement officers are becoming targets. But there is no authority without risk. Lessons from military history

Since 1968, it is not only the reasons for the protests or the nature of the clashes that have changed. The relationship with the authorities has changed (photo: Getty)
There is a question that runs through the history of armies and which, paradoxically, is now being raised once again in the streets of our cities: where should those in command be? It is not so much a question of geography. It is a question of responsibility, of the relationship between authority and risk, and of the distance that can separate those who issue an order from those who must carry it out.
On 17 October, during the clashes in central Milan, a police officer on duty in plain clothes was struck on the head by a cobblestone. Blood was streaming down his face, but he did not leave the scene. He continued to lead his men until late in the evening. The following day, with four stitches, he was back on the streets. He could have taken some time off, at least for a few days. Instead, he carried on with his duties, returning to where his men were. Some time later, he received a letter, dated 20 October, in which someone expressed regret that the blow had not resulted in more serious consequences.
The letter criticising the police officer wounded in Milan: the authors regretted that the shooting had not resulted in more serious consequences
The two acts of violence are not of the same nature. The first is physical; the second reveals a way of viewing those who represent the state. It does not matter who they are, what they have done, or how they have carried out their duties. They are a despicable cop, and that is enough. It is arbitrary to attribute the sentiment of the person who wrote that letter to all the demonstrators. But it would be just as naïve to dismiss those words as a mere display of rudeness, without questioning the climate in which an attack on a representative of the state can become a cause for satisfaction.
Almost sixty years ago, following the clashes in Valle Giulia, Pier Paolo Pasolini provoked the Italian left by declaring his sympathy for the police officers – children of the poor – as opposed to the students, children of the middle classes. It was not an indiscriminate defence of the police. It was a rejection of an overly simplistic narrative, in which right and wrong were assigned according to one’s social background. That provocation has stood the test of time, though it has often been reduced to a catch-all phrase suitable for any occasion. A few days ago, Adriano Sofri returned to the difficulty of reducing the complexity of a street clash to a pre-determined dichotomy, with the ‘good guys’ on one side and the ‘bad guys’ on the other. The issue is not to decide once and for all which side to take, but to understand what happens when people disappear behind the categories by which we have chosen to identify them. And yet, compared to 1968, something has changed. Not only the social composition of the demonstrators, the reasons for the protest or the nature of the clashes. What has changed – at least in certain manifestations of street violence – is the relationship with authority. The police officer is no longer merely the one who prevents people from achieving a goal or disperses a demonstration. He becomes the symbol of a power whose legitimacy is denied. It does not matter what decision he has taken or how he has behaved. His guilt precedes his actions: it is what he represents. This is an issue that extends beyond Italy’s borders.
Pasolini’s avowed sympathy for the police was not an indiscriminate defence of them, but a rejection of an overly simplistic portrayal
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Bernard-Henri Lévy described the clashes sweeping across France with deep anguish. To him, the burning of Limoges Town Hall represents more than just the destruction of a building: it is one of the ‘cathedrals of the Republic’ going up in smoke. And the French crisis, in his words, is no longer merely political, but ‘metapolitical’: it undermines the very fabric of society. Above all, Lévy condemns the shift from protest to the legitimisation of violence, culminating in the delegitimisation of the republican police force. And he rejects the reassuring comparison with 1968: what he sees today does not strike him as the return of a revolutionary era, but as the expression of a nihilism which he fears may spread far beyond France.
One may debate its political assessments, its interpretation of responsibilities and even the severity of its judgement on a generation. Yet the question it raises remains: what holds a political community together when some of its members no longer recognise as legitimate the institutions that are supposed to belong to everyone? The letter addressed to the officer injured in Milan does not prove that this rift runs through the whole of society. But it does reveal a possible manifestation of it, and a particularly stark one at that. There is no challenge to an abuse of power, no condemnation of unlawful behaviour, no demand for accountability regarding the use of force. Instead, the person who struck the police officer is criticised for not having injured him badly enough. But there is another aspect of this hostility that deserves attention: the way in which adversaries recognise each other – or cease to recognise each other – as such.
From Alexander the Great to Wellington: according to historian John Keegan, those in command know that the danger faced by their men concerns them too
In 1813, Beethoven composed Wellington’s Victory, based on the Battle of Vitoria, to celebrate the success of the British and allied troops over Napoleon’s army. A unique composition: a battle transformed into music. The two armies enter the scene in chivalrous fashion through recognisable marches and hymns; they face each other and do battle. Beethoven entrusts the representation of two opposing forces to sound. Fifteen minutes of musical symmetry, of course, not a description of the nobility of the wars of that era. And yet that music evokes an image: two adversaries who, whilst fighting one another, exist for one another as recognisable forces.
In street clashes, the picture is different. There are not two armies, nor two sides bearing the same responsibilities. Those who enforce the law are identifiable, subject to a chain of command, bound by the law and held accountable for their actions. Demonstrators are exercising a constitutional right, but those who resort to violence can evade that very recognisability and, above all, can refuse to attribute any legitimacy to the authority before them. It is not merely an asymmetry of means and rules. It can become an asymmetry of recognition. The police officer must see the demonstrator as a citizen, even when called upon to prevent them from committing a crime. The violent protester, on the other hand, may see the police officer as nothing but an enemy. And the enemy, once stripped of the legitimacy of their role, becomes a target. But the recognisability of those who represent authority also raises another question: where should those called upon to exercise that authority stand in relation to their own officers? The Wellington celebrated by Beethoven leads us precisely to this question.
He is one of the four protagonists of "The Mask of Command", the book in which military historian John Keegan examines, through the examples of Alexander the Great, Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler, four profoundly different ways of exercising military power. Not four biographies juxtaposed for the sake of comparison, but four answers to a single question: how does one build and maintain the authority of one who sends other men into danger? Wellington is not Alexander the Great. The former gauges his presence on the battlefield according to the needs of the battle, the opportunity to observe, and the responsibility to decide. The latter embodies what Keegan calls ‘heroic leadership’: the commander who leads his men from the front, who puts himself on the line, who derives part of his authority from his willingness to share the risk. In the Greek hoplite phalanx, the right flank was particularly vulnerable. The shield, carried on the left arm, also protected the neighbouring comrade, whilst leaving the right side more exposed. Officers occupied the forward positions of the formation, where the risk was greatest and their presence most immediately apparent to the soldiers. The commander did not merely have to tell others where to go. He had to show that he was prepared to go there himself. Courage, of course, is not the same as recklessness. Wellington had understood this. Alexander interpreted his relationship with his men differently. Keegan does not provide us with a ranking of valour, but rather a reflection on the different forms of command. Through these differences, one element remains constant: those in command cannot regard the danger faced by their men as something that does not concern them.
On 1 March 1896, at Adwa, during a gruelling clash between the Italian army and Menelik’s Ethiopian forces, two brigadier generals, Giuseppe Arimondi and Vittorio Dabormida, were killed. But the soldiers were also directly led by the officers of the units engaged on the ground, recognisable by their blue scarves, a distinctive sign of their command role. The soldiers were able to spot them and follow them even amidst the chaos of battle. That very same scarf, however, made them recognisable to the Shioans, who could deliberately target them. The mark that allowed the soldiers to recognise their leaders exposed those very officers to enemy fire. And here, history offers a curious coincidence. As early as 1864, Italian legislation provided for another identifying mark for public security officers: the tricolour scarf. Article 24 of the 1940 Public Security Regulations stipulates its use, when the officer is not wearing a uniform, to disperse a meeting or gathering.
For authority to be exercised, it must be recognisable to everyone, including those who oppose that authority
We do not know whether the officer wounded in Milan was wearing it. But that is not the point. The point is that authority, in order to be exercised, must also be recognisable. To its own officers, so that they know who is in charge; to the public, so that they know who is responsible for the decisions taken. And inevitably also to those who oppose that authority. The injured officer was engaged in directing the men on the ground, as is normally the case for those in charge of contingents in public order services. It is at this level – and not at that of those who govern the entire operation – that the comparison with the officers at Adwa takes on meaning: in the responsibility, inherent to that role, of directly leading the men and sharing the risks with them.
This is clearly not a matter of equating a contemporary demonstration with a colonial battle, nor of transposing the categories of war onto the streets of Milan. The differences are fundamental and cannot be erased. But military history can still help us to understand one aspect of responsibility: the relationship between those in command, their presence and the danger.
Let us return, then, to the official in Milan. His presence alongside the officers is no exception: it is the very nature of the task that demands it. But to continue leading the operation after sustaining a head injury and to return to the streets the very next day, with four stitches still fresh, was by no means a foregone conclusion. He could legitimately have stopped. He chose not to. Without attributing a heroic calling to him, we must simply acknowledge, without embellishment, his sense of duty. A sense of duty that those called upon to carry out orders know full well how to recognise and distinguish from the pernicious ‘zero-zero’ mentality. In football, there have been and still are different philosophies: Trapattoni’s ‘don’t concede first’ approach, with which one can even win league titles, and Zeman’s, which is prepared to concede a few goals in order to score the decisive one – the winner. But within institutions, the ‘zero-zero’ mentality can take on a different meaning, not least because what is at stake is not simply a league title: it means limiting oneself to not losing, not making mistakes, not exposing oneself. It means weathering difficulties whilst letting others bear the consequences, all the whilst jealously guarding one’s own position of comfort. This career philosophy can prove convenient, because the absence of visible mistakes is superficially mistaken for leadership ability. Not taking risks does not necessarily mean knowing how to manage them. And never being called to account for a decision is not the same as always having made the right choice.
Wellington’s prudence was not the prudence of one who shirks responsibility. It was that of one who understands the weight of his own decisions. Similarly, Alexander’s boldness cannot be reduced to a mere taste for personal exposure. They are two different ways of facing up to a responsibility that neither of them thought they could evade.
During the Second World War, the American sociologist Samuel Stouffer studied the behaviour of US soldiers in combat. In the second volume of The American Soldier, published in 1949, there is an account by a lieutenant who had fought in North Africa. “In combat, you must stand in front of your men and lead them, not direct them from the rear. Soldiers say: ‘If the officer stays a hundred yards behind, then I’ll stay behind too, with him’. You cannot simply issue orders: you must lead them.”