Further lessons from Ukraine

From the refineries to Kerch, Kyiv is exploring creative ways to manage without Starlink. Primarily satellite and radio communications, but also less technology-dependent methods that reduce the need for corrections. The truth is that none of these solutions fully replaces Starlink
18 NOV 26
Translated by AI
Soldiers from a separate rifle battalion of the National Police of Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia region use a camouflaged case to protect a Starlink satellite communications terminal from Russian aerial reconnaissance in the Donetsk region, Ukraine, on O

(Photo: Getty)

Hangzhou. Following Ukraine’s attack on the Kerch Bridge – a symbol of Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea – there has been much discussion about Ukraine having circumvented the satellite connectivity service provided by SpaceX, Elon Musk’s company, as if there were only one way to do so. In reality, there are several ways, with varying costs, and not all are documented with the same degree of certainty.
The underlying issue is well known. Since mid-October, and again in November, Starshield terminals on Ukrainian vehicles have been subject to speed limits of around 160 kilometres per hour. SpaceX denies having made any changes and is said to have cited a general technical issue. A missile or a jet-powered drone travels much faster, and Starlink does not work on Russian territory anyway, as SpaceX blocks it there.
One approach is via satellite. Since late October, several Russian military channels have claimed to have recovered terminals from the Israeli firm hiSky – which rely on the European Eutelsat and OneWeb constellations – from a number of downed Ukrainian drones. The Kyiv Post has reported the news, and a Ukrainian research group, DP Defpulse, considers it unconfirmed but highly likely. It must be said, however, that the bandwidth of these constellations is far lower than that of Starlink. One analyst writes on X that Eutelsat’s coverage of Russia – which is in geostationary orbit – has a latency of 600–800 milliseconds, making it essentially unusable for manual piloting, whilst OneWeb’s low-Earth orbit satellites perform better in border regions, such as Crimea and the Black Sea. A drone on a pre-programmed route can cope with that delay, but one flown by visual line of sight cannot. It should be added that this interpretation of the story relates to the discovery of hiSky terminals on Ukrainian drones reported by Russian military channels in late October, and these appear to refer to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure; they therefore do not prove that Ukraine used the same technology in the attack on the Kerch Bridge. Furthermore, in this case, the evidence comes from the enemy.
A second option is radio. If the link is only needed in the final minutes, a low-definition video relayed by drones acting as repeaters is sufficient to complete the mission, as explained by a Ukrainian officer involved in planning the operation against the Kerch Bridge, interviewed by the British newspaper The Times. Physics, however, imposes its own limits: line of sight and limited bandwidth play a significant role, as do the relays, which must remain airborne in a contested sky and thus become targets in their own right. This does not, however, diminish the feat, which at times takes on a miraculous quality: guiding the missiles to a bridge more than 250 kilometres from the front line was a veritable technical marvel, with the relay drones active for the final strike.
There are also those who make almost no use of a link. According to EUobserver, the attack on the Borisoglebsk airbase in mid-October was carried out using Neptune missiles, which have their own navigation systems. Regarding the Ryazan refinery, the Institute for the Study of War referred to alternative communication channels and point-to-point navigation. In such cases, the network serves, at most, to correct the trajectory at the last moment.
Finally, there is the less technological approach, perhaps the most important one: reducing the need for corrections. According to the ISW, Ukraine has been degrading Russian air defences for months and then overwhelmed them with a barrage of low-cost drones, opening a corridor for cruise missiles and jet-powered drones from multiple directions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky speaks of seven phases in just a few weeks. A bridge arch is a large, stationary target, and with the defences already disabled, it is reasonable to assume that it requires less remote control than a moving lorry.
However, none of these solutions can replace Starlink where it matters most. Musk’s network keeps units and high-bandwidth interceptors connected, which is why Kyiv protests when the terminals slow down: without it, it becomes difficult to shoot down Russian jet-powered drones. According to Euromaidan Press, some FP-5s were piloted by operators who could see exactly what the missile was seeing. Zelensky said that the connection worked without a hitch right up until the very last seconds.
To date, however, all we have to show for it is a collapsed bridge and a piece of electronic equipment photographed by the Russians: that is enough for both sides’ propaganda machines to fan the flames of suspicion, which perhaps only a breeze from Shenzhen these days could quell.