This is how the churches in Germany lost their congregation

Rome. No possibility of dialogue, mediation or understanding. “Alternative für Deutschland is clearly nationalist and völkisch, and there is no place for this way of thinking either inside or outside places of worship, nor in Christianity, Judaism or Islam”. The President of the German Bishops’ Conference, Bishop Heiner Wilmer, was crystal clear in the wake of the far-right’s success in Saxony-Anhalt. These words, spoken before representatives of the CDU and the SPD, drew a red line that, in his view, should not be crossed: it is not a question of right or left, but of reacting when human solidarity is endangered. “We are at odds when democratic institutions are weakened,” he added. It is the danger of a Nazi resurgence, of its theories that have never been entirely eradicated, and the Churches (Protestant and Catholic) have decided to stake their very existence on this issue: freedom is at stake, they say.

A mistake in perspective, according to Alexander Grau, a journalist, writer and philosopher who has for years written a column in Cicero, the bible of German intellectual conservatism. “The AfD is not a National Socialist party,” he tells Il Foglio: “It does not seek to physically annihilate an ethnic minority, it does not seek to conquer ‘living space’ in the east, it is not militaristic, and it does not even seek to abolish democracy or parliamentarianism. The AfD elects its leaders democratically, not by acclamation. Its voters do not want a repeat of 1933, but rather a return to the 1980s, when, from their point of view, the world was still in order, the streets were safe and there were no migrants loitering in the squares.” Is this similar to the many security-focused parties that have emerged in Europe over the last decade, although each has its own specific focus which is not necessarily the same as that of its sister party, as Giovanni Orsina explained so well in La Stampa? “Alternative für Deutschland is a protest movement against the decades-long dominance of ‘woke’ thinking and left-wing and liberal-progressive culture in public debate. People do not want left-wing ideologues to impose linguistic or ideological rules on them. In response, the political left tries to brand all non-left-wing positions as ‘fascist’ or at least inhumane. It is a transparent ploy to intimidate moderate and middle-class voters”, observes Alexander Grau, who is also convinced that the argument that the party is confined to certain states of the former GDR is limited and fails to fully account for the facts. “The AfD is also making inroads in western Germany. However, it is true that in the east – and this has long been underestimated – there are, to some extent, strong reservations about Western culture. It is true that, from the 1960s onwards, the West was also a model in the youth culture of the GDR: jeans, rock music, fashion. But the Western way of thinking never really took hold there. In a sense, the East has remained very German, whilst West Germans have opened up – like the Italians, the French, the Dutch and other Europeans – to Americanised everyday culture.”

In the conservative commentator’s view, “the fact that, in the years following 1990, East Germans were effectively deprived of power in their own country and that all leadership positions were filled by West Germans certainly did not help to promote a positive image of the West. This also explains why the AfD in western Germany is liberal-conservative and pro-Atlantic, whilst in the east it is national-conservative and shows sympathies for Russia. The fact, however, that the AfD has managed to expand throughout Germany demonstrates that the reasons for its success are present at a national level. And these reasons lie above all in migration, as all the polls show’. Bishop Wilmer said that fear reinforces “the desire for certainties, for simple answers and for a homeland” and added that, yes, the religious factor is becoming increasingly recognisable. Precisely for this reason, attention must be paid to how it is used: “Where faith becomes ideology and religious language fuels fear or pits people against one another, it loses its truth”. But can a response of this kind be sufficient in the face of the challenges of our time, which we see in Germany and elsewhere, not just in Europe? Grau replies: “What is correct in Bishop Wilmer’s statement is that, in the face of digitalisation and globalisation, people need to feel at home and to have emotional security. This may also include religious aspects. This is why there are many conservative Catholics in the AfD. Here, a nostalgia for tradition is evident, which perhaps has less to do with faith in the strict sense, but a great deal to do with the need for religious rites and cultural elements. The Churches are failing to reach out to these people. On the contrary, they offend and alienate them, accusing them – as Bishop Wilmer does – of fuelling fear and pitting people against one another. It is a recipe for disaster. Conservative Christians have the impression that, for church leaders, a secular and universal ethic and interfaith dialogue are more important than a clearly defined and recognisable Christianity. I fear that this leads – much as is happening in the political sphere – to radicalisation and the emergence of conservative schisms within both major denominations. In this regard, the Churches are clearly failing.”

The journalist and theologian Rolad Noé, in a commentary published on Kath.net, describes the bishops’ stance as hypocritical. He takes his cue from the joint statement issued by the Churches in the wake of the AfD’s success – the one in which they assured that “we will not remain silent if human dignity is violated” – and wonders why, just a few days ago, no one from the Diocese of Fulda said a word – not even a greeting – to those taking part in the march for the right to life organised there. Does dignity only count on certain days? Noé argues that, when it comes to voting, the appeals of bishops and pastors are not even given a second thought. This probably also explains why Catholics and Protestants in Saxony-Anhalt preferred to vote not only for the AfD, but also for parties as far removed as the SPD and the Greens, rather than the Christian Democratic centre represented by the CDU. Why are the Churches failing to reach their own people? “To understand this,” says Alexander Grau, “one must realise that the churches play no role whatsoever in eastern Germany. Eastern Germany is the most secularised region in Europe. Furthermore, present-day Saxony-Anhalt is the heart of the Protestant Reformation. Wittenberg is located here. This further contributes to the distance from the Churches. Catholicism carries no weight here. Moreover, the Churches in Germany – first the Protestants, then the Catholics – have shifted significantly to the left on the political spectrum. The established churches espouse socio-political positions similar to those of the Greens and the SPD. This is why they now barely manage to reach people with conservative views. To some extent, these people no longer even want to be reached, and it has even been claimed that ‘anyone who votes for the AfD cannot be a Christian’.”