Pope Leo’s dilemmas in the face of China’s moves

Rome. On Wednesday, the Vatican Press Office reported on the episcopal ordination of Giuseppe Chang Yanfeng, whom the Pope had appointed Bishop of Chifeng on 15 June (though this was only made public two days ago), “having approved his candidacy within the framework of the Provisional Agreement between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China”. He is the first bishop in China to be appointed this year. Two were appointed last year: the first took up his post in October (the auxiliary bishop of Shanghai, Monsignor Ignatius Wu Jianlin) and the second in December (the apostolic prefect of Xinxiang, Monsignor Francis Li Jianlin). Both had been chosen by the Chinese Communist Party during the papal interregnum, a supreme snub by Beijing towards Rome: the Pope had only just died and, with the funeral arrangements yet to be finalised, the bishops were already being selected. This is clear evidence of the imbalance that characterises a – provisional and secret – agreement which, in effect, lawfully allows China to choose the bishops who best suit its plans for controlling religious denominations. The new bishop was ordained by the vice-president of the Patriotic Association, and the first co-consecrator was the vice-president of the Catholic Bishops’ Council of China – a sort of Bishops’ Conference which, however, is not recognised by the Holy See. Bishop Chang Yanfeng, who had already been chosen in March by local leaders, fits perfectly into the mould of bishops loyal to the regime. As reported by Asianews, on 30 June the bishop emphasised the need to “faithfully follow the guidelines coming from Beijing” regarding relations between the Han and Mongolian ethnic groups, calling for “discipline” and stressing the need to “fully integrate the thinking and principles of the rule of law into the entire process of daily evangelisation work”. 

Just over a year after the election of Leo XIV, it is therefore clear that nothing has changed from the previous pontificate regarding relations – in terms of episcopal appointments – with the People’s Republic of China. Beijing chooses the bishops and Rome signs off on them, granting its approval. At times – as is known only because the Holy See has publicly expressed its irritation via a press release – the Chinese authorities proceed without even seeking the Vatican’s (largely formal) approval. This occurred on 26 November 2022, when the Holy See ‘noted with surprise and regret the news of the “installation ceremony”, which took place on 24 November in Nanchang, of His Excellency Monsignor Giovanni Peng Weizhao, Bishop of Yujiang (Jiangxi Province), as “auxiliary bishop of Jiangxi”, a diocese not recognised by the Holy See. This event, in fact, did not take place in accordance with the spirit of dialogue between the Vatican and the Chinese authorities, nor with the provisions of the Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops, dated 22 September 2018. Furthermore, according to reports, the civil recognition of Bishop Peng was preceded by prolonged and intense pressure from the local authorities.”

The point is: could something different have been done now? The Pope, in the only interview he has granted to date, spoke about the Chinese issue and stated straight away that ‘in the short term’ he would continue ‘the line that the Holy See has followed for some years now, and which has been pursued by several of my predecessors. (…) I am also in constant dialogue with various Chinese people on both sides of some of the issues at stake. I am trying to gain a better understanding of how the Church can continue its mission, respecting both the culture and the political issues, whilst also respecting a significant group of Chinese Catholics who, for many years, have experienced a kind of oppression or difficulty in freely practising their faith, without having to choose sides. Ostpolitik – the choices made to say, in realistic terms: ‘This is what we can do now, as we move towards the future’ – I am certainly taking these into consideration, along with other experiences I have had in the past in dealing with Chinese people – both in government and amongst religious leaders and laypeople. It is a very difficult situation. In the long term, I do not presume to say what I will or will not do, but after two months I have already begun to hold discussions at various levels on this issue.”

It is clear, therefore, that Leone is proceeding without much enthusiasm, or at the very least with considerable doubts. But could he have immediately disavowed an agreement of such magnitude that had been negotiated behind the scenes for years? What would the consequences have been for the faithful in China? We are certainly not talking about the somewhat folkloric ‘self-consecrations’ witnessed earlier this month in Écône. What would have happened to the bishops in China? The Pope must have concluded that a degree of stabilisation is better than chaos and that it is preferable (for the time being) to have a relationship structured by a written agreement rather than nothing at all. Even though the restrictions on religious freedom and worship are glaringly obvious, as repeatedly denounced by independent observers (including Catholics) who have been documenting events in China for years: from the ban on minors attending Mass to the prohibition – in some provinces – of ‘noisy’ liturgical hymns. Not to mention, of course, the oaths of allegiance to the supreme leader and the obligation to display portraits of Xi Jinping in churches. In the long term, however, it is by no means certain that things will remain this way. These are not mere dark premonitions. They are the Pope’s own words.