The Great War in the Red Sea. A report by Med-Or

Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz; the Houthis contest Bab el-Mandeb. The Red Sea is the scene of the ‘great war’ – a term that, until two and a half years ago, would have been considered, at the very least, an exaggeration. Yet now, on the contrary, the Red Sea is at the heart of numerous questions and complex situations. Some of these are addressed in the scenarios and risks outlined by the Med-Or Italian Foundation in its report “La grande guerra del Mar Rosso”, presented today in Rome. 

Introduced by Andrea Manciulli, the first session featured contributions from Umberto Tavolato, Luigi Di Maio, Abdul Mohammed, Cecilia Piccioni and Enrico Vignola. The second session, moderated by Matilde Vecchioni, assessed the economic and industrial implications of the crisis, with Gabriele Maria Cafaro, Edoardo D’Andrea, Vittoria Villa, Gaetano Mazzitelli, Simone Nisi and Fabio Panunzi Capuano.

The overcoming of the friend-foe dichotomy, the emergence of quantum diplomacy, and the intertwining of the crises in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea have created a geographical landscape fraught with consequences. These are far from being merely regional in scope.

In this regard, the focus of the study – by Tavolato and Chepkorir Sambu – is on three risks to monitor, starting with the spillover from Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb. That is to say, the possibility of a second front should the situation with Tehran deteriorate to the point of disrupting the gradual return of shipping companies to the Suez route. No less crucial, moreover, is the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which today harbours the possibility of open conflict. Here, the hostility between the two states – fuelled by issues regarding access to the sea and the situation in Tigray – risks weakening control over the Eritrean coast, opposite Yemen. Finally, the third point concerns the weakening of Somalia and the strengthening of Al-Shabaab’s Salafi-jihadist movement. The weakness of the federal authorities and the vigour of the terrorist movement – active in Somalia and the Horn of Africa – are, as is well known, inversely proportional. The report therefore examines the gradual erosion of Mogadishu’s governing capacity and Al-Shabaab’s objective of overthrowing it.

The document’s guidelines in this regard are geared towards strengthening the European presence. Without downplaying regional agreements, the EUNAVFOR ASPIDES and ATALANTA missions are highlighted in red. The first, a defensive mission, was launched in 2024 to protect merchant shipping with a specific de-escalation mandate extended to surrounding areas. The second – ATALANTA – dates back to 2008. Its mandate encompasses numerous tasks, including combating arms trafficking and contributing to the embargo against Al-Shabaab (as well as monitoring the so-called Russian ‘shadow fleet’). Extended until February 2027, ATALANTA sees Italy among the main contributing countries, deploying a naval vessel, two aircraft and approximately 198 military personnel.

From this point onwards, then, the Med-Or report emphasises the need for support for political stability on both sides, no less than the involvement of Italian and European companies in the development of new routes between the Gulf and East Africa – be they commercial, energy-related or digital. 

A common thread, however, runs through Italy. Its central role is evident on three fronts: trade, energy and submarine cables. In terms of energy, the blockage or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz effectively elevates the Red Sea to the status of an essential safety valve. Whilst the fragility of this corridor exposes Europe to significant repercussions on energy costs, it also opens up the possibility of trans-Egyptian links to the Mediterranean, which are becoming increasingly essential for continental security and the supply of Saudi crude oil.

But ultimately, the game is played out in the realm of global connectivity. As the authors of the report point out, Bab el-Mandeb is in fact a crucial hub for submarine cables that link the continents. While Italy is already a natural landing point for these backbones, it becomes all the more vulnerable in a context of profound maritime insecurity, with the risk of deliberate or accidental damage that may not be promptly repaired by specialised vessels.

Ultimately, therefore, the stability of the wider Mediterranean is not a foreign policy option but a categorical imperative. All the more so given that the war, which is also affecting us, has quickly escalated into a ‘major’ conflict.