Too rational, the reformists need to rethink their approach if they are to have any influence on the left

Has reformism gone out of fashion? It would certainly seem so, judging by the many people in political debate – not just in Italy – who opt for the most extreme and radicalised words and ideas. On both the right and the left, this seems to be the prevailing mood of the times we are living in. But beware: it is above all on the left that this spirit is doing the most harm. Admittedly, democratic countries are currently experiencing a crisis amongst the major popular parties that guided the post-war era and the establishment of both NATO and the European Union. Within this crisis, the left faces a specific challenge, which often leaves it unable to articulate anything beyond the weary repetition of clichés. The left is the political force that has identified itself with the welfare state and the great social achievements of the twentieth century, founded on labour relations and a national dimension of democracy that no longer hold true today. It is also the side which, in more recent times, has identified with an unambiguously optimistic view of globalisation, failing to see the problems it has caused – those problems of disorientation and insecurity that have brought about the shift to the right currently taking place in all democracies. The right is capitalising on this insecurity; the left needs a new way of thinking. And this is where the reformists have a role to play – they are the only ones who can offer a vision capable of charting new paths: those of a courageously liberal left, capable of shifting paradigms when the world is changing so profoundly.

Even the reformists, however, need to rethink their approach somewhat. Among their many virtues, they have one flaw: that of being too rational. Politics is not just about rationality; it is also about emotions, and the ability to recognise and mobilise them. Let us consider the issue that is currently the most important for the reformists: Europe’s commitment to the defence of Ukraine. Is it enough to talk about weapons, borders and international law? It would seem not, judging by the lukewarm response from European public opinion, apart from those who feel directly threatened by Russia. So the discourse needs to be revised and broadened somewhat. Certainly, Putin attacked Ukraine to prevent the "democratic contagion" that might have resulted. But there is also a cultural or ideological element, which Putin himself made abundantly clear in the speech he gave a couple of days before the invasion. It is the concept of the Russian world, the ‘russkij mir’. Ukraine cannot be allowed to go its own way because it is part of the Russian world. Why emphasise this point? Because it tells us something important about the role of political myths. Even in an autocracy where public opinion is repressed and stifled, such as Russia, political myths serve to cement support for the autocrat. Certainly not the support of the young men who enlist to send a bit of money home to their families, but nevertheless, even in Russia there is a segment of support, particularly amongst the elites, that props up Putin; without it, Putin would fall.

Even more important is the role of political myth in democracies. Let us consider France. Could Macron’s call to defend the Republic have been made in Italy? For us Italians, the Republic is an institutional framework. For the French, it is a national myth encompassing the storming of the Bastille, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, and the armies of the Revolution.

What I mean is that cultural and ideological aspects are important and must be considered carefully. Of course, a political myth is not constructed at a desk. It is born in the crucible of history, provided one recognises the role of political sentiments. For some time now, there has been talk of sentiments in politics, but the focus has been solely on fear. Yet the sentiments involved in national identity, which stir the heart, also matter. Sentiments that we consider right-wing but which are not, even though the right is accustomed to exploiting them. We must seek a reformist left-wing interpretation of these sentiments. For example, simply saying ‘if you want peace, defend democracy’ (copyright Giorgio Tonini) is a step towards creating a unifying myth – Europe as a land of democracy – which goes beyond the mere technical and legal transfer of sovereignty. The sense of belonging to the national community is not something that can be ignored or dismissed; Europe will work if we manage to transfer, at least in part, this sense of belonging to it.